The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2

Second Jf^kf'- Iu a^ acquired dexterities and habits, secondarilj^BDmatic performances as they are called, we do what or^finally required a chain of deliberately con scious perceptions and volitions. As the actions still keep their intelligent character, intelligence must still preside over their execution. But since our consciousness seems all the while elsewhere engaged, such intelligence must consist of unconscious perceptions, inferences, and volitions.

Reply. There is more than one alternative explanation in accordance with larger bodies of fact. One is that the perceptions and volitions in habitual actions may be per formed consciously, only so quickly and inattentively that no memory of them remains. Another is that the conscious ness of these actions exists, but is split-off from the rest of the consciousness of the hemispheres. We shall find in Chapter X numerous proofs of the reality of this split-off condition of portions of consciousness. Since in man the hemispheres indubitably co-operate in these secondarily automatic acts, it will not do to say either that they occur without consciousness or that their consciousness is that of the lower centres, which we know nothing about. But either lack of memory or split-off cortical consciousness will certainly account for all of the facts.f

Third Proof. Thinking of A, we presently find our selves thinking of C. Now B is the natural logical link between A and C, but we have no consciousness of having thought of B. It must have been in our mind ' wwcon- * J. S. Mill, Exam, of Hamilton, chap. xv. f Cf. Dugald Stewart, Elements, chap. n. sciously,' and in that state affected the sequence of oui ideas. Reply. Here again we have a choice between more plausible explanations. Either B was consciously there, but the next instant forgotten, or its brain-tract alone was adequate to do the whole work of coupling A with C, with out the idea B being aroused at all, whether consciously or 'unconsciously.'

Fourth Proof. Problems unsolved when we go to bed are found solved in the morning when we wak^ Somnam bulists do rational things. We awaken pi^^kally at an hour predetermined overnight, etc. Uncons^HI thinking, volition, time-registration, etc., must have presided over these acts. Fifth Proof. Some patients will often, in an attack of epileptiform unconsciousness, go through complicated processes, such as eating a dinner in a restaurant and pay ing for it, or making a violent homicidal attack. In trance, artificial or pathological, long and complex performances, involving the use of the reasoning powers, are executed, of which the patient is wholly unaware on coming to.

Reply. Rapid and complete oblivescence is certainly the explanation here. The analogue again is hypnotism. Tell the subject of an hypnotic trance, during his trance, that he will remember, and he may remember everything perfectly when he awakes, though without your telling him no memory would have remained. The extremely rapid oblivescence of common dreams is a familiar fact. Sixth Proof. In a musical concord the vibrations of the several notes are in relatively simple ratios. The mind must unconsciously count the vibrations, and be pleased by the simplicity which it finds.

Reply. The brain-process produced by the simple ratios may be as directly agreeable as the conscious process of comparing them would be. No counting, either conscious or 'unconscious,' is required. Seventh Proof. Every hour we make theoretic judgments and emotional reactions, and exhibit practical tendencies, for which wre can give no explicit logical justification, but which are good inferences from certain premises. We know more than we can say. Our conclusions run ahead of our power to analyze their grounds. A child, ignorant of the axiom that two things equal to the same are equal to each other, applies it nevertheless in his concrete judgments unerringly. A boor will use the dictum de omni et nullo who is unable to understand it in abstract terms.

" We seldom consciously think how our house is painted, what the shade of it is,^hat the pattern of our furniture is, or whether the door opens to thn^^^t or left, or out or in. But how quickly should we notice a chai^^B any of these things ! Think of the door you have most often opSR, and tell, if you can, whether it opens to the right or left, out or in. Yet when you open the door you never put the hand on the wrong side to find the latch, nor try to push it when it opens with a pull. . . . What is the precise characteristic in your friend's step that enables you to recognize it when he is coming ? Did you ever con sciously think the idea, ' if I run into a solid piece of matter I shall get hurt, or be hindered in my progress ' ? and do you avoid running into obstacles because you ever distinctly conceived, or consciously acquired and thought, that idea?"*

Most of our knowledge is at all times potential. We act in accordance with the whole drift of what we have learned, but few items rise into consciousness at the time. Many of them, however, we may recall at will. All this co operation of unrealized principles and facts, of potential knowledge, with our actual thought is quite inexplicable unless we suppose the perpetual existence of an immense mass of ideas in an unconscious state, all of them exerting a steady pressure and influence upon our conscious thinking, and many of them in such continuity with it as ever and anon to become conscious themselves.

