The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

an individual history of the performer, certainly nothing like history with regard to the particular stimulus then at work. But then historical elements of this sort are entirely absent in another group of phenomena, where at first glance it might possibly seem that they were present. Let us begin with an instance discovered by Jennings in studying the Protozoon Stentor, and already shortly mentioned above. To one and the same mechanical stimulus Stentor first reacted by a simple turning aside, but this reaction did not bring it out of reach of the stimulus; it then reversed the direction of its ciliary movement, and after that contracted itself into its tube, but without success; the stimulus, a falling of powder, continued ; then, finally, the Stentor swam away. We here see three or more different reactions following each other in correspondence to one stimulus. We may say, perhaps, that the following reactions occurred because the first one was not successful, and certainly there is some thing of an individual historical element in this behaviour ; but, in spite of that, we should prefer not to speak of an action. It is one series of events that occurs here, not one reaction at one time and another reaction, modified by experience, at another ; there is " trial " perhaps, but no " experience." ]

1 The same holds for the movements of Ophiurids, according to von Uexkuell and Glaser (Journ, exp. ZnoL 4, 1907). There is a great variety of reactions, but no "experience." Preyer was right in his description of facts, but not in his interpretation. But in Asterids there exists " experience," besides a great -variability of reactiDg (see the recent memoir of Jennings cited on page 31). in its most primordial form, when Stentor, the experiment with the powder being repeated after a short time, reacts from the very beginning with its fourth kind of reaction instead of with the first one. This example, besides its excluding a whole group of motor phenomena from our future discussion, may well serve at the same time to illustrate provisionally what really will be called " action " by ourselves.

True actions, though, as will be stated later on, of a less high degree of complication than actions in man, are most clearly exhibited in the following classes of the animal kingdom : in all, even in the lowest classes of vertebrates, in bees, ants, and some beetles, in crabs, cuttle-fishes, Actinia, and some Protozoa. One point has always to be kept well in mind in all investigations about so-called animal " intelligence." All organisms, of course, can acquire " experience " only about what is " experienced " by them : in other terms, only about that which stimulates them to motor reactions. Now it is clear, that it always must remain doubtful in lower organisms what sort of sense organs — to use the common expression at this stage of our argument — they possess ; their " medium " will only be the sum of the factors to which they are accessible. How, for instance, could we expect individualised stimuli to act upon organisms possess ing no organ like the eye or the ear ? Perhaps it is for this one reason that so little is exactly known about real acting in Protozoa. There are many observations about

them — those about their hunting, for instance — which seem to prove that a rather high degree of experience may exist in infusoria ; but who can feel able to give any fairly correct answer about the stimuli — of a chemical nature perhaps — which are able to reach such minute organisms ? And, on the other hand, there may be spheres of experience — in the higher classes of the Invertebrates, for instance — which are almost unintelligible to ourselves in a subjective way. Bees seem to remember the absolute amount of their change of place in space. Even if they have been trans ported passively, and not on a direct line, they always reach their hive again. And similar facts occur in birds.1

The very important facts recently discovered by Pawlow and his followers also belong here, as it seems to me, though they do so in a different way. " Association " may relate not only to phenomena of the sensorial or motor class, generally spoken of as " conscious " ones, but to processes of secretion also. Secretion, on the part of the salivary glands, for instance, may be called forth by any stimulus that has ever been contemporary with the original stimulus of the purely physiological process of secretion in any way.

A few words on the distribution of experience, not in the animal kingdom, but among the parts of one organism, may close these preliminaries. A little more on the same subject is to follow in another connexion. It has been shown by the experiments of Goltz, Schrader, and 1 Radl (Biol. Centralblatt, 26, 1906, and other papers) has given a very good analysis of the behaviour of animals with relation to their orientation in space. Part of it is certainly due to sight, to keeping the eye on a fixed object ; another part is due to the semicircles connected with the ear of vertebrates, or to other "statical" organs ; a last part, it seems to me, is not yet understood at all physiologically. The behaviour of bees would belong to the last group.

others that it is not only the so-called hemispheres of the brain of vertebrates that are related to experience. Frogs and pigeons at least, and probably dogs also, may acquire new experience, or may at least make use of older experience, even after the total extirpation of those hemispheres. No doubt there is less experience shown after the extirpation than before it ; but experience is by no means lost. Thus we see that other parts of the central nervous system besides the hemispheres may also be in relation to experience. This holds for all so-called lower brain centres, and perhaps for the spinal cord also.

