The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

According to Johannes Mueller, the father of the " law " of the specific energy, the meaning of this principle was that the specificity of sensation, say of red or green, or heat or a musical tone, was in some way a " property " of the single nerve fibre under stimulation, and that it was quite indifferent by what sort of an occurrence the stimulation had happened. Later science has transferred the speci ficity from the nerve fibres to specific localities of the brain, but the general view has remained almost the same, and Emil du Bois-Eeymond gave strange but clear expression to the doctrine when he said that after an operation which combined the ear with the optic nerve and the eye with the acoustic nerve, we should hear lightning as a crack and see the thunder as a line of sparks.

1 So-called •' spontaneous " actions are intentionally left out of account here, as they do not touch our most fundamental problems. No doubt something affecting the brain, in some way, is concerned in these facts also, and there fore no special discussion is required. logical part of the question concerned here, which is by no means an easy problem, and has been treated rather im properly in almost all essays on it. Even Johannes Mueller was wrong when he paralleled his principle with the Kantian doctrine of apriorism, with which it has nothing at all to do. Intentionally we shall take up the position of naive realism in the short discussion that is to follow, and shall not hesitate to enter for a moment into the field of pseudo-psychology.

We simply ask, is it true that the process of nervous conduction is always the same, and that specific qualities reach the brain only because specific parts of it have been stimulated without any relation to the nature of the stimulus ? It seems to me, I confess, that we are quite unable to say at present whether it is true or not. Certainly there is not a single instance brought forward in favour of Mueller's principle that can be said to be above all doubt. The often discussed fact, for instance, that cutting the optic nerve gives the sensation of light proves nothing, since, as all modern authors agree, this operation is not possible without stimulating the retina to a certain extent before the nerve has been cut quite through. The electrical phenomena, on the other hand, that are exhibited equally well in any stimulation of nerves whatever, are only secondary phenomena, and prove nothing either for or against the problem of qualitative differences in nervous conduction. There remain only the facts — strange as they are — of a localised feeling of say the hand or the fingers after the amputation of the whole arm, but not a single one of these amputations has been performed on an individual who had not already received the specific sensa-

tions in question in the normal manner during his previous life. There always had been many normal stimulations before the operation, and who is able to say whether the different localities of the brain may not have become specific ly having been stimulated specifically7: We shall come back to this question on another occasion. Now, on the other hand, the experiments made with the aid of an extirpation of parts of the brain, as carried out by Goltz and many others, have positively shown, as will also be discussed later on, that there may be a certain regulation in those parts, at least to a certain extent. Of course, there probably will be a difference in regulation according to whether the single parts of one and the same sensory sphere, or whether parts belonging to different " senses," are in question. There may be a regulability in the first case and not in the latter. But even then the principle of " specific energy " would be broken as far as the single elements of one nerve or the single parts of one so-called " centre " are concerned : one and the same element of the brain would be related to various qualities of sensa tion — at least with regard to one and the same sensory sphere — and, on the other hand, we could hardly escape the hypothetic assumption that one and the same fibre of a nerve is able to transmit stimulations that are different with regard to sensory "quality." This view is held at present by "Bering,1 while Wundt2 seems to go still farther in assuming what might be called the original equipotentiality of the brain.

false, as far as the adult is concerned, though it is perhaps quite false for the child.1 We soon shall enter once more into these questions. At this stage of our analysis the most important point for ourselves — strange to say — is not the question about the adequacy or inadequacy of the theory of " specific energies," but the simple fact that this whole problem does not touch at all our principle of the " individuality of correspondence" It was only to make this clear that our short remarks about the present state of the problem of specific energy have been made here.

In fact, if any kind of equipotentiality of the brain were positively established, a new and independent proof of vitalism might be gained from that fact alone. But even if Mueller's law held good, nothing would be affected in our previom discussion. For the principle of the " individuality of correspondence," one of the two foundations of our third proof of life -autonomy, only deals with the unity and individuality of a totality which is constituted by single elements, without asking in any way by what sort of processes the elements of the external " individualised " stimulus may be offered to the "something" that is reacting. That this something cannot be a machine remains equally true both if different processes of conduction may occur in the same nerve fibre, and if it is different localities of the brain which, when irritated, represent the different elements of the

1 In refuting the principle of a " specific energy," in the sense of Johannes Mueller, we, of course, do not intend to deny what may be called the specificity of sensation and its incompatibility with everything like move ment or energy. Whenever — to speak in the language of naive realism — sensation occurs, there always occurs something absolutely alien to that which "caused " sensation. But to cause specific sensation is not the innate specific potential property of specific parts of the nervous system as such.

