The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2

Some such shadowy view of the evolution of the centres, of the relation of consciousness to them, and of the hemi spheres to the other lobes, is, it seems to me, that in which it is safest to indulge. If it has no other advantage, it at any rate makes us realize how enormous are the gaps in our knowledge, the moment we try to cover the facts by any one formula of a general kind. THE elementary properties of nerve-tissue on which the brain-functions depend are far from being satisfactorily made out. The scheme that suggests itself in the first instance to the mind, because it is so obvious, is certainly false: I mean the notion that each cell stands for an idea or part of an idea, and that the ideas are associated or 'bound into bundles' (to use a phrase of Locke's) by the fibres. If we make a symbolic diagram on a blackboard, of the laws of association between ideas, we are inevitably led to draw circles, or closed figures of some kind, and to connect them by lines. When we hear that the nerve-cen tres contain cells which send off fibres, we say that Nature has realized our diagram for us, and that the mechanical substratum of thought is plain. In some way, it is true, oui diagram must be realized in the brain ; but surely in no such visible and palpable way as we at first suppose.* An enormous number of the cellular bodies in the hemispheres are fibreless. Where fibres are sent off they soon divide into untraceable ramifications ; and nowhere do we see a simple coarse anatomical connection, like a line on the black board, between two cells. Too much anatomy has been found to order for theoretic purposes, even by the anat omists ; and the popular-science notions of cells and fibres are almost wholly wide of the truth. Let us therefore rele gate the subject of the intimate workings of the brain to

* I shall myself in later places indulge in much of this schematization. The reader will understand once for all that it is symbolic; and that the use of it is hardly more than to show what a deep congruity there is between mental processes and mechanical processes of some kind, not necessarily p* the exact kind portrayed. the physiology of the future, save in respect to a few points of which a word must now be said. And first of in the same nerve-tract. This is a property extremely im portant for the understanding of a great many phenomena of the neural, and consequently of the mental, life ; and it behooves us to gain a clear conception of what it means be fore we proceed any farther.

The law is this, that a stimuli^ which itiould be inadequate by itself to excite a nerve-centre to effective discharge may, by acting ivith one or more other stimuli (equally ineffectual by themselves alone) bring the discharge about. The natural way to con sider this is as a summation of tensions which at last over come a resistance. The first of them produce a 'latent excitement ' or a ' heightened irritability ' — the phrase is immaterial so far as practical consequences go ; the last is the straw which breaks the camel's back. Where the neural process is one that has consciousness for its accom paniment, the final explosion would in all cases seem to involve a vivid state of feeling of a more or less substantive kind. But there is no ground for supposing that the ten sions whilst yet submaximal or outwardly ineffective, may not also have a share in determining the total conscious ness present in the individual at the time. In later chapters we shall see abundant reason to suppose that they do have such a share, and that without their contribution the fringe of relations which is at every moment a vital in gredient of the mind's object, would not come to conscious ness at all.

The subject belongs too much to physiology for the evidence to be cited in detail in these pages. I will throw into a note a few references for such readers as may be in> terested in following it out,* and simply say that the direct * Valentin: Archiv f. d. gesanimt. Physiol., 1873, p. 458. Stirling: Leipzig Acad. Berichte, 1875, p. 372 (Journal of Physiol., 1875). J Ward : Archiv f. (Anut. u.) Physiol., 1880, p. 72. H. Sewall : Johns Hopkins Studies, 1880, p. 30. Kronecker u. Nicolaides : Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1880, p. 437. Exner : Archiv f. die ges. Physiol., Bd. 28, p. 487 (1882). Eckhard : in Hermann's Hdbch. d. Physiol., Bd. i/Thl.' u. p. 31. Frangors-Franck : Lecons sur les Fonctions tuotrices du Cer-

electrical irritation of the cortical centres sufficiently proves the point. For it was found by the earliest experimenters here that whereas it takes an exceedingly strong current to produce any movement when a single induction-shock is used, a rapid succession of induction-shocks (' faradiza tion ') will produce movements when the current is com paratively weak. A single quotation from an excellent investigation will exhibit this law under further aspects :

