Elements of Physical Biology

The answer to these questions has already been foreshadowed. It is not consciousness that has been evolved—an elementary flash of consciousness may be a native property of matter—but a particular kind of integrated consciousness, a consciousness spun into a continuous thread by a faculty of memory, a consciousness embroidered as upon a canvas, whose function is to hold in place and in their proper relation the components of the picture. This background, this reference frame, in the state of development in which we observe it in ourselves, is the ego, to whom all experiences are referred. The material organs to which this integrating function is entrusted is the nervous system, including the brain.

* For a somewhat detailed discussion of this and related phases of the subject the author’s article The Intervention of Consciousness in Mechanics may be consulted. See Science Progress, 1924, p. 407. The nervous system is that bodily system, the special office of which, from its earliest appearance onward throughout evolutionary history, has been more and more to weld together the body’s component parts into one consolidated mechanism reacting as a unity to the world about it. More than any other system it has constructed out of a collection of organs an individual of unified act and experience. It represents the acme of integration of the animal organism. . . . . Assuchit has spelt biological success to its possessor.‘

4 Sir C.S. Sherrington, Presidential Address at British Association Meeting, 1922. Nature, 1922, vol. 110, p. 350. Compare also A. G. Tansley, The New Psychology, 1916, p. 20, referring to Holt, The Freudian Wish, 1916, pp. 76-94. Tansley summarizes Holt’s view in the words: ‘‘Professor Holt very clearly expounds the view that mind is merely the ‘integration’ of the organism’s motor responses to stimuli. Professor Holt’s position is that ‘even two reflexes acting within one organism bring it about that the organism’s behavior is no longer describable in terms of the immediate sensory stimulus, but as afunction of objects and situations in the environment.’ The secret of the connection of mind, and brain remains as dark as ever. Professor Holt does, indeed, admit that mind is a ‘synthetic novelty’—‘the advent of specific response : is the birth of awareness and therefore of psychology itself.’ But even if the integration of ‘reflex responses’ to become ‘specific response’ (i.e. response to an object or situation rather than to a mere stimulus) is rightly described as ‘awareness,’ and this is by no means self-evident, we are not thereby in the least degree helped to understand awareness or cognition in terms of anything else. We are still absolutely bound to interpret mind in terms of our own mind—the only mind of which we have direct knowledge, though we may learn much about the conditions of its evolution.”

“The behavior of an organism adapted to its surroundings is related rather to the objects and situations of those surroundings than to physical and chemical stimuli as such, and this takes place by integration (i.e., the putting together to make a new whole) of simple motor responses to form complex ones. Thus the specific responses of an organism may be regarded as ‘functions’ (in the mathematical sense) of the objects and situations of its environment, and the history of the evolution of response to environment, i.e., of behavior, and of mind itself, is the history of successive integrations of these ‘functions’ to more and more complex purposes.”’

Die Physik wird in der Biologie viel mehr leisten wenn sie erst noch durch die letztere gewachsen sein wird.—Z. Mach. To the naive observer, at any rate, consciousness appears to exert a directive action upon the course of events. If we regard the physical world as a determinate system, the events in which are completely determined by the physical laws to which matter and energy are subject, a question thus arises: Where, in such a scheme as this, is there any opportunity for the agency of consciousness to bring its influence to bear? Several alternative answers to this question seem compatible with our limited knowledge.

First Alternative: Possible Inaccuracy of Laws of Dynamics. First, the laws of physics as known to us may be an inaccurate representation of facts. Indeed, we know that they must be thus inaccurate, for we are far from having completely solved the problem of the Universe. It is therefore possible that something omitted from our formulation of dynamics and energetics is the origin of our perplexity. That such an eventuality as this cannot be wholly ignored is demonstrated, for example, by certain features of the Bohr theory of the atom. “The quantum conditions determining the permissible Bohr orbits can be explained physically only by attributing to the electrons a knowledge of the future.’’! This is a case in which the equations of motion contain a term with a lead, not a spurious lead that can be eliminated by suitable substitutes, but a real, essential lead that must of necessity appear in the equations. Let there be no misunderstanding. It is not intended to suggest that there is a direct relation between this circumstance and consciousness. The example is cited merely to show that the conceptions of classical dynamics are far from exhausting the types of conceptions, in such matters, that we must be prepared to contemplate. At the same time it is only fair to observe that it seems hardly logical for a being composed of electrons to affect great surprise at the fact

that these electrons display certain properties reminiscent of consciousness. Second Alternative: Singular Orbits with Indeterminate Motion. But, in point of fact, without going so far afield, we can see in the domain of classical dynamics opportunity for the entrance of consciousness as a directive agent upon the field of physical events. For there are certain cases in which the course of these events is not fully determinate in classical dynamics. Every case of unstable equilibrium is an instance in point. What do we know regarding the future fate of a cone set up and exactly balanced on its point? Any infinitesimally small force applied to it at any time will decide its fall in one direction or another. The history of such a system as this depends on infinitesimals, that is to say, on data of an order of magnitude that must escape the observation of our senses. To state the matter in more general terms, the orbits of a system moving in accordance with the laws of classical dynamics are of two kinds. Stable orbits are characterized by the fact that a small change in the conditions of the systems will bring about a small change in the orbit. Such is the orbit of a ball rolling down an inclined plane, after being started at an angle @ with a velocity v. If we slightly change the angle 6 or the velocity v, or both, the orbit also will be but slightly changed.