" individualised stimulus." In neither case is this stimulus a mere sum ; and the fact that there is more than a sum proves in any case that there is more than a machine at work. Thus we understand that our analysis of action is in dependent of the problem whether the doctrine of " specific energy " be right or wrong. The great physiological im portance of this problem, of course, is by no means diminished by what we have stated ; but problems must always be clearly separated.

But now let us try to ascertain positively what the part played by the brain in acting is. We all know, of course, that the brain and the nerves actually do play a most important part in actions as in all movements ; for the sake of completeness, therefore, we are forced to state at least in general terms what that part is. Otherwise our whole argument about action might seem rather unconnected with well-established facts. At the beginning of the present part of our lectures we observed that we should study organic motions especially under the aspect of regulations, and we mentioned briefly that regulations may enter into these motions in three different ways. The specificity of movement may be determined, firstly, by the specificity of the stimuli coming

1 Compare besides the text-books of Physiology: L. Asher, Zeitschr.f. Physiol. d. Sinnesorg. 41, 1906, p. 157 ; Nagel, Handbuch d. Physiol. iii. 1 ; von Monakow, Ergebn. d. Physiol. i. 2, 1902 ; Lewandowsky, Die Functional des centralen Nervcnsystems, 1907. A very good historical and critical review of the whole subject will be found in C. Hauptmann, Die Metaphysik in der modcrnen Physiologic, 1893. from without ; secondly, by the specificity of the variable state of the motor organs ; and thirdly, by the specificity of the variable state of the central organs.

Hitherto we have been studying only the first class of these regulations. Our analysis, leading to a new proof of vitalism, was based exclusively on the correspondence of the stimuli and the reactions. The brain, and in fact organisation altogether, played no part in that analysis, but it will become important as soon as we come to study the other possible kinds of motor regulation. Let us say a few words, in the first place, about regulability of the brain functions themselves. This subject has just been touched in our remarks on the doctrine of specific energy. There exists anything but unanimity and agree ment in this field of physiology, and to form a proper judgment is very difficult for one who, like myself, has no personal experience of the matters in question, and is obliged to rely on the literature. On the one hand, the parts of the brain are regarded as almost completely equal in function, whilst, on the other hand, the utmost functional specificity, even of the individual cell, has been insisted on.

As far as I am capable of judging, it seems to me, from a study of the literature, both experimental and pathological, that two different fundamental factors are to be distinguished relating to the organisation of the brain and of the so-called cerebral hemispheres in particular, and each accounting for different results among the experimental and pathological facts. In fact there is an interesting parallelism between the brain and the youngest germ, inasmuch as they are con structed according to two different types of complexity. In

the mature germ 1 we had the intimate structure of mere direction, more or less regulable according to the state of the protoplasm, and the true material structure showing scarcely any regulability at all. In the brain of the adult, as we shall see, we find the two features — a simple structure for conduction and then some higher sort of tectonics, and here again only one of them seems to be regulable to any great extent. The hypothetic differences between the young and the adult brain with regard to regulability are paralleled, on the other hand, by the differences of the germ before and after fertilisation and maturation.

In the first place, the brain is a system of nervous connexions of almost inconceivable complexity for the work of conduction. I think we shall not be very wrong in saying that not only is every part of the brain connected in some way with every other, but also almost every part of the surface of the body is by the aid of the brain connected in some way with every other part.2 It is to these features that the functional regulability of the brain relates. It is a known fact that cerebral diseases, apoplexy in particular, diminish in their symptoms after a certain time, at least to a certain extent, and it is also known from experimental work3 that defects in the brain, caused by a localised

2 For man this statement can be proved as follows : You are able to decide voluntarily that when a certain point of your skin is touched you will touch with your finger another certain point of it ; the two points may be any you please. 3 Experiment is always better than clinical observation : for sickness may also have affected the faculty of regulability and may overshadow it where it exists. operation, are followed by sensorial and inotorial defects, but that these defects become smaller and smaller as time advances,1 until a certain maximum of regulation is reached. It is highly probable that this regulation, in part at least, is due to the fact that some typical nervous connexions in the brain, which had been destroyed by the apoplexy or by the operation, are restored after a while : not, of course, morphologically, for there is no actual restitution or re generation of any sort in the brain of vertebrates, but physiologically, in the sense that the functional connexion between the parts A and B is now, after the destruction of the shortest route, accomplished by some other of the many possible routes.

It was upon these facts that our doubts respecting the doctrine of the so-called "specific energy" in its extremes were based. The same facts, when more accurately and minutely established, might furnish a sort of new and independent proof of vitalism, by showing the brain to be what might be called a " functional harmonious-equipotential system." The specificity of a motory reaction is not dependent on the specificity of the brain as such, but the organisation of the brain is only used in order to perform a specific reaction, and its different parts may be used differently in such a manner that harmony, i.e. the specificity of the individualised effect in question, is never altered.

