The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

The individualised stimulus in acting, represented in our instance by the phrase " my brother is seriously ill," may be expressed analytically as being a specific arrangement of the specific elements a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, and so on. The specific effect which the stimulus has upon the acting person, say the friend B in our example, may be figured as being a typical combination of av b^ cv dv er fr gv hr i^ and so on. The question then is : How is the series a, b, c, etc. connected with the series av b^ cv etc., and is there any way of explaining alt bv c^ etc. by a, b, c, etc., with the aid of the given organisation, with the aid of the brain in particular, or at least with the aid of any kind of machine, in the broadest sense of the word, in general ?

Matters would be easy if to each element of the stimulus there corresponded an element of the effect, if a^ were the effect of a, ^ of b, c1 of c, and so on. That is so in the phonograph, but by no means in acting. How then may our observations of what happens in ordinary conversation be formulated analytically? It seems to me that our particular result may be generalised in the following manner. into a, b, y, d, e, f, g, h, i, and the effect may be transformed from av \, cv dv ev /j, gr hv \ into m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t.

And secondly, change the stimulus from a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i into a, @, 7, S, e, f, tj, 0, i, re, and the effect may remain av \, cv dv evflt gv hv \, in spite of that change. There can hardly be a clearer expression of the fact that it is the totality in its specificity, both of the stimulus and of the effect, that comes into account in acting, and nothing else. But what is the meaning of this totality ? Here we have used the word that embraces our problem, almost unwillingly ; we may say, that it came upon us unawares : the word " meaning." The totalities of stimulus and effect have a " meaning," and their meanings do not at all depend on one another piece by piece.

We meet a psychological term here, though we know that we are not allowed to enter the field of psychology : at any rate we have found something very strange. We now ask the important question : Is there anything like this in inorganic nature ? If not, one of our principles concerned in acting, the principle of the individuality of correspondence, would form a new and independent proof of the autonomy of the phenomena of life, of vitalism. Is it possible to imagine a machine, or rather, to con ceive the brain as a machine, the reactions of which, being individualised combinations of a high degree of complexity, change correspondingly with any sort of a stimulus which

is also itself individualised ? Or does it contradict the concept of a machine to assume that a typical arrangement of physico-chemical elements might respond to typically combined stimuli with always a typically combined effect, though the single elements of the one do not stand in causal relation to the single elements of the other ? In a former part of our lectures, when dealing with the physiology of metabolism and of immunity in particular, we said already that the indefiniteness of correspondence between specific cause and specific effect, always following the principle of adaptive regulation, may be taken as in dicating at least the autonomy of life-processes. It was of " simple " stimuli that we were then speaking ; but now we have to do with " individualised " stimuli, and it seems to me that a proof of vitalism is now possible instead of a mere indication of it, on account of the intimate nature of the correspondence between the individualised stimulus and the individualised effect, both of which are totalities.1

Goltz,2 when analysing the movements of frogs deprived of their hemispheres, introduced the term "answering reaction" (" Antwortsreaktion ") in order to state what happened in his experiments. He did not altogether avoid pseudo-psychology in his discussions, but, in spite of that, his concept seems to me to be as valuable as his experiments were. Indeed we may say that it is because they are 1 What this "totality," built up of singularities, is, can be best understood by an excursion into the field of pure psychology. The artist, a painter for example, bears within himself the complete totality of what he is to perform, and what afterwards is to be carried out by single acts of movement of his hand. In the same way the single phrases of a conversation, in spite of their consisting of single elements, form a totality that " means " something.

2 Beitrdge zur Lehre von den Functional der Nervencentren des Frosches, Berlin, 1869. ansivering reactions, or still better, individualised answering reactions, that actions seem to be beyond the reach of mechanical explanation. A few words may not be out of place with regard to the different possible kinds of " individuality " that stimuli and effects in acting may acquire. The individualised effects of action, as will easily be understood, may be composed according to order in time exclusively, like a phrase in a conversation or a melody, or according to time and space, like all objects of art or handicraft. The individualised stimuli may belong to the two classes just mentioned, but there is also a third class which is composed specifically only with regard to space : the perfect object of art or handicraft as a stimulus belongs here, and so does any typical object, any " Gegenstand." Also this last class of stimuli possesses an individual wholeness, as a table or a dog, for instance. We meet here the problem we met already when dealing with the problematic stimuli of instincts. The dog, " this dog," " my dog " is " the same " stimulus, seen from any side or at any angle whatever : it always is recognised as " the same," though the actual retina image differs in every case. It is absolutely impossible to under stand this fact on the assumption of any kind of preformed material recipient in the brain, corresponding to the stimulus in question,1 even if we intentionally neglect the fact that the material recipient would have been created by the stimulus in the individual's life : a recipient for the dog seen from the side would not suffice for identifying the dog from behind ! In fact — to speak psychologically —