But there are other, unstable orbits, such as that of a ball rolling along the ridge of a straight watershed. Such orbits correspond to singular integrals, or contain singular points. Here, if the angle of the initial velocity deviates ever so little from the orientation of the ridge, the ball will proceed along an orbit totally different from that following the ridge—it will descend into one or other of the valleys on the two sides of the ridge.

Here again, infinitesimal interference will produce finite, and, it may be, very fundamental changes in the result. This, essentially, is the nature of the conception suggested years ago by Clerk Maxwell,? and independently, it seems, by J. Boussinesq.? It is to be noted that such unstable equilibria and 3 Cours de Physique Mathématique; Conciliation du véritable déterminisme méchanique avec l’existence de la vie, ete. Originally published 1878, republished 1922, Gauthier-Villars, Paris.

orbits as exemplified by the cone precariously balanced on its point and by the ball performing its tight-rope trick along the ridge of a watershed are typical of systems disposing of a fund of “available” energy. Such a fund of free energy, in turn, is typical of living organisms. To quote again Clerk Maxwell: In all such cases there is one common circumstance,—the system has a quantity of potential energy, which is being transformed into motion, but which cannot begin to beso transformed until the system has reached a certain configuration, to attain which requires an expenditure of work which in certain cases may be infinitesimally small, and in general bears no definite proportion to the energy developed in consequence thereof. . . . . . Every existence above a certain rank has its singular points, the higher the rank, the more of them. At these points influences too small to be taken into account by a finite being may produce results of the greatest importance. All great results produced by human endeavor depend on taking advantage of these singular states when they occur.

In the course of this our mortal life we more or less frequently find ourselves on a physical or moral watershed, where an imperceptible deviation is sufficient to determine into which of two valleys we shall descend.® This conception makes the interference of consciousness (will) in physical events an exceptional occurrence: It appears that in our own nature there are more singular points—where prediction, except from absolutely perfect data, and guided by omniscience of contingency, becomes impossible—than there are in any lower organization. But singular points are by their very nature isolated and form no appreciable fraction of the continuous course of our existence.®

Third Alternative: Possible Influence of Factors Eliminated from Equations of Dynamics. As to the last quotation, perhaps, one feels disposed to hesitate in adopting the standpoint suggested by the great physicist. For it seems that even the most trivial voluntary action involves the interference of consciousness in the course of physical events, and of such more or less trivial voluntary acts our waking consciousness is filled to the brim. <A certain interest may therefore attach to an alternative point of view which has been developed by the writer elsewhere, and which is based on the following consideration:

A quantity which does not appear in the working equation describing the laws of action of a physical system may nevertheless play a significant réle in the world’s events. So, for example, a mathematical theory of wealth, covering at any rate certain aspects of economics, can be built up in terms of prices and sales alone, without pushing the analysis of fundamentals beyond this point; that is to say, without examining the human emotions and motives that, presumably, find their numerical expression in prices. On such basis as this, for example, Cournot founded his admirable ‘“Re- searches into the Mathematical Theory of Wealth.”

But to most of us it will appear quite evident that such a treatment as this is necessarily a very incomplete presentation of the actual events, however exactly it may represent the resultant effects observed. For it wholly ignores our desires and purposes, which to us appear very real and important constituents of the course of nature. This example should open our eyes to the possibility, with which we must be prepared to reckon, that the equations of dynamics, however perfectly they may picture the course of certain physical events, may fail entirely to reveal or to give expression to underlying agency that may, in fact, be of fundamental significance. The interference of consciousness in mechanics may be very real, and yet the course of events may appear fully determined by the laws of dynamics.’

Energetics of Aimed Collisions. Aimed collisions imply a correlation between a present state or event and a future occurrence or eventuality (a future that will be or a future that may be). Psychologically this correlation is apprehended as purposive forethought. Physically it implies the disposal of a fund of free energy, since the energy for bringing about (or for avoiding) a future encounter cannot itself be derived from that encounter. There is thus of necessity a fundamental connection between purposive action and the disposal of a fund of free energy. Purposive behavior can and does occur only in material structures disposing of such a fund.

