BioelectricaAlterspan Labs
Goals and control  ·  Article

Goal-directedness

Goal-directedness is the property of a process that reaches a typical end, often by varying its means. Older authors called it teleology or purposefulness. Verworn described it as a fact that pushed early naturalists toward a fore-ordained plan.2 Recent authors treat it as a feature of cells and tissues that can be tested, seen when development and regeneration stop at the correct shape.79

Earliest held
1852, Du Bois-Reymond, E. (ed. H.…
Most discussed in
Principles of General Physiology, 1915
In the library
974 passages in 69 works
Rewritten
2026-10-03
18501875190019251950197520002025James, W., 18901Verworn, M., 18992Morgan, T. H., 19013Driesch, H., 19084Lotka, A. J., 19255Thompson, D. A. W., 19926Baluška F, Levin M, 20167Fields C, Levin M, 20228Levin M, 20239
01

Purpose in living nature

Verworn wrote that the purposefulness of living things forced early men of science to embrace teleology, meaning a plan of creation fixed in advance.2 Morgan, in Regeneration, quoted Driesch on development. Driesch argued that a typical result always follows, so each step must be judged by the result. He concluded that ontogeny must be seen as though guided by an intelligence.3 William James made a wider point. He held that materialism contradicts itself when it denies teleology while naming atoms as the essential facts.1

02

Machines, selection and doubt

Driesch separated kinds of teleology. He argued that the working of a man-made machine is purposeful because it is the action of its makers, so the term had been carried over to inorganic events.4 Thompson, in On Growth and Form, described a different reading. On it, the final cause shrinks to the result of sifting the good from the bad, and so becomes part of mechanism.6 Lotka admitted a doubtful class. For an amoeba, he said, we know neither its experience nor its full mechanism.5

03

Goal states in development

Baluška and Levin (2016) argued that embryogenesis, regeneration and metamorphosis stop when the correct anatomical shape exists. They compared this to goal-directed behaviour. The system can take several paths to one goal state, can absorb unpredictable perturbations, and rests when satisfied.7 Fields and Levin (2022) said that evidence for goal-directed behaviour is abundant in developmental and regenerative biology. They counted the ability to reach goals despite unexpected circumstances as activity beyond fixed responses.8

04

Same goal, different means

Levin (2023) recalled James's definition of intelligence as a degree of the ability to reach the same goal by different means.9 Levin noted that the definition does not depend on what an agent is made of. It asks the investigator to define a problem space and to test what competencies the system uses in it.9 The old teleological question is thus recast as an experimental one, although the passages held here do not settle whether this answers the mechanical reading described by Thompson.6

SourcesEach quotation was checked word for word against the passage it opens.
  1. Materialism becomes self-contradictory when it denies teleology, and yet in the same breath calls atoms, etc., the essential facts.James, W., 1890 · The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2 · open at passage 2483
  2. The fact of purposefulness in living nature, which was so marvellous to men of science in early times, even down to the middle of the present century, forced them constantly to embrace teleologyVerworn, M., 1899 · General Physiology: An Outline of the Science of Life · open at passage 498
  3. We can only reach a satisfactory view of the phenomena when we introduce the word 'purpose.' This means that we must look upon the ontogeny as a process carried out in its order and quality as though guided by an intelligence.Morgan, T. H., 1901 · Regeneration · open at passage 720
  4. All processes contributing to the construction of any kind of engines and machines made by man are purposeful, for they are actions of men.Driesch, H., 1908 · The Science and Philosophy of the Organism · open at passage 281
  5. We cannot enter the amoeba in spirit and become parties to its conscious experience; we do not even know whether it has any such experience.Lotka, A. J., 1925 · Elements of Physical Biology · open at passage 877
  6. a teleology in which the final cause becomes little more, if anything, than the mere expression or resultant of a process of sifting out of the good from the bad, or of the better from the worseThompson, D. A. W., 1992 · On Growth and Form · open at passage 37
  7. the system can pursue multiple paths toward the same (anatomical) goal state, can accommodate unpredictable external perturbations (is not hardwired but flexible), and rests when it is satisfiedBaluška F, Levin M, 2016 · On Having No Head: Cognition throughout Biological Systems · open at passage 41
  8. Evidence for goal-directed behavior (a hallmark of a coherent intelligence in any embodiment), including the sophisticated ability to achieve those goals despite unexpected circumstancesFields C, Levin M, 2022 · Competency in Navigating Arbitrary Spaces as an Invariant for Analyzing… · open at passage 18
  9. William James anticipated a cybernetic approach to this problem by defining intelligence as a degree of “the ability to reach the same goal by different means” (James 1890).Levin M, 2023 · Bioelectric networks: the cognitive glue enabling evolutionary scaling from… · open at passage 6
Linked ideas
Levin and Fields treat reaching a target form despite perturbation as the developmental case of goal-directed behaviour.
Regenerationprecursor of / follows
Morgan, citing Pflüger, takes regrowth of bile duct and nerve as examples of purposeful processes; later authors treat regeneration as goal-directed.
Basal cognitionrelated to
Levin's framework places basic goal-directed activity among the components of cognition at any scale.
Washburn, discussing Lukas, lists a teleological test among criteria of consciousness; Levin ties goal-directed activity to consciousness capacity.
Lotka's amoeba is his doubtful case: purposive or mechanistic cannot be settled while its working is unknown.
Levin treats homeostatic setpoints as the first, smallest goals, so homeostasis is the base of goal-directed behaviour in his account.
Pio-Lopez and colleagues pair mechanistic detail with goal-directed action, a position between strict reduction and an added vital principle.
Fields and Levin ask how decision making can be formalised in a deterministic system, framing navigation as search for a preferred region.
Fields and Levin place simple systems that roll down a hill and cognitive systems on one spectrum of agency, without discontinuities.
Scale of the selfprecursor of / follows
The cognitive boundary is defined by the events a system tries to regulate in its goal-directed activity.
Evolvabilityrelated to
Fields and Levin treat agents that build actionable self-models, and high-level reward spaces, as part of why biological systems evolve so readily.
Baluška and Levin cite a least-action principle implemented by the organism as a base case for goal-directed activity.
Reaching the same target form despite departures from default components is the reliability that invites goal-directed descriptions of development.
Where it is discussedPassages matching goal-directed, teleology, purposive, teleonomy
1915Principles of General Physiology · Bayliss, W. M.155
1890The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2 · James, W.119
1908The Science and Philosophy of the Organism · Driesch, H.90
1906Plant Response as a Means of Physiological Investigation · Bose, J. C.71
1925Elements of Physical Biology · Lotka, A. J.53
1899General Physiology: An Outline of the Science of Life · Verworn, M.44
1992On Growth and Form · Thompson, D. A. W.44
1894Materials for the Study of Variation Treated with Especial Regard to… · Bateson, W.34
1880The Power of Movement in Plants · Darwin, C.31
1924Physiological Foundations of Behavior · Child, C. M.31