1 Such an attempt has lately been made by von Uexkuell (Zeitschr. f. Biol. 50, 1907). identification or simple remembrance of sameness depends only in part on stimulation, and is in the main an active trying on the part of the Ego according to probability.1 We shall come back to this point later on. So much, for the present, about the "individuality of correspondence " in its bearing on vitalism. It always is an agreeable occurrence when two in vestigators in the same scientific field independently arrive at almost the same results, and as some such independent but contemporaneous discoveries have been made in the subject that we are now considering, I should like to ask your permission to say a few words about them. It was in the spring of 1903 that I first published the argument forming a new and independent proof of vitalism, which I just have explained to you, and it was at about the same time that the late philosopher Busse, in his book, Geist und Korper, Seele und Leib, brought forward an argument against so-called psycho -physical parallelism, which is almost identical with my analysis down to the smallest details ; and we knew nothing at all about one another. Busse uses a telegram as his instance, where I use a conversation, but that is the only difference. Later on we shall see that proving the autonomy of life, as revealed in acting, is indeed the same as defeating the parallelismtheory.

But there is still another case of independent argument to be mentioned. I was very glad to learn after this chapter was written that one of the most original thinkers of the present day, the French philosopher Henri Bergson, in his profound analysis of the relation between Mati&re et 1 Compare Bergson, and also the paper of von Kries : Ueber die materiellen Grundlagen der Bewusstseiiis-Erscheinungen, Tubingen, 1901. Mtfmoire,1 had, as early as 1896, established what I should call the autonomy of acting, by a discussion which, though confined to Psychology, and therefore different from my own analysis in verlis, is very similar to it in re. I most strongly recommend Bergson's book to all who take a deeper interest in our subject.

Let us call those arguments in favour of the autonomy of life which were gained from the analysis of the differentiation of the harmonious-equipotential systems as concerned in morphogenesis the first proof of vitalism. Let us call the evidence obtained from the discussion of the genesis of the complex-equipotential systems, which are the foundation of heredity and of many morphological regula tions, the second proof. Then we may see a third proof of vitalism in our analysis of the principle of the " individuality of correspondence," which is one of the chief characteristics of action. This proof is as independent and self-contained as the first two proofs ; nothing but the general logical scheme is the same, viz., a machine of whatever kind or degree of complication is not imaginable.

But our third proof is not yet complete ; we must add another half to it, and it was for this reason that we have so far dealt with it comparatively briefly. The principle of the individuality of correspondence, as we know, does not mean that there is a statical or fixed 1 Paris, 1896. — This excellent work was quite unknown to me when I wrote my Seele (1903), and is not even mentioned by Busse or by A. Klein (Die modernen Theorien iiber das allgemeine Verhdltnis von Leib und Seele, Breslan, 1906).

something, the brain, through which that correspondence passes, and the real nature of which — whether machine or not — is in question. The brain, or rather the reacting some thing, has been created in its specificity, has been made such as it is ly its history. The first half of our argument, therefore, though able itself, it seems to me, to prove vitalism, requires to be completed by another half, and this second half will be gained by a minute analysis of the " historical basis of reacting." Both our principles of action, we know, are united inseparably.

That which acts in action is, as we know, determined in its potential specificity by its individual history. All the stimuli it has received in the past, and all the effects of these stimuli, determine how stimuli may be answered in the future, in agreement with the principle of the in dividuality of correspondence. Here, now, we are faced by the very strange fact that a something, from which reactions are to start, is determined in the specificity of its faculty of reacting almost completely from without ; but not in the sense of a mere giving back of what had been received. We know, firstly, that it is solely the elements of the typical combinations received that form the basis of all reacting in the future, and secondly, that specificities are received in a very different field from that in which they are given off in reacting. So-called sensations, or rather typical constellations of centrifugal irritations of the central nervous system, are received ; movements, or rather typical constellations of irritations of centripetal nerves, are given off. It is the latter point, as we know, that distinguishes our reacting "something" from the phonograph.

I could not imagine any sort of " machine " so con structed as to react in the manner the organism does, and I suppose that you also will not be able to do so. Imagine that it is the medium, in the widest meaning of the term, and the medium alone, which makes a child speak English or German or French, that the medium only makes him a reader of the Latin or the Greek, or the Cyrillian or the Arabic alphabet, and you will become convinced still better perhaps than by mere abstraction, what an impossibility it would be to assume a machine to be the foundation and ' basis of these facts.