Reply. No such mass of ideas is supposable. .But there are all kinds of short-cuts in the brain ; and processes not aroused strongly enough to give any ' idea ' distinct enough to be a premise, may, nevertheless, help to determine just that resultant process of whose psychic accompaniment the said idea would be a premise, if the idea existed at all. A certain overtone may be a feature of my friend's voice, and may conspire with the other tones thereof to arouse in my brain the process which suggests to my consciousness his name. And yet I may be ignorant of the overtone per se, and unable, even when he speaks, to tell whether it be there or no. It leads me to the idea of the name ; but it pro duces in me no such cerebral process as that to which the ' idea of the overtone would correspond. And similarly of our learning. Each subject we learn leaves behind it a modifi cation of the brain, which makes it impossible for the latter to react upon things just as it did before ; an^the result of the difference may be a tendency to act, thou^^ith no idea, much as we should if we were consciously WRing about the subject. The becoming conscious of tli^Tatter at will is equally readily explained as a result of the brain-modifi cation. This, as Wundt phrases it, is a ' predisposition ' to bring forth the conscious idea of the original subject, a pre disposition which other stimuli and brain-processes may convert into an actual result. But such a predisposition is no 'unconscious idea;' it is only a particular collocation of \/ the molecules in certain tracts of the brain.

Eighth Proof. Instincts, as pursuits of ends by appro priate means, are manifestations of intelligence ; but as the ends are not foreseen, the intelligence must be unconscious. Reply. Chapter XXIV will show that all the phenomena of instinct are explicable as actions of the nervous system, mechanically discharged by stimuli to the senses. Ninth Proof. In sense-perception we have results in abundance, which can only be explained as conclusions drawn by a process of unconscious inference from data given to sense. A small human image on the retina is referred, not to a pygmy, but to a distant man of normal size. A certain gray patch is inferred to be a white object seen in a dim light. Often the inference leads us astray : e.g., pale gray against pale green looks red, because we take a wrong premise to argue from. We think a green film is spread over everything; and knowing that under such a film a red thing would look gray, we wrongly infer from the gray appearance that a red thing must be there. Our study of space-perception in Chapter XYIII will give abundant additional examples both of the truthful andilhi'

sory percepts which have been explained to result from unconscious logic operations. Reply. That Chapter will also in many cases refute this explanation. Color- and light-contrast are certainly purely sensational affairs, in which inference plays no part. This has been satisfactorily proved by Hering,* and shall be treated of again in Chapter XVII. Our rapid judg ments of size, shape, distance, and the like, are best ex- \ / plained as processes ^ i simple cerebral association. Cer tain sense-impressions directly stimulate brain-tracts, of whose activity ready-made conscious percepts are the immediate psychic counterparts. They do this by a mech anism either connate or acquired by habit. It is to be remarked that Wundt and Helmholtz, who in their earlier writings did more than any one to give vogue to the notion that unconscious inference is a vital factor in sense-percep tion, have seen fit on later occasions to modify their views and to admit that results like those of reasoning may accrue without any actual reasoning process unconsciously taking place. f Maybe the excessive and riotous applications made by Hartmann of their principle have led them to this change. It would be natural to feel towards him as the sailor in the story felt towards the horse who got his foot into the stirrup, — " If you're going to get on, I must get off." V

Hartmann fairly boxes the compass of the universe with the principle of unconscious thought. For him there is no namable thing that does not exemplify it. But his logic is so lax and his failure to consider the most obvious alter natives so complete that it would, on the whole, be a waste of time to look at his arguments in detail. The same is true of Schopenhauer, in whom the mythology reaches its climax. The visual perception, for example, of an object in space results, according to him, from the intellect performing the following operations, all unconscious. First, it apprehends the inverted retinal image and turns it right side up, constructing flat space as a preliminary operation ;

then it computes from the angle of convergence of the eye balls that the two retinal images must be the projection of but a single object; thirdly, it constructs the third dimen sion and sees this object solid; fourthly, it assigns its dis tance; and fifthly, in each and all of these operations it gets the objective character of what it ' constructs ' by uncon sciously inferring it as the only possible cause of some sen sation which it unconsciously feels.* Comment on this seems hardly called for. It is, as I said, pure mythology.

None of these facts, then, appealed to so confidently in proof of the existence of ideas in an unconscious state, prove anything of the sort. They prove either that con scious ideas were present which the next instant were forgotten ; or they prove that certain results, similar to results of reasoning, may bo wrought out by rapid brainprocesses to which no ideation seems attached. But there is one more argument to be alleged, less obviously insuffi cient than those which we have reviewed, and demanding a new sort of reply.