7 For a more detailed presentation of this viewpoint the reader must be referred to the author’s article The Intervention of Consciousness in Mechanics, Science Progress, January, 1924. Man is the arch machine, of which all these shifts drawn from himselfare toy models.—Hmerson. Some of the outstanding features of our reflections and observations in the chapters immediately preceding are summarized in tables 34 and 35, which at the same time bring out a number of other significant facts.

Table 34 sets forth systematically the main facts regarding the receptors and effectors, as exhibited particularly in the case of man. (A few entries shown in parentheses relate to species other than man, in cases in which man lacks the feature to be exemplified). In this tabulation Depictors or Informants are shown as divided up into Receptors, Elaborators, Relators, and Communicators. The Receptors are further subdivided into Internal Ceptors, Contact Ceptors and Distance Ceptors. These terms hardly require explanation, especially in view of the other entries on the table, which will serve to elucidate them. In every case represented, the name of the corresponding faculty, the native or natural organs, and the artificial organ or organs are shown. ‘The list of the latter is far from exhaustive.

The imagination, the faculty by the aid of which we hold before our mind’s eye the material upon which we operate in the process of thinking, is shown divided into autistic and realistic imagination. The term autistic thinking has been introduced by psychologists to denote that type of thought in which the fancy is given free reins, unchecked by any demand for correspondence with reality ; the thought of the savage, the child, the dreamer, the poet.! Realistic thinking, on the contrary, is constrained by the laws of Logic, which assure a due correspondence between the products of cogitation and the features of the external world to which they relate.

' “Les poétes se consolent, comme les enfants, avec des images.’”’ Anatole France , Le Jardin d’Mpicure. (1040 ‘seoped104) odooso1fy (099 ‘saro ‘yanj) surim ‘Surdirvenb ‘sary -Snpur Joezi{yJey (SurArep ‘Aapusgsny jeuiue ‘A1ysnputr guejd) eimgjjnowse ‘soAros -o1d owes ‘satreysy ‘suodvo\y -uBs ‘syuese o1ynedeiey} ‘ssniq Apoq 03 pard -de sjuvyzoojursip ‘sorydes -1jue “B10S OTxOyTQUB ‘SaUTOOw A Wor earuany|y soAIou orydor} ‘sensst4 [[¥ -90 9AIOU PUB SpuB] orydom ‘sonssty [|TV SUBSIO [BqIIUSY) wsieds ‘vag

rojyamojouseU ‘ssedurosy ‘JayoMIOUBAIBS ‘I9JOUIO.IYOOTTT dtyoejaojoyd = ‘rayau10,04d “ojo ‘somyoid suraowm ‘sia -wed o1ydeisojoyd ‘1oyourt -rejod ‘xajauro1ej1ejut ‘edoos -o1oeds ‘adoosejo} ‘edoososo1yy auoydororyyy SIsA]Bus [BOIUIEyD ssuduioo ‘edoos -o1h8 ‘qoAo] yraids ‘our, quin,tg ‘0y0 ‘adoosopua ‘shvi-y SdIsad|vuB ‘SoTJOYSeUy soodgotiM -sotiosga ,xjoxeslW .aqosnoioi Mi talog xelennrabieici qos “ao sidgargoiody tem) The item “semi-realistic imagination” calls for special notice. It was suggested primarily by the case of the so-called realistic novel. Such a novel is realistic as to the types presented, though the specific instances may have no counterpart in reality. Such semi-realistic thinking plays an important part in Science. Every physical formula is, in a sense, an instance of this type of thinking. When I say that the area of a rectangular surface measuring 2 by 4 feet is 8 square feet, this does not imply that any such rectangle exists in reality. It may exist or not, the statement has a certain quality of truth independent of the reality of such a rectangle; the statement relates to a type rather than to a specific instance.

The terms “Sense of Time” and “Spatial Sense”’ are self-explanatory. They are suggested without prejudice as to their metaphysical significance. Wemust accept it as a fact that we distinguish experience as having a definite sequence in time, and that we are able, unaided by artificial adjuncts, to gage with very fair accuracy equality of time intervals within certain somewhat narrow limits. Similar remarks apply to the entry Spatial Sense. Such entries are needed to make the table complete. If the reader, on metaphysical or other grounds dislikes these terms, others may be substituted at his discretion.

The item Communicators calls for little comment. These are, in a sense, receptors and effectors set apart for or employed in a particular, and a highly important use. Just as the Depictors or Informants throw a picture of the external world upon or into the organism, so the Epictors or Transformants translate into material reality the plans conceived, the pictures formed in the mind. The Brooklyn Bridge, for example, is a material representation or picture of the plans that once were in the designer’s mind.