Does it not contradict the very concept of a " machine," i.e. a typical arrangement of parts built up for special purposes, to suppose that it originates by contingencies from without ? And, in fact, the " historical basis " of acting originates in its specificity by contingencies from without, and afterwards plays its part in the " individuality of correspondence." The " individuality of correspondence," even in itself, is inconceivable on the basis of something pre-established or prepared, since stimulus and reaction are totalities. But now what might possibly have been prepared a priori, proves to be not prepared but made from without, and made from without in such a manner as to allow of resolution into its elements and transport into another scene of events.

Mechanistic authors occasionally have brought forward some inorganic " analogies " to " experience " or to " memory " as the potential ground of experience. I doubt whether any one of them really thought he had given even the slightest mechanical explanation of the facts in question by doing so. In fact, what they have brought forward, it seems to me, does not even deserve to be called " analogy," much less " explanation " of the historical basis of reacting as it really is.1

In the first place, we must notice that — speaking psychologically — mere " memory," as the faculty of simple storing and identifying, is far from being the same as the " historical basis " as it plays its part in action. In psycho logical terms " association " comes in here, besides " memory " pure and simple, and not merely association alone but association submitted to judgment. Here again the " historical basis " is inseparable from its role in the " individuality of correspondence."

The so-called elastic after-effect, and some similar phenomena, have occasionally been called analogies to the historical basis. In my opinion, however, they are not even analogies to simple " memory " ; they may be analogies to " fatigue," but that is about the opposite to what is con cerned in "experience." Certainly an elastic ball is " altered " by its " history " ; but our critics must remember what we understand by this word in our definition, which is throughout of the style of a technical term. Others have objected to my argument by saying that the " reactions " of a mountain, with regard to its being slowly washed away by

1 A very careful analysis of my Seele has been given by Becher (Zeitschr. f. Psych. 45, 1907, p. 401). Becher is right in saying that my two "criteria" ought always to be regarded together. But his mechanical analogy to their being at work together (p. 428) fails, since he does not consider that the historical stimuli and the reactions of my "historical basis" belong to different fields of events. rains and rivers, also depend on its individual geological " history." Granite resists destruction longer than limestone, but why do my critics not say that a mountain " acts," whenever it is lowered by atmospherical agents ? In fact they do not say so — and I suspect they never will. But let us formulate the distinction as strictly as possible. In the elastic after-effect one and the same process occurs the first time in a typical manner, considered as to quantity, and the second time a little differently. In dynamical geology different phases of history are followed by merely passive different effects in later days, the first differences corresponding with the second in locality. In acting, however, historical specificities (including differences) in quite a special class of occurrences, namely, sensation in the widest sense of the word, are responsible for specificities (including differences) which firstly are active and true reactions to real stimuli in the narrowest sense of the term, and which secondly occur in quite another field of happening, in the field of movements. In the face of these diversities all " analogies " between " experience " and inorganic events appear to be a mere playing with words.

Analogies like these would never have been even suggested, had it always been borne in mind that so-called experience, or rather the principle of the " historical basis of reacting " in our strict definition, not only means the mere recollection of what has happened, but means also the ability to use freely in another field of occurring the elements of former happening for newly combined individualised specificities of the future which are wholes. We see one of our fundamental principles of acting always united with the other, and this fact may also be well expressed by

stating that the word " element," in its relation to the principle of the " historical basis," is throughout relative. " Elements " may be words, but may be the mere letters also, or whole phrases, or the mere lines of the written characters — just as you like. We understand how restricted the role of " association " in acting is : it is important, no doubt, but only as a means of acting ; or, to speak psychologically, association offers the material for judging, but is not judging ; and judging enters into all psychical acts that are more than association.

But as all so - called analogies of inorganic facts to experience are not really analogies, so, on the other hand, all endeavour to transfer the elemental organic or vital facts to the inorganic world are extremely misleading also. It is nonsense to speak about the stone " liking " to reach the ground, even if " liking " is only a psychological word for a natural process. There is nothing at all in the inorganic world even in the least comparable with the " individuality of correspondence." Modern monism, socalled, is unfortunately almost always a monism of mere phrases but not of ideas.

Let us then try to formulate in a definite manner our third proof of the autonomy of life, founded upon the analysis of acting as a phenomenon in objectified nature. All acting is correspondence between individualised stimuli and individualised effects occurring on a basis of reaction that has been created historically from without. physico-chemical tectonics of any sort, for the following reasons. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to imagine / £. ) a machine — in the widest sense of the word — such as to allow of even the individuality of correspondence in acting, taken alone. For it can be shown that it is not the single constituents of the stimulus on which the single constituents of the effect depend, but one whole depends on the other whole, both " wholes " being conceivable in a logical sense exclusively.

But to this first general impossibility is added a second, still more important, by an analysis of the character of the historical basis. That the individualised correspondence in acting takes place upon a historical basis, that its basis is made from without, is a very strange feature in itself — but here we have the phonograph as an analogue. The historical basis of acting — the " prospective potency " for acting, if you care to say so by analogy — differs in two fundamental respects from the phonograph, or from any sort of machine imaginable in physics and chemistry. Firstly, the effects that are given off in acting occur in a field of natural events very different from that of the stimuli received historically : sensations belong to one, movements to another field. Secondly, the historical basis serves only as a general reservoir of faculties, the specific combinations of the stimuli received historically being preserved by no means in their specificity, but being resolvable into elements ; these elements then — transferred, however, to another sphere of happening — are rearranged into other specificities, according to the individuality of the actual stimulus in question.

The " something " that " acts " has the innate faculty of producing some specific combination of muscular movements ; the combination it produces in a special case depends on the individuality of the stimulus present in that case, and on the whole of past sensations in the widest sense. This is the result of an analysis of action unbiased by dogmatism. This seems to be just the right place in our discussion to give a name to the acting something which we have discovered not to be a machine. We might speak of " entelechy " again, as we did in the theory of morpho genesis, but it appears better to distinguish also in terminology the natural agent which forms the body from the elemental agent which directs it. The words " soul," " mind," or " psyche " present themselves, but one of them would lead us into what we have so carefully avoided all along, viz., pseudo-psychology. I may speak of my " psyche "- —which is no more than saying " Ego " — but there " are " no souls in this sense in the phenomenon called nature in space. I therefore propose the very neutral name of " Psychoid " for the elemental agent discovered in action. " Psychoid " — that is, a something which though not a " psyche " can only be described in terms analogous to those of psychology. In fact, there can be no doubt that only the processes called " ab straction," " thinking," and so on, will enable us to under stand the correspondence of the two individualities in our important principle : and the process of so-called

" abstraction," regarded as a process occurring on bodies, cannot be performed by a machine. That is our justi fication of the name " Psychoid." If the analysis of instincts should help us some day to a true proof of vitalism, instead of offering only some indications towards it, it might also be said that a " psychoid " is the basis of instinctive phenomena. The usual difference between the " Conscious " and the " Uncon scious " would then have to be brought to its legitimate and truly philosophical expression by distinguishing between two different kinds of psychoids.

There certainly is a difference, expressed already by the want of experience in instincts. But there is a difference between the instinctive psychoid and morphogenetic entelechy also. The first systematic vitalist we know, Aristotle, saw these analytical differences very clearly and gave a very adequate denomination to them. Calling the spiritual principle, which he regarded as the real foundation of life, ^rv^rj in general, he carefully discriminated between three kinds of it. The lowest of all is the -ty-vyr) OpeTmtcr), the soul of metabolism, which, together with its modifications, called av^TiKr) and yevrjTiKrj, that is, the soul of growth and of propagation, may be said to represent our " Entelechy " as concerned in morphogenesis ; it is possessed by all organisms, plants as well as animals. The next higher class of souls is represented by the -^v^rj aiaQrjTitcij, the soul of sensation as well as of volition ; it belongs to animals only, and to some extent may properly be called the soul of instincts. It is only to men, according to Aristotle, that the highest soul, the vovs, is given, that is, the faculty

of reasoning, corresponding to what we have called the " psychoid " as regulating action. Indeed, it seems to me that the general classification of Aristotle may be accepted even nowadays, at least with a few modifications, if we give up his restriction of vovs as being only possessed by man. Certainly there is more than mere instinct in animals, at least if the word instinct is used in its original meaning, that is in the sense of purposefulness and perfection in reacting without any experience or anything similar to experience in any way. We do not intend to deny by this statement the great differences that exist between acting in man and acting in even the highest animals ; later on we shall learn a little more about these problems. But there certainly is " experience " in the proper sense of the word in many animals. In this respect I cannot agree with the terminology of Wasmann, though, what is more important, I almost wholly agree with his actual analysis of the facts in question.

We now have completed the outlines of our analytical study of action as such, and have given a distinctive name to its results. But we must not yet leave our present studies : the part which the brain and nervous system play in acting is not yet clear from what we have said, and a few words about the real differences in acting between man and animals may also seem to be required. According to our analytical researches so far it might seem as if the brain were almost unnecessary in acting ;,

but, of course, such an opinion would be very far from the truth. Let us then try, in the first place, to connect our analysis with a physiological problem which has been discussed very often in the last century, and which can by no means be said to be solved ; a problem that relates to our concept of the "individuality of correspondence," in so far as the process of the " individualisation " of the stimuli comes into account. I refer to the problem of the so-called " specific energy " of the sensory nerves, and you will easily understand that this problem is not unconnected with our analysis, if you remember that all stimulation to acting is transmitted along the sensory nerves.1