Tenth Proof. There is a great class of experiences in our mental life which may be described as discoveries that a subjective condition which we have been having is really something different from what we had supposed. We sud denly find ourselves bored by a thing which we thought we were enjoying well enough ; or in love with a person whom we imagined we only liked. Or else we deliberately ana lyze our motives, and find that at bottom they contain jealousies and cupidities which we little suspected to be there. Oar feelings towards people are perfect wells of motivation, unconscious of itself, which introspection brings to light. And our sensations likewise : we constantly dis cover new elements in sensations which we have been in the habit of receiving all our days, elements, too, which have been there from the first, since otherwise we should have been unable to distinguish the sensations containing them from others nearly allied. The elements must exist, for we use them to discriminate by ; but they must exist in

an unconscious state, since we so completely fail to single them out.* The books of the analytic school of psychol ogy abound in examples of the kind. Who knows the countless associations that mingle with his each and every thought? Who can pick apart all the nameless i'eelings that stream in at every moment from his various internal organs, muscles, heart, glands, lungs, etc., and compose in their totality his sense of bodily life ? Who is aware of the part played by feelings of innervation and suggestions of possible muscular exertion in all his judgments of distance, shape, and size ? Consider, too, the difference between a sensation which we simply have and one which we attend to. Attention gives results that seem like fresh creations ; and yet the feelings and elements of feeling which it reveals must have been already there — in an unconscious state. We all know practically the difference between the so-called sonant and the so-called surd consonants, between D, B, Z, G, V, and T, P, S, K, F, respectively. But comparatively few persons know the difference theoretically, until their atten tion has been called to what it is, when they perceive it readily enough. The sonants are nothing but the surds plus a certain element, which is alike in all, superadded. That element is the laryngeal sound with which they are uttered, surds having no such accompaniment. When we hear the sonant letter, both its component elements must really be in our mind ; but we remain unconscious of what they rerlly are, and mistake the letter for a simple quality of sound until an effort of attention teaches us its two com ponents. There exist a host of sensations which most men pass through life and never attend to, and consequently have only in an unconscious way.

The feelings of opening and closing the glottis, of making tense the tympanic mem brane, of accommodating for near vision, of intercepting the passage from the nostrils to the throat, are instances of what I mean. Every one gets these feelings many times an hour ; but few readers, probably, are conscious of exactly ^hat sensations are meant by the names I have just used. All these facts, and an enormous number more, seem to * Cf. the statements from Helmholtz to be found later iu Chapter

prove conclusively that, in addition to the fully conscious way in which an idea may exist in the mind, there is also an unconscious way ; that it is unquestionably the same identical idea which exists in these two ways ; and that therefore any arguments against the mind-stuff theory, based on the notion that esse in our mental life is sentiri, and that an idea must consciously be felt as what it is, fall to the ground. Objection. These reasonings are one tissue of confusion. Two states of mind which refer to the same external reality, or two states of mind the later one of which refers to the earlier, are described as the same state of mind, or ' idea,' published as it were in two editions ; and then whatever qualities of the second edition are found openly lacking in the first are explained as having really been there, only in an * unconscious' way. It would be difficult to believe that intelligent men could be guilty of so patent a fallacy, were not the history of psychology there to give the proof. The psychological stock-in-trade of some authors is the belief that two thoughts about one thing are virtually the same thought, and that this same thought may in subsequent reflections become more and more conscious of what it really was all along from the first. But once make the distinc tion between simply having an idea at the moment of its pres ence and subsequently knowing all sorts of things about it ; make moreover that between a state of mind itself, taken as a subjective fact, on the one hand, and the objective thing it knows, on the other, and one has no difficulty in escaping from the labyrinth.

Take the latter distinction first : Immediately all the arguments based on sensations and the new features in them which attention brings to light fall to the ground. The sensations of the B and the V when we attend to these sounds and analyze out the laryngeal contribution which makes them differ from P and F respectively, are different sensations from those of the B and the V taken in a simple way. They stand, it is true, for the same letters, and thus mean the same outer realities; but they are different mental affections, and certainly depend on widely different processes of cerebral activity. It is unbelievable that two mentaJ

