The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

1 To speak of an "inherited experience" here would only be to state the problem in another form. Besides that there is no good reason at present for assuming such an inheritance. Compare vol. i. pp. 278 ff. basis of reacting, i.e. secondary knowing and willing, comes into account, but they feel unable to accept autonomical teleological agents unpossessed of these secondary faculties. Schneider, Pauly, Strecker and many others among modern authors take this view ; Kant, it seems to me, thought similarly, for he left open the question of vitalism proper, and only advocated formal teleology in morphogenesis and metabolism, though he was not opposed to the theory of so-called " psycho-physical " interaction.1

But it is my firm conviction that we cannot avoid the admission of vitalistic autonomic agents possessing no experience, i.e. no " secondary " faculties, and yet endowed with specific knowing and willing : indeed, as far as morphogenesis and physiological adaptation and instinctive reactions are concerned, there must be a something comparable metaphorically with specified knowing and willing, but without experience. Of course, we must be careful about what has to be "known" and "judged" and " willed." This problem seems rather easy to answer in the light of morphological restitutions. Here the end to be attained is the normal organisation ; that " means " towards this end are known and found may seem very strange, but it is a fact ; and it is a fact also, in the case of what we have called " equifinal regulations," that different means leading to one and the same final state may be known and adopted.

As to the primary faculties concerned in adaptation great theoretical caution seems to be advisable. We have already urged on a former occasion that it is quite 1 Compare my book, Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und ah Lehre, Leipzig, impossible to imagine even by analogy how the organism could " know " that any substance when taken in either by the intestine or by the skin will poison it. But it is possible to imagine that the organism knows how to act, whenever the functional state of its life is on the point of becoming disturbed, and that it then does something to repair the disturbance. In fact we have noticed that " anti bodies " are not formed till after poisons have entered the organism, and we have noticed changes in the permeability of surfaces that do not occur until after the abnormal specific exchange of material between the medium and the fluid of the organism had gone on for some time.1

1 The concept of "function" may seem to require a little further logical sifting in this place beyond what was said about it in the first volume (pp. 168 ff.). In the strict meaning of the term a part of an organism is "functioning" when it performs that kind of specific metabolism which is normal to it ; the totality of all the normal metabolic performances of the parts of the organism is its "normal functional state." If this state is disturbed from without, "adaptation" may restore it; this adaptation consists in a specific change of the functioning of a specific part. So far everything, it seems to me, is quite clear, and so far the concept of "func tioning" was discussed at great length in the first volume of this work. But the word "functioning" may also be applied in a certain other sense : not relating to the performance of a certain organ as such, but to the relation or effect of this performance with regard to other parts of the same organism, or even the whole organism. It is the "function" of the cells of the pan creas to secrete trypsin ; let us call this their "proper function." But by secreting trypsin the pancreatic cells prepare material for assimilation by all the other organs of the individual : that is the " harmonious function " of the pancreas. And in the same way it is the "proper" function of the cells of the bones to secrete salts, whilst it is their " harmonious " function to support the organism mechanically. We now see what ' ' adaptation " of the disturbed " functional state" of the organism, carried out by a change of functioning in a certain part of it, really means teleologically.

The harmonious function of a certain part — its role in the total unity of the living individual, in other words — had been disturbed by disturbing the "functional state" from with out : and this disturbance of harmonious functioning, or the harmony of func tioning, is rectified by adaptation. Indeed, only because it leads to the restoration of this harmony, is the change of the "proper" functioning of the organ in question adaptive. In this way, regarding it only as a kind of description, I see no fundamental difficulty in speaking of entelechy's primary " knowing and willing " ; at least no other descrip tion of what happens seems to be derivable from any species of analogy.

We shall now regard entelechy from yet another point of view, necessitating a comparison between organisms and crystals. From ancient times the organism has been called an individuum, i.e. a something that cannot be divided without ceasing to be what it was. " Individua " in this meaning are the atoms of the Organic, the words " individuum " and aro/jiov indeed expressing the same thing. If this view is held, entelechy must be said to represent the individuum, to be itself individualising. But it is only with some restriction that modern science can make use of the con cept of the individuum. We know from experimental work that the organism, both adult and embryo, can be divided without change of its nature, since it restores its parts to new wholes. The term individuum, therefore, if applied to bodily forms, is incorrect, at least in very many cases : parts of an original individuum may be individua too, at least potentially. Perhaps it would be more success ful to apply the term individuum to entelechies only and not to bodily forms : but if we do so the fundamental problems of the divisibility of entelechy and its relation to matter at once present themselves. The discussion of

these very central problems of biology must be reserved for a future chapter. Let us rather restrict ourselves at present, and let us ask : In what sort of natural bodies are entelechies mani fested, and in what relations do these bodies stand to other bodies in nature ? All bodies l may be classified according to two general views : they are either homogeneous or combined, and their form is either accidental or essential. Homogeneousaccidental bodies are called amorphous ; they are without any interest for our present discussion. Combined-accidental bodies play a great role in geology : islands and mountains belong to this class ; their form is given to them from without by processes which are parts of a cumulation, as studied in a chapter of our first volume. Homogeneousessential bodies are crystals, all typical arrangements of crystals, such as so-called dendrites, and all other varieties of form capable of being assumed by homogeneous matter, such as figures produced by the shrinking of gelatin or albumen or some other material. Combined - essential bodies are organisms and artificial products exclusively.

One of the great differences between crystals and organisms is that crystals are of the same material nature throughout, while organisms are not. The other fundamental difference relates to their manner of origin. Organisms 1 We shall not insist here on the problem of what is meant by "being a body." This question — the subject of a theory of matter — is not a proper problem of theoretical biology. originate from a starting-point which exhibits less visible manifoldness than does the end ; crystals are always themselves, and might almost be said to show nothing but mere increase of size. A third difference might be found in the fact that crystals during their growth use the specificity