" If wo continue to stimulate the cortex at short intervals with the strength of current which produces the minimal muscular contrac tion [of the dog's digital extensor muscle], the amount of contraction gradually increases till it reaches the maximum. Each earlier stimula tion leaves thus an effect behind it, which increases the efficacy of the following one. In this summation of the stimuli .... the following points may be noted : 1) Single stimuli entirely inefficacious when alone may become efficacious by sufficiently rapid reiteration. If the current used is very much less than that which provokes the first begin ning of contraction, a very large number of successive shocks may be needed before the movement appears — 20, 50, once 106 shocks were needed. 2) The summation takes place easily in proportion to the shortness of the interval between the stimuli. A current too weak to give effective summation when its shocks are 3 seconds apart will be capable of so doing when the interval is shortened to 1 second. 3) Not only electrical irritation leaves a modification which goes to swell the following stimulus, but every sort of irritant which can produce a contraction does so. If in any way a reflex contraction of the muscle experimented on has been produced, or if it is contracted spontaneously by the animal (as not unfrequently happens 'by sympathy,' during a deep inspiration), it is found that an electrical stimulus, until then inoperative, operates energetically if immediately applied." *

"In a certain stage of the morphia-narcosis an ineffectively weak shock will become powerfully effective, if, immediately before its appli- *Bubnoff und Heidenhain : UeberErreguugsuncl Hemmmigsvorgauge innerhalb der motorisclieii Hirucentren. Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 156(1881). cation to the motor centre, the skin of certain parts of the body is exposed to gentle tactile stimulation. ... If, having ascertained the subminimal strength of current and convinced one's self repeatedly of its inefficacy, we draw our hand a single time lightly over the skin of the paw whose cortical centre is the object of stimulation, we find the cur rent at once strongly effective. The increase of irritability lasts some seconds before it disappears. Sometimes th 3 effect of a single light stroking of the paw is only sufficient to make the previously ineffectual current produce a very weak contraction. Repeating the tactile stimu lation will then, as a rule, increase the contraction's extent." *

We constantly use the summation of stimuli in our practical appeals. If a car-horse balks, the final way of starting him is by applying a number of customary incite ments at once. If the driver uses reins and voice, if one bystander pulls at his head, another lashes his hind quarters, and the conductor rings the bell, and the dis mounted passengers shove the car, all at the same moment, his obstinacy generally yields, and he goes on his way re joicing. If we are striving to remember a lost name or fact, we think of as many ' cues ' as possible, so that by their joint action they may recall what no one of them can recall alone. The sight of a dead prey will often not stimulate a beast to pursuit, but if the sight of movement be added to that of form, pursuit occurs. " Briicke noted that his brain less hen, which made no attempt to peck at the grain under her very eyes, began pecking if the grain were thrown on the ground with force, so as to produce a rattling sound." t "Dr. Allen Thomson hatched out some chickens on a carpet, where he kept them for several days. They showed no in clination to scrape, . . . but when Dr. Thomson sprinkled a little gravel on the carpet, . . . the chickens immediately began their scraping movements." J A strange person, and darkness, are both of them stimuli to fear and mistrust in dogs (and for the matter of that, in men). Neither circum-

* Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 176 (1881). Exner thinks (ibid. Bd. 28, p. 497 (1882) ) that the summation here occurs in the spinal cord. It makes no difference where this particular summation occurs, so far as the general philosophy of summation ?oes. f G H. Lewes : Physical Basis of Mind, p. 479, where many similar examples are given, 487-9. stance alone may awaken outward manifestations, but to gether, i.e. when the strange man is met in the dark, the dog will be excited to violent defiance. * Street-hawkers well know the efficacy of summation, for they arrange themselves in a line upon the sidewalk, and the passer often buys from the last one of them, through the effect of the reiterated so licitation, what he refused to buy from the first in tne row. Aphasia shows many examples of summation. A patient who cannot name an object simply shown him, will name it if he touches as well as sees it, etc.

Instances of summation might be multiplied indefinitely, but it is hardly worth while to forestall subsequent chapters. Those on Instinct, the Stream of Thought, Attention, Dis crimination, Association, Memory, ^Esthetics, and Will, will contain numerous exemplifications of the reach of the prin ciple in the purely psychological field. One of the lines of experimental investigation most diligently followed of late years is that of the ascertain ment of the time occupied by nervous events. Helmholtz led off by discovering the rapidity of the current in the sciatic nerve of the frog. But the methods he used were soon applied to the sensory nerves and the centres, and the results caused much popular scientific admiration when described as measurements of the ' velocity of thought.' The phrase ' quick as thought ' had from time immemorial signified all that was wonderful and elusive of determina tion in the line of speed ; and the way in which Science laid her doomful hand upon this mystery reminded people of the day when Franklin first ' eripuit ccelo fulmen,' fore-