states so different as the passive reception of a sound as a whole, and the analysis of that whole into distinct ingre dients by voluntary attention, should be due to processes at all similar. And the subjective difference does not con sist in that the first-named state is the second in an ' un conscious ' form. It is an absolute psychic difference, even greater than that between the stages to which two different surds will give rise. The same is true of the other sensa tions chosen as examples. The man who learns for the first time how the closure of his glottis feels, experiences in this discovery an absolutely new psychic modification, the like of which he never had before. He had another feeling before, a feeling incessantly rerewed, and of which the same glottis was the organic starting _, oint ; but that was not the later feeling in an ' unconscious state ; it was a feeling sui generis altogether, although it took cognizance of the same bodily part, the glottis. "We shall see, hereafter, that the same reality can be cognized by an endless number of psychic states, which may differ toto coelo among themselves, without ceasing on that account to refer to the reality in question. Each of them is a conscious fact : none of them has any mode of being whatever except a certain way of being felt at the moment of being present. It is simply unintelligible and fantastical to say, because they point to the same outer reality, that they must therefore be so many editions of the same ' idea/ now in a conscious and now in an 'unconscious' phase. There is only one 'phase' in which an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious condi tion. If it is not in that condition, then it is not at all. Something else is, in its place. The something else may be a merely physical brain-process, or it may be another conscious idea.

Either of these things may perform much tha same function as the first idea, refer to the same object, and roughly stand in the same relations to the upshot of our thought. But that is no reason why wo should throw away the logical principle of identity in psychology, and say that, however it may fare in the outer world, the mind at any rate is a place in which a thing can be all kinds of other things without ceasing to be itself as well. tion, that namely between having a mental state and know ing all about it. The truth is here even simpler to unravel. When I decide that I have, without knowing it, been for several weeks in love, I am simply giving a name to a state which previously / have not named, but which was fully con scious ; which had no residual mode of being except the manner in which it was conscious ; and which, though it was a feeling towards the same person for whom I now have a much more inflamed feeling, and though it continuously led into the latter, and is similar enough to be called by the same name, is yet in no sense identical with the latter, and least of all in an * unconscious ' way. Again, the feelings from our viscera and other dimly-felt organs, the feelings of innervation (if such there ?e), and those of muscular exer tion which, in our spatial judgments, are supposed uncon sciously to determine what we shall perceive, are just exactly what we feel them, perfectly determinate conscious states, not vague editions of other conscious states. They may be faint and weak ; they may be very vague cognizers of the same realities which other conscious states cognize and name exactly ; they may be unconscious of much in the reality which the other states are conscious of. But that does not make them in themselves a whit dim or vague or uncon scious. They are eternally as they feel when they exist, and can, neither actually nor potentially, be identified with anything else than their own faint selves. A faint feeling may be looked back upon and classified and understood iu its relations to what went before or after it in the stream of thought. But it, on the one hand, and the later state of mind which knows all these things about it, on the other, are surely not two conditions, one conscious and the other * unconscious,' of the same identical psychic fact.

It is the destiny of thought thai, on the whole, our early ideas are superseded by later onos, giving fuller accounts of the same realities. But none the less do the earlier and the later ideas preserve their own several substantive identities as so many several successive states of mind. To believe the con trary would make any definite science of psychology im possible. The only identity to be found among our suc cessive ideas is their similarity of cognitive or represents

fcive function as dealing with the same objects. Identity oi being, there is none ; and I believe that throughout the rest of this volume the reader will reap the advantages of the simpler way of formulating the facts which is here begun.* So we seem not only to have ascertained the unintelligibility of the notion that a mental fact can be two things at once, and that what seems like one feeling, of blueness for example, or of hatred, may really and ' unconsciously ' be ten thousand elementary feelings which do not resem ble blueness or hatred at all, but we find that we can express all the observed facts in other ways. The mind-

* The text was written before Professor Lipps's Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebeus (1883) came into my hands. In Chapter III of that book the notion of unconscious thought is subjected to the clearest and most search ing criticism which it has yet received, Some passages are so similar to what I have myself written that I must quote them in a note. After proving that dimness and clearness, incompleteness and completeness do not pertain to a state of mind as such — since every state of mind must be txactly what it is, and nothing else — but only pertain to the way in which states of mind stand for objects, which they more or less dimly, more or less clearly, represent ; Lipps takes the case of those sensations which attention is said to make more clear. "I perceive an object," he says, " now in clear daylight, and again at night. Call the content of the dayperception a, and that of the evening-perception a1. There will probably be a considerable difference between a and a1. The colors of a will be varied and intense, and will be sharply bounded by each other ; those of a1 will be less luminous, and less strongly contrasted, and will approach a common gray or brown, and merge more into each other. Both percepts, however, as such, are completely determinate and distinct from all others. The colors of a1 appear before my eye neither more nor less decidedly dark and blurred than the colors of a appear bright and sharply bounded. But now I know, or believe I know, that one and the same real Object A corre sponds to both a and a}. I am convinced, moreover, that a represents A better than does a1.