By no means do we wish these words to be understood as if the possible harmony of the parts of the brain in use were perfect in every case. On the contrary, in spite of 1 As a rule this diminishing of functional defects is attributed to the ceasing of the ' ' shock." Most recent authors, however, agree that use has been made a little too freely of "shocks." There can belittle doubt that this favourite term has often blinded us to the existence of true regulation.

the enormous manifoldness of cerebral connexions it can very well be imagined that certain apoplectical or experi mental disturbances will render functional reparation impossible. In such cases there is no longer any connexion between the points A and B, and clinical or experimental defects are permanent. But the permanency of such defects generally seems to have other reasons, and I hope we shall learn to understand them, if we now turn to study the second fundamental feature concerned in cerebral organisation. The brain is not only a system of connexions : it is something more. The specific differences of sensations, to speak psychologically, seem to require some specific arrangement in organisation, specifically localised, which render the brain mequipotential to a certain extent.

And these arrangements are really found to exist. Certain specific parts of the brain seem to have a specific functional value that is more than a mere locality of specific connexion, at least in the adult. Disturbances of these " spheres," as they are called, by disease or experiment are to a great extent irreparable. These cerebral specificities would seem to be responsible for the specificity of " sensation," and to justify as much of the old law of Johannes Mueller as will stand criticism, at least with regard to the adult. But they are not the only factors concerned in specific sensation : the specificity of the process of centripetal nervous conduction is another factor of importance. It is now granted by the first authorities in this field that at

least in one and the same sensorial sphere, such as sight, for instance, one nerve element may transmit different " qualities " in their specificity ; and as far as the sense of smell is con cerned I do not see any possibility of escaping this conclusion. The peripheral organs, being the seat of the real stimulation of the organism, in this way become responsible for the specificity of sensation to a very high extent, though not, of course, on account of the nature of the stimulating external agent alone, but also on account of their own (chemical ?) specificity.

Thus it is by the co-operation of both parts, the specific centres as well as the specific reception organs, that specificity of sensation occurs. The specific centres are not liable to regulation. But this is only true for the adult. Bechterew1 remarks that extirpation of the so-called motor spheres carried out in the newly lorn dog or cat has no effect whatever on its future motions. Moreover, it is a well established fact that aphasia may be almost completely cured by re-learning to speak. These facts seem to prove that " spheres " are not innate but created during life, and that even " spheres " are liable to regulation, at least in some cases. That would allow us to call the brain an organ which possesses originally the same functional " prospective potency " in all its parts, these parts obtaining their specific " prospective value " secondarily, and being able to modify it to a certain extent under certain conditions. Such a doctrine would be the

death-blow to the doctrine of " specific energy " in any sense. It is true, nothing has been actually ascertained here at present, so far as sensorial nerves and centres are in question ; no experiments have yet been made on the newly born. Might we expect that specificity of " centres " in the adult is completely a product of specificity of previous centripetal conductions ? — that by interchanging the connexion of the optic and acoustic nerves to their respective sensory organs in the newly born, the optic brain centre of the adult would be transferred to the place where the acoustic centre normally is, and vice versa ? Such ideas regarding " centres " as simply what is generally called " Einfahrung " in the single nerves, are rather revolutionary ; but one must grant at present, it seems to me, that they are possible, and that, so far as only one sensorial sphere is concerned, they even are probable. If they held good to the fullest extent, all kinds of " pressure -points," " heat -points," and " painpoints " found in the skin of the adult would prove nothing at all, of course, regarding innate specificities of nerves or parts of the brain : all specificities would originally be peripheral.1

1 The few "facts" relating to the specificity or non -specificity of nerves or parts of the brain, besides those mentioned above (p. 86), are the following, all relating to the adult. Stimulation of the chorda tympani, i.e. the nerve of taste, carried out directly by electric or mechanical agents, is always followed by a sensation of taste ; this fact, of course, may be interpreted in favour of the specificity of "centres" in the adult, but may also be related to a chemical process in the nerve, set up by the irritation. Langley succeeded in transforming a vaso-contracting nerve into a vaso-dilating one, and a motor nerve into one that stimulated peripheral ganglia ; a connexion of the central part of nerve A with the peripheral part of nerve B, and rice versa, had been effected here ; the experiment proves the possibility of centrifugal conductions leading to different results in one and the same nerve, it does not immediately relate to "centres."