* See a similar instance in Mach : Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 36, a sparrow being the animal. My young children are afraid of their own pug-dog, if he enters their room after they are in bed and the lights are out. Compare this statement also : " The first question to a peasant seldom proves more than a flapper to rouse the torpid adjustments of his ears. The invariable answer of a Scottish peasant is, 'What's your wull? ' — that of the English, a vacant stare. A second and even a third question may be required to elicit an answer." (R. Fowler: Some Obser vations on the Mental State of the Blind, and Deaf, and Dumb (Salisbury, 1843), p. 14.)

shadowing the reign of a newer and colder race of gods, We shall take up the various operations measured, each in the chapter to which it more naturally pertains. I may say, however, immediately, that the phrase ' velocity of thought ' is misleading, for it is by no means clear in any of the cases what particular act of thought occurs during the time which is measured. ' Velocity of nerve-action ' is liable to the same criticism, for in most cases we do not know what particular nerve-processes occur. What the times in question really represent is the total duration of certain reactions upon stimuli. Certain of the conditions of the reac tion are prepared beforehand ; they consist in the assump tion of those motor and sensory tensions which we name the expectant state. Just what happens during the actual time occupied by the reaction (in other words, just what is added to the pre-existent tensions to produce the actual discharge) is not made out at present, either from the neural or from the mental point of view.

The method is essentially the same in all these investiga tions. A signal of some sort is communicated to the subject, and at the same instant records itself on a time-register ing apparatus. The subject then makes a muscular move ment of some sort, which is the * reaction,' and which also records itself automatically. The time found to have elapsed between the two records is the total time of that observation. The time-registering instruments are of various types.

One type is that of the revolving drum covered with smoLed paper, on which one electric pen traces a line which the signal breaks and the ( reaction ' draws again ; whilst another electric pen (connected with a pendulum or a rod of metal vibrating at a known rate) traces alongside of the former line a ' time-line ' of which each undulation or link stands for a certain fraction of a second, and against which the break in the reaction-line can be measured. Compare Fig. 21, where the line is broken by the signal at the first arrow, and continued again by the reaction at the second. Ludwig's Kymograph, Marey's Chronograph are good ex amples of this type of instrument.

Another type of instrument is represented by the stop watch, of which the most perfect form is Hipp's Chronoscope. The hand on the dial measures intervals as short as j-fas of a second. The signal (by an appropriate electric FIG. 2-2.— Bowditeh's Reaction-timer. F, tuning-fork carrying a little plate which holds the paper on which the electric pen M makes the tracing, and sliding in grooves on the base-board. P, a plug which spreads the prongs of the fork apart when it is pushed forward to its extreme limit, and releases them when it is drawn back to a certain point. The fork then vibrates, and, its backward movement con tinuing, an undulating line is drawn on the smoked paper by the pen. At T is a tongue fixed to the carriage of the fork, and at K an electric key which the tongue opens and with which the electric pen is connected. At the instant of opening, the t>en changes its place and the undulating line is drawn at a different level on the paper. The opening can be made to serve as a signal to the reacter in a variety of ways, and his reaction can be made to close the pen again, when the line re turns to its first level. The reaction time = the number of undulations traced at the second level.

connection) starts it ; the reaction stops it ; and by reading off its initial and terminal positions we have immediately and with no farther trouble the time we seek. A still simpler instrument, though one not very satisfactory in its working, is the ' psychodometer ' of Exner & Obersteiner, of which I picture a modification devised by my colleague Professor H. P. Bowditch, which works very well. The manner in which the signal and reaction are con nected with the chronographic apparatus varies indefinitely

in different experiments. Every new problem requires some new electric or mechanical disposition of apparatus.* The least complicated time-measurement is that known as simple reaction-time, in which there is but one possible signal and one possible movement, and both are known in advance. The movement is generally the closing of an elec tric key with the hand. The foot, the jaw, the lips, even the eyelid, have been in turn made organs of reaction, and the apparatus has been modified accordingly, f The time usually elapsing between stimulus and movement lies be tween one and three tenths of a second, varying according to circumstances which will be mentioned anon.

The subject of experiment, whenever the reactions are short and regular, is in a state of extreme tension, and feels, when the signal comes, as if it started the reaction, by a sort of fatality, and as if no psychic process of perception or volition had a chance to intervene. The whole succession is so rapid that perception seems to be retrospective, and the time-order of events to be read off in memory rather than known at the moment. This at least is my own per sonal experience in the matter, and with it I find others to agree. The question is, What happens inside of us, either in brain or mind ? and to answer that we must analyze just what processes the reaction involves. It is evident that some time is lost in each of the following stages :

1. The stimulus excites the peripheral sense-organ adequately for a current to pass into the sensory nerve ; 3. The transformation (or reflection) of the sensory into a motor current occurs in the centres ; 5. The motor current excites the muscle to the contract ing point. * The reader will find a great deal about chronographic apparatus in J. Marey : La Methode Grapbique, pt. n. chap. n. One can make pretty fair measurements with no other instrument than a watch, by making a large number of reactions, each serving as a signal for the following one, and dividing the total time they take by their number. Dr. O. W. Holmes first suggested this method, which has been ingeniously elaborated and applied by Professor Jastrow. See Science ' for September 10. 1886.