What the real meaning of these facts is, must also be reserved for a future discussion. And now we are prepared to enter minutely into an analysis of the process of acting itself. The phonograph is a well-known machine the reactions of which depend on its individual history in their utmost specificity : the phonograph may give forth what it has received in the past. Now we have said already provision ally that the individual history is one of the most important features concerned in the characteristics of acting. Is for this reason acting in any way comparable to the reactions of a machine such as the phonograph ? With this question we may fitly begin our analysis of the process of " action."

If we at first consider the acting organism as a whole, without laying any special stress on what is called its nervous system or its brain, we may say that the specificity of every one of its actions depends on the specificity of all stimuli relating to sensation and movement which have encountered it in the past, and on all the specific effects of those stimuli. This character we have already tried to describe briefly by saying that acting depends on the " individual history " of the organism, and we shall now describe it technically by saying that an " historical basis of reacting " (" historische Reaktionsbasis ") is one of the chief components of which the specificity of every action is a function.

Without any difficulty you will become convinced, I suppose, that this " historical basis of reacting," being one of the foundations of action, is something different from the " history " of a phonograph. Therefore the technical term " historical basis of reacting " requires a precise technical definition : it is to mean more than the mere verbal expression states. The phonograph, though determined in the specificity of its reactions by the specificity of its history, is not able to change the specificity of what it has received in any way ; the organism has the faculty of profiting from the specific combinations received in order to form other combined specificities. It changes, so we may say, the specificities it has encountered into other specificities, which it forms on the foundation of their elements. Here we find what we are in search of : the historical basis of acting is " historical " only in a most general, not in a specific meaning ; specificities, it is true, have made up the " history " that is commonly called " experience," but the basis of reacting, as a basis of action created historically, is not in any way specified in detail, but consists of the elements of the experienced specificities. The second half

of our analysis of action will have to show us how new combined specificities may be formed on the foundation of the elements of the historically received ones.1 But a second fundamental difference between the " historical basis of reacting " of a phonograph and of an organism may at once be discovered as easily as the first difference was. The phonograph receives vibrations of the air and gives off vibrations of the air ; in other terms, previous stimulus and later reaction are of the same nature. The organism receives impressions on its sensory organs whilst acquiring "experience," and gives off movements. That is to say, the events which have created the organism's history, and the events which occur on the basis of this history, belong to two absolutely different classes of phenomena.

We now must insist more fully on the analysis of our " historical basis/' and shall in the first place justify a certain phrase that we have used in our definition. We have said that actions not only depend on all the stimuli received in the past but also on the effects of those stimuli. The word "stimuli" is to include here everything that has affected the sense organs of the acting subject in any form whatever ; the word " effects " is to embrace the final consequences of any previous moving that had been caused by any stimulus. The second half of this explanation now may seem to want some further interpretation, and this interpretation may advantageously be founded upon a short discussion of a fundamental

1 There would be a strict analogy between the "historical basis" of a phonograph and the "historical basis" of action if all human speech were like reciting a story or a poem learnt "by heart." But — a conversation, for example, is something very different from this. problem, very often discussed by philosophical psychologists, the problem of the so-called origin of the act of volition in the child. It will hardly be avoidable to use a few psychological expressions in the following analysis, but we repeat that we use them only for the sake of brevity, and it would be better could every one of them possess its proper phenomenological correlate ; for it is with moving bodies in nature that we are dealing.

Movements without any specific regularity, called forth by unknown general causes from without and within, are considered to be the real starting-point of acting in the child ; a supposition that agrees very well with the recent discoveries of Jennings. The child notes the effect of every one of those movements and its share in bringing pleasure or pain — these words taken in their broadest meaning — and afterwards it " desires " and carries out certain possible effects of its movements, and others it does not " desire " and carry out. The possible effects, of course, as the age of the child advances, may relate to any change of the medium in the widest sense, as far as the medium may be the subject of experience. It belongs to Psychology to make out what elemental psychical functions are concerned in this " desiring " and " liking " : of course the rudiments of judging are concerned in it, and a fuller analysis would probably reveal that volition, reasoning, and liking are at work here as a whole, inseparable in fact and separated only by analytical science. It has been neglected by some writers, but has been most clearly