Instead, however, of giving to my conviction this, its only correct, expression, and keeping the content of my consciousness and the real object, the representation and what it means, distinct from each other, I substitute the real object for the content of the consciousness, and talk of the experience as if it consisted in one and the same object (namely, the surreptitiously introduced real one), constituting twice over the content of my consciousness, once in a clear and distinct, the other time in an obscure and vague fashion. I talk now of a distiucter and of a less distinct consciousness of A, whereas I am only justified in talking of two consciousnesses, a and a}, equally distinct in se, but to which the sup posed external obiect A corresponds with different degrees of distinctness."

stuff theory, however, though scotched, is, we may be sure, not killed. If we ascribe consciousness to unicellular animalcules, then single cells can have it, and analogy should make us ascribe it to the several cells cf the brain, each individually taken. And what a convenience would it not be for the psychologist if, by the adding together of vari ous doses of this separate-cell-consciousness, he could treat thought as a kind of stuff or material, to be measured out in great or small amount, increased and subtracted from, and baled about at will ! He feels an imperious craving to be allowed to construct synthetically the successive mental states which he describes. The mind-stuff theory so easily admits of the construction being made, that it seems certain that ' man's unconquerable mind ' will devote much future pertinacity and ingenuity to setting it on its legs again and getting it into some sort of plausible work ing-order. I will therefore conclude the chapter with some consideration of the remaining difficulties which beset the matter as it at present stands.

It will be remembered that in our criticism of the theory of the integration of successive conscious units into a feel ing of musical pitch, we decided that whatever integration there was was that of the air-pulses into a simpler and sim pler sort of physical effect, as the propagations of material change got higher and higher in the nervous system. At last, we said (p. 23), there results some simple and massive process in the auditory centres of the hemispherical cortex, to which, as a ivhole, the feeling of musical pitch directly corresponds. Already, in discussing the localization of functions in the brain, I had said (pp. 158-9) that conscious ness accompanies the stream of innervation through that organ and varies in quality with the character of the cur rents, being mainly of things seen if the occipital lobes are much involved, of things heard if the action is focalized in the temporal lobes, etc., etc.; and I had added that a vague formula like this was as much as one could safely venture on in the actual state of physiology. The facts of mental

deafness and blindness, of auditory and optical aphasia, show us that the whole brain must act together if certain thoughts are to occur. The consciousness, which is itself an integral thing not made of parts, ' corresponds ' to the entire activity of the brain, whatever that may be, at the moment. This is a way of expressing the relation of mind and brain from which I shall not depart during the re mainder of the book, because it expresses the bare phenomenal fact with no hypothesis, and is exposed to no such logical objections as we have found to cling to the theory of ideas in combination.

Nevertheless, this formula which is so unobjectionable if taken vaguely, positivistically, or scientifically, as a mere empirical law of concomitance between our thoughts and our brain, tumbles to pieces entirely if we assume to represent anything more intimate or ultimate by it. The ultimate of ultimate problems, of course, in the study of the relations of thought and brain, is to under stand why and how such disparate things are connected at all. But before that problem is solved (if it ever is solved) there is a less ultimate problem which must first be settled. Before the connection of thought and brain can be explained, it must at least be stated in an elementary form ; and there are great difficulties about so stating it. To state it in elementary form one must reduce it to its lowest terms and know which mental fact and which cerebral fact are, so to speak, in immediate juxtaposition. We must find the minimal mental fact whose being reposes directly on a brain-fact ; and we must similarly find the minimal brain-event which will have a mental counterpart at all. Between the mental and the physical minima thus found there will be an immediate relation, the expression of which, if we had it, would be the elementary psycho-pnysic law.

Our own formula escapes the unintelligibility of psychic atoms by taking t/ie entire thought (even of a complex object) as the minimum with which it deals on the mental side. But in taking the entire brain-process as its mini mal fact on the material side it confronts other difficulties almost as bad- In the first place, it ignores analogies on which certain critics will insist, those, namely, between the composition of the total brain-process and that of the object of the thought. The total brain-process is composed of parts, of simultaneous processes in the seeing, the hearing, the feeling, and other centres. The object thought of is also composed of parts, some of which are seen, others heard, others perceived by touch and muscular manipulation. " How then," these critics will say, " should the thought not itself be composed of parts, each the counterpart of a part of the object and of a part of the brain-pro cess?" So natural is this way of looking at the matter that it has given rise to what is on the whole the most flourishing of all psychological systems — that of the Lockian school of associated ideas — of which school the mindstuff theory is nothing but the last and subtlest offshoot.