Time is also lost, of course, outside the muscle, in the joints, skin, etc., and between the parts of the apparatus ; and when the stimulus which serves as signal is applied to the skin of the trunk or limbs, time is lost in the sensorial conduction through the spinal cord. The stage marked 3 is the only one that interests us here. The other stages answer to purely physiological processes, but stage 3 is psycho-physical ; that is, it is a higher-central process, and has probably some sort of con sciousness accompanying it. What sort?

Wundt has little difficulty in deciding that it is con sciousness of a quite elaborate kind. He distinguishes between two stages in the conscious reception of an im pression, calling one perception, and the other apperception, and likening the one to the mere entrance of an object into the periphery of the field of vision, and the other to its coming to occupy the focus or point of view. Inattentive aivareness of an object, and attention to it, are, it seems to me, equivalents for perception and apperception, as Wundt uses the words. To these two forms of awareness of the impression Wundt adds the conscious volition to react, gives to the trio the name of ' psycho-physical ' processes, and assumes that they actually follow upon each other in the succession in which they have been named. * So at least I understand him. The simplest way to determine the time taken up by this psycho-physical stage No. 3 would be to determine separately the duration of the sev eral purely physical processes, 1, 2, 4, and 5, and to sub tract them from the total reaction-time. Such attempts have been made, t But the data for calculation are too

* Physiol. Psych., n. 221-2. Cf. also the first edition, 728-9. I must confess to finding all Wundt's utterances about 'apperception ' both vacil lating and obscure. I see no use whatever for the word, as he employs it, in Psychology. Attention, perception, conception, volition, are its ample equivalents. Why we should need a single word to denote all these things by turns, Wundt fails to make clear. Consult, however, his pupil Staude's article, ' Ueber den Begriff der Apperception,' etc., in Wundt's periodical Philosophische Studien, i. 149, which may be supposed official. For a minute criticism of Wundt's 'apperception,' see Marty. Vierteljahrschrift f. wiss. Philos. , x. 346.

inaccurate for use, and, as Wundt himself admits, * the pre cise duration of stage 3 must at present be left enveloped with that of the other processes, in the total reaction-time. My own belief is that no such succession of conscious feelings as Wundt describes takes place during stage 3. It is a process of central excitement and discharge, with which doubtless some feeling coexists, but ivhat feeling we cannot tell, because it is so fugitive and so immediately eclipsed by the more substantive and enduring memory of the impression as it came in, and of the executed move ment of response. Feeling of the impression, attention to it, thought of the reaction, volition to react, ivould, undoubt edly, all be links of the process under other conditions, f and would lead to the same reaction — after an indefinitely longer time. But these other conditions are not those of the experiments we are discussing ; and it is mythological psy chology (of which we shall see many later examples) to con clude that because two mental processes lead to the same result they must be similar in their inward subjective con stitution. The feeling of stage 3 is certainly no articulate perception. It can be nothing but the mere sense of a reflex discharge. The reaction ivhose time is measured is, in short, a reflex action pure and simple, and not a psychic act. A foregoing psychic condition is, it is true, a pre requisite for this reflex action. The preparation of the attention and volition ; the expectation of the signal and the readiness of the hand to move, the instant it shall come ; the nervous tension in which the subject waits, are all con ditions of the formation in him for the time being of a new path or arc of reflex discharge.

The tract from the senseorgan which receives the stimulus, into the motor centre which discharges the reaction, is already tingling with pre monitory innervation, is raised to such a pitch of heightened irritability by the expectant attention, that the signal is instantaneously sufficient to cause the overflow.^ No other * P. 222. Cf. also Riohet, Rev. Philos., vi. 395-6. ~ t For instance, if, on the previous day, one had resolved to act on a signal when it should come, and it now came whilst we were engaged in other things, and reminded us of the resolve.