These transformants include once again the elaborators, relators and communicators, for these fulfill a double function; the transformants further include the Internal and the External Effectors, whose nature and significance is apparent from the table. If time had permitted, the writer would much have liked to give to this table a quantitative cast by adding columns showing persons employed, production, consumption, imports, exports, and capitals invested in the arts and industries corresponding to the several items shown in the table, adding, in other words, a quantitative descrip-

tion of the behavior schedule of human society. The table would thus give a coherent, biologically founded, picture of the life activities of the Body Politic. The behavior of this body as a whole, no less than that of its constituent organisms, is conditioned by its anatomical constitution and its biological needs. The substitution of artificial for natural organs in nowise alters this fact. The adjustors could not very conveniently be accommodated in the scheme of table 34. They have been separately systematized in table 35.

The adjustors are here shown divided into two groups. The Internal Adjustors are those that control the distribution of effort in different pursuits in one organism, within the organism, so to speak. The External Adjustors, on the other hand, control the distribution of effort among the several organisms or groups of organisms comprised in one species. Internal Adjustors. The internal adjustors operate through the faculty of choice (wish, will, etc.). Such choice may be made without any conscious reference to any objective principle, purely according to the dictates of instinctive impulse or tastes. No attempt is made to enumerate such instincts in any degree of completeness. They are shown classified according to the principal beneficiary into egorstic and altruistic instincts. The agent is not always conscious of the relation of his actions to the beneficiary. Thus, for example, the scientific investigator, working under the stress of the instincts of curiosity, workmanship, and self-expression, may have little or no thought of conferring a benefit on society. Such benefit nevertheless follows.

The choice may not be made simply in response to instinctive impulse. It may be more or less consciously guided by “ principles,” such as may be given either empirically, on the word of an accepted authority, the Church for example; or as worked out systematically by the agent himself (philosophy of conduct, ethics). These two types of choice may be respectively termed instinctive and reflective, or, in analogy with the terms employed with regard to thought, the instinctive may also be classed as autistic, the reflective as realistic, since the former seeks no basis outside the individual himself, the latter tends to seek an objective basis. The discipline of Ethics here appears as a regulator of conduct in close analogy to the manner in which logic functions as a regulator of thought.

This analogy is brought out with the greatest clarity in the following quotations, which should be read in parallel: “Logic is the muse of thought. When I violate it I am erratic; if I hate it, I am licentious or dissolute; if I love it, I am free—the highest blessing the austere muse can give.”’ Compare also the saying of Seneca: ‘Si tibi vis omnia subjicere, te subjice rationi.”’ Ethics: Clerk Maxwell ieee an abandonment of wilfulness without extinction of will, but rather by means of a great development of will, whereby, instead of being consciously free and really in subjection to unknown laws, it becomes consciously acting by law, and really free from the interference of

In the development of ethics, as in that of logic, the influence of natural selection must be to favor those habits of thought and action which are conducive to the welfare of the species. And just as we have reached the point where at least the rudiments of logic are unassailably fixed in the healthy adult mind, so we may expect that socially sound principles of conduct will in time be more and more accepted as inevitable truths, their converse as “unthinkable,” at least to the naive mind. Indeed, in very appreciable measure this is the case even now. Theft, for example, is to the normal person utterly unthinkable. The philosophic mind will of course, still, at all times, be able to conceive of unethical conduct as a possible alternative, just as today the philosopher can, as a sort of tour de force, of mental gymnastics, overcome his native faith in an external world, and assume temporarily the rdéle of the solipsist.

External Adjustors. The external adjustors, those that govern the distribution of effort among the several individuals of the species, present several points of much interest. Their operation is, of course, essentially restricted to species living in organized communities, such as the bee, the ant, and, quite particularly, man. Nature has developed two entirely distinct methods of adjusting the distribution of activities among the several members of such a social group. The individual may be born into the world or nurtured to adolescence with a definitely specialized endowment of anatomical equipment and physiological and psychological faculties and predilections. So the queen bee is fitted for her very particular part, the drone for his, and the working bee for its task. Each is capable only

of playing the part assigned, and presumably each is perfectly content, wholly innocent of the joys and sorrows characteristic of the other’s calling. In our own human species this condition is nearly approached as regards the special tasks of sex, at least in their primary forms. The second method adopted by nature is really a very singular, and one feels tempted to say, a highly ingenious one. Here the individual may have little or no natural disposition to specialize in a blind obedience to the call of social expediency. Nature, as it were, gives the reins into his hands, and only demands the right to impose a tax on all his profits. Smith and Jones get together, Smith offers Jones a pound of bread, and Jones accepts it in return for six ounces of beef. Each is satisfied. Each has driven a purely selfish bargain, without the least thought of the good of the community. But the community has already collected its tax—the exchange, on the whole, is to its benefit.