emphasised by Wundt and a few others, that the doctrine of the so-called origin of the act of volition relates by no means to the origin of volition as such, but only to the origin of the faculty of accomplishing what had been " willed." Volition itself, just as liking and judging, is one of the unexplainable elemental facts of psychology. But let us turn back to our proper problem, which is a problem not of psychology but of natural science. The discussion of the genesis of the volitional act has shown us most clearly, that the effects of motor stimuli may form part of the historical basis of reacting. It was the effects of random movements that became liked by the child, and this liking of the effects enters into the historical basis of his future actions, just as do all sorts of stimulations themselves. In a certain sense we may say that the effects of motor stimuli become new stimuli on their own account, at least as far as they are a something presented to the organism and " experienced " by it, and in this way the whole analysis of the " historical basis " might seem to become more simple and uniform. But nevertheless it is worth while to maintain the distinction between two different types of historical bases of acting, and to study them as they actually occur in special cases.

Acting based upon the experienced final effects of previous motor stimuli always starts from " chance," and it is in so-called " trying " that it gains its highest import ance. Imagine you have got a new portmanteau without knowing how to open it. You first try all sorts of manipulations familiar to you from your experience about the effects of moving your hands with regard to opening other trunks, but no success attends this " trying." At last by chance you press a certain plain knob, and the opening of the box is the " effect." The second time you will press the knob at once ; there is no " trying " any more, but the new experience assists you in " trials " in the future. The whole process has a great similarity to what we know already from the analysis of the first actions in the child, though, of course, differences must not be overlooked.

Experience based upon stimuli alone is no less familiar to all of you than our last instance. The learning of languages and all cases of imitation are typical instances of this class. The general scheme of this type of " historical basis of reacting " is this : you learn by experience that a certain simple secondary phenomenon always accompanies the primary one which is the proper motor stimulus of your acting, and you then, in response to that secondary or indicating phenomenon, perform the same action that at first only followed the primary stimulus. In this way you learn to identify different tramway lines by the coloured boards or coloured lights they bear.

All of you know, of course, that it is "association," as the psychologists call it, of which we have here given a rather complicated but not incorrect description. A good popular illustration of the difference between an " historical basis " concerned with previous stimuli and effects and one concerned with stimuli alone is given by the two following instances. If in a strange town you want to reach a certain place, of which you only know the general position, you will probably go wrong very often the first time, but will "learn" to go right by the " effects " of your walking. If, however, you are accompanied the first time by a friend who knows the town and give good heed to what you " see " on your way, you may find the place the next time without any " error."

One of the most important features, we said, of the historical basis of reacting is that its specificities may be resolved into their elements. We must not, however, forget that, in spite of this possibility of being resolved, a certain conservation of the combination of the specificities received is the conditio sine qua non in the process of acting : otherwise there would be no "association." Psychology, as you know, speaks of two kinds of " association," one dependent on contiguity, the other on similarity or contrast. Now all association by contiguity is to be regarded as in some sort the conservation of at least a part of the original specificity of combination in the stimuli forming the historical basis of acting. The mere fact on the other hand that, psychologically, association alone is quite unable to explain the totality of psychical life, shows that conservation of a portion of the specificities originally present cannot play more than a subordinate part in acting : conservation does indeed play a part, but there would be none but very primitive forms of acting, if conservation were not accompanied by separation and new combination of what had been received originally,

and if there were no such thing as the remarkable phenomenon of association based upon contrast and similarity. But these processes, and in particular the process of resolving given complex peculiarities into other peculiarities, can hardly be properly understood without a discussion of the second fundamental characteristic of action.1 In proceeding to discuss this second characteristic we do not bid farewell to the first. On the contrary, as the first proved to be incomplete in itself without the second, so the second will prove to be inseparable from the first.