£ " I need hardly mention that success in these experiments depends in a high degree on our concentration of attention. If inattentive, one gets tract of the nervous system is, at the moment, in this hairtrigger condition. The consequence is that one sometimes responds to a ivrong signal, especially if it be an impression of the same kind with the signal we expect.* But if by chance we are tired, or the signal is unexpectedly weak, and we do not react instantly, but only after an express perception that the signal has come, and an express voli tion, the time becomes quite disproportionately long (a second or more, according to Exner t), and we feel that the process is in nature altogether different.

In fact, the reaction-time experiments are a case to which we can immediately apply what we have just learned about the summation of stimuli. ' Expectant attention ' is but the subjective name for what objectively is a partial stimulation of a certain pathway, the pathway from the 4 centre ' for the signal to that for the discharge. In Chapter XI we shall see that all attention involves excitement from within of the tract concerned in feeling the objects to which attention is given. The tract here is the excito-motor arc about to be traversed. The signal is but the spark from without which touches off a train already laid. The per formance, under these conditions, exactly resembles any reflex action. The only difference is that whilst, in the ordinarily so-called reflex acts, the reflex arc is a permanent result of organic growth, it is here a transient result of previous cerebral conditions. ;£

very discrepant figures. . . . This concentration of the attention is in the highest degree exhausting. After some experiments in which I was con cerned to get results as uniform as possible, I was covered witli perspiration and excessively fatigued although I had sat quietly in my chair all the while." (Exner, loc. cit. vn. 618.) \ In short, what M. Delboeuf calls an 'organe adventice.' The reactiontime, moreover, is quite compatible with the reaction itself being of a reflex order. Some reflexes (sneezing, e.g.) are very slow. The only timemeasurement of a reflex act in the human subject with which I am acquainted is Exner's measurement of winking (in Pfliiger's Archiv f. d. gesammt. Physiol., Bd. vui. p. 526, 1874). He found that when the stimulus was a flash of light it took the wink 0.2168 sec. to occur. A strong electric shock to the cornea shortened the time to 0.0578 sec. The ordinary ' reaction-time ' is midway between these values. Exuer ' reduces ' his times by eliminating the physiological process of conduction. His 'reduced

I am happy to say that since the preceding paragraphs (and the notes thereto appertaining) were written, Wundt has himself become converted to the view which I defend. He now admits that in the shortest reactions "there is neither apperception nor will, but that they are merely brain-reflexes due to practice." * The means of his conver. sion are certain experiments performed in his laboratory by Herr L. Lange, t who was led to distinguish between two ways of setting the attention in reacting on a signal, and who found that they gave very different time-results. In the ' extreme sensorial ' way, as Lange calls it, of reacting,

minimum winking-time' is then 0.0471 (ibid. 531), whilst his reduced reac tion-time is 0.0828 (itrid. vn. 637). These figures have really no scientific value beyond that of showing, according to Exner's own belief (vn. 531), that reaction-time and reflex-time measure processes of essentially the same order. His description, moreover, of the process is an excellent description of a reflex act. ' ' Every one," says he, " who makes reaction-time experi ments for the first time is surprised to find how little he is master of his own movements, so soon as it becomes a question of executing them with a maximum of speed. Not only does their energy lie, as it were, outside the field of choice, but even the time in which the movement occurs depends only partly upon ourselves. We jerk our arm, and we can afterwards tell with astonishing precision whether we have jerked it quicker or slower than another time, although we have no power to jerk it exactly at the wished-for moment." — Wundt himself admits that when we await a strong signal with tense preparation there is no consciousness of any duality of ' appercep tion ' and motor response; the two are continuous (Physiol. Psych., II. 226).— Mr. Cattell's view is identical with the one I defend. "I think," he says, "that if the processes of perception and willing are present at all they are very rudimentary. . . . The subject, by a voluntary effort [before the signal comes], puts the lines of communication between the centre for" the stimulus " and the centre for the co-ordination of motions . .. in a state of unstable equilibrium.

When, therefore, a nervous impulse reaches the" former centre, " it causes brain-changes in two directions; an impulse moves along to the cortex and calls forth there a perception corresponding to the stimulus, while at the same time an impulse follows a line of small resist ance to the centre for the co-ordination of motions, and the proper nervous impulse, already prepared and waiting for the signal, is sent from the centre to the muscle of the hand. When the reaction has often been made the entire cerebral process becomes automatic, the impulse of itself takes the well-travelled way to the motor centre, and releases the motor impulse." (Mind, xi. 232-3.)— Finally, Prof. Lipps has, in his elaborate way (Grundtatsachen, 179-188), made mince-meat of the view that stage 3 involves either conscious perception 01 conscious will.