I myself have laid stress upon the fact that in many of the transplantation experiments in young amphibial larvae, as carried out by Born, the brain has to accomplish quite abnormal duties, which it does in perfect harmony. See But enough of such hypothetic discussions : the cerebral physiology of the adult certainly does reveal specificities in the brain which are not liable to regulation. This is the right place to say a few words on that very ambiguous word, " brain-centre." At first the " centre " was conceived purely anatomically as a so-called ganglion, but this view has been abandoned, especially under the influence of Loeb and Bethe. Loeb1 then regarded the centre as nothing more than a typical locality of typical intracerebral connexions. It seems to me that this view is a little too restricted. As we have said, there may be specific functions in the brain, related to sensation, and these functions might be specifically localised, at least in the adult. Of course, the word " centre " would be a very suitable name for these localities.

But, most important of all, the very factor that determines the specificity of any cerebral or rather motor reaction is not a " centre "in any sense ; we have proved that this factor is not physico-chemical in character at all. So we may say, there is something more concerned in reactions starting from the brain or passing through the brain than mere localities of connexion, and something more also than my Seek, p. 42 ; also Braus, Anat. Anz. 26, 1905. The transplantation experiments performed on the earthworm, by Korschelt, Joest, and'Ruttloff, seem only to prove the possibility of nervous conduction going on in a direction opposite to the normal (Arch. Entw. Mech. 25, 1908). 1 Comparative Physiology of the Brain, New York, 1900.

localities of specific function ; but this " more " is not a " centre " in the sense of something in the brain. This " more/' our Psychoid or Entelechy, uses the conductive and specific faculties of the brain as a piano-player uses the piano. In these words is included what we are not entitled to attribute to brain-functions proper. Another very important topic now requires some further elucidation. The "historical basis of reacting" is created in its specificity from without ; it therefore must be marked in a certain bodily manner in the central nervous system. Let us try to show what this manner is. The immediate functions of the historical basis are of two kinds. It is an elemental fact, to speak psychologically, that a sensorial impression occurring the second time is known to be " the same " as the first impression ; this character, " sameness," may be called the first immediate function of the historical basis of reacting. Its second function is " association by contiguity," or the fact that any sensation is not only regarded as the " same " or " different," but that it also awakens the remembrance of other sensations of the past, which were connected with it in time or space on a former occasion.

It is in the brain that the possibility of the origin of these two kinds of elemental functions of the historical basis must lie in some way; experiments indeed show that they are present in it in a sort of specifically localised distribution. factor in acting identical with these bodily prerequisites of acting, or with their distribution : the brain is a sort of warehouse, a place of storing, and some day indeed we may understand its physiology. But the acting factor is not identical with the warehouse : it uses it, just as it uses the brain as a system of connexions.1 The brain, as a specifically organised body, possesses nothing but the faculty of storing all the impressions that have occurred to it in any way just as they are given, and, by doing so, it is able to become differently stimulated the second time by the same stimulus : the " having been stimulated " by it alters the type of its future effects. Borrowing a very convenient name from a book of Semon's,2 we may say that the brain possesses the faculty of storing " engrammata." But it only can store engrammata in the sense of given combinations of given elements, and therefore nothing but the psychical phenomena of simple recognition and of association by contiguity is immediately related to cerebral processes : it is absolutely inconceivable how the brain qua bodily brain could accomplish the new and free and " logical " rearrangement of the elements of the engrammata, following the lines of individuality.3 The storing of en-

1 It cannot be our task here to develop a theory of insanity, and so we may content ourselves with saying that in all "mental " diseases it is not the " mind " which is ill but the brain : on account of abnormalities in the brain the mind receives what might be called an " abnormal reality." The theory of hypnotism is also beyond the province of this book. Of course all hypnotising agents, though "psychical" in themselves, must affect the brain somehow. The same holds for the phenomenon of so-called "double consciousness." "What is generally called " subconsciousness " in psychology — a very bad term indeed — would be a psychoid of inferior order, according to our terminology.

3 Von Uexkuell's "schemata" promoting " iconoreception " and "motoreception" can be nothing except engrammata in the sense defined. Of grammata may be compared in some way, as already said on another occasion, with the elastic after-effect or even with the faculty of a phonograph, but the faculty of rearranging, nay, even the faculty of " association " by identity and contrast, has no relationship with any per formance of any combination of physico-chemical agents whatever.1

By a psychological analogy we shall understand still more easily and more fully what happens. It is the difference between association and apperception we are thinking of, or the difference between idea and judgment. The ideas come as they like, but I judge about their being right or wrong in each case. The first has real cerebral processes as its starting-point, the second has not ; it has been shown in our third proof of vitalism that the second cannot be a mechanical process of any sort. To summarise the most important points of this proof: the "historical basis of reacting" might be understood mechanically, if this basis revealed itself as it does in the phonograph ; but it reveals itself by free combination of its elements. Therefore a factor that is by no means like anything inorganic in any sense is concerned in