We have already explained, whilst dealing with the theory of instincts, what is meant by a " simple " and an " individualised " stimulus. A stimulus is individualised if it consists of a specific combination, specifically arranged, of single elements ; the arrangement may be one of space as well as one of time. Now the second of the two main characteristics of action, considered as a problem of natural science, is that action always is a reaction corresponding to an individualised stimulus. I need only remind you that the sight of a specific person or a specific house may influence your

1 A psychological theory of association is not our business. Mere passive association certainly contributes very little to psychical life, at least when we are awake. It never accounts for the fact that among the innumerable ideas that are "similar" to one another one comes into consciousness at the given moment and none other. See the excellent 'discussion by Bergson (Matiere et Memoire, Paris, 1896), and compare also the concept of "apper ception " as used by Wundt.

behaviour in a specific manner, and that a melody or a specific phrase you hear may do the same, in order to give you a concrete instance of what our analysis expresses more abstractly. And then the individualised stimulus of actions has an effect that is individualised also. There are many cases in the inorganic world where the same thing happens, and yet in spite of that there is a great difference at the first glance between the Inorganic and the Organic in this field. A seal with specific initials may also be called an individualised stimulus or at least cause, and if it is pressed into hot sealing-wax the effect will be individualised also : but the two individualisations are of exactly the same kind in this case. That is not true in the individualisations of cause and effect appearing in action : the one is individualised in & specific manner, but the other is individualised quite differently.

In more technical language we may state the result of .our provisional analysis as follows. Besides the principle .of the "historical basis of reacting," there is another fundamental principle concerned in actions, when considered as bodily processes in nature ; this second fundamental principle may appropriately be called the principle of " indi viduality of correspondence " between stimulus and effect. We now in the first place have to study more fully in what the individuality of correspondence in acting really consists, and it is here that the interpenetration of our first .and our second principle, spoken of already, will become apparent. For the individualisation of the acting effect, though dependent on — because corresponding to — the individuality of the cause, is at the same time found to

depend on the " historical basis of reacting " : in other terms, the elements of the individualised acting effect are derived from this basis. What the theoretical consequences of this relation are will be shown hereafter ; at present the minute analysis of the correspondence between the individualised stimulus and the individualised effect concerned in action is to be our chief problem. As every problem of a complicated nature is easier understood when at first demonstrated in a concrete instance, I prefer to begin our discussion with a concrete fact. It will be a fact very familiar indeed to all of you, for it is the great advantage in this department of biology dealing with action, that the facts are generally matter of common knowledge, whilst in morphogenesis even the most simple facts of a merely descriptive character have to be first explained to laymen in order to make them available for theoretical discussion.

We all experience a hundred times a day what a con versation between two human beings is. Let us try to analyse what a conversation would mean from the point of view taken by natural science. Two friends meet in the street, and one of them, A, says to the other, B, " my brother is seriously ill." There will be a very specific effect caused in B by the stimulus that went out from A. Let us imagine that the brother is in America : B then would talk about the difficulty of his coming home, or of visiting him, and very many other things, all of them of a very definite and specific character. But what would have happened if instead of the word " brother " the word " mother " had been used ? Certainly something very different, and certainly something very specific also. The mother may be living in

the town where the friends meet, then B might ask, whether he could do anything for her, he might remark that the ill ness must be attended with some danger at her age, and he would say very many other things, all very specific. Taken as stimuli from the point of view of natural science, the phrases " my brother is seriously ill " and " my mother is seriously ill" differ only in a point of utmost unimportance : br is pronounced in one case where m is pronounced in the other. In spite of this minute difference the effects of the stimuli are totally different.

And now let us assume that the two friends are of different nationalities, the one being German, the other French, but that the town, where they are staying and where they meet, is an English town, and that both friends talk English, French and German equally well, and that they are accustomed to use all three in their conversations. Then A, instead of saying " my brother is seriously ill," might also have said " nion frere est S6* verement malade," or " mein Bruder ist ernstlich erkrankt." What would have been the effect of these variations ? Certainly the same as that of the phrase spoken in English.1

This example shows us, that in acting the effect may remain unchanged in spite of a most fundamental change in the stimulus : this second result of our analysis is the exact counterpart to the first. 1 It has been said that in these instances it is not the phrases " my brother is ill," etc., that constitute the real stimulus of action, but the general ' ' mental " condition of the person addressed. But, beyond doubt, these phrases are real stimuli in the true physical meaning of the word, and, moreover, the general "mental" condition, i.e. what we call the "historical basis " in all its essentials, could never account for these particular and specific reactions at this particular place and time.

of the reaction when the stimulus is altered fundamentally, and again, there may be the most fundamental difference in the reaction when there is almost no change in the stimulus. This is a very strange result to have reached by our analysis. Let us now try to state our result in more abstract form. This will bring us face to face with our central problem : Is acting explainable on the hypothesis of a specific physicochemical arrangement, say a machine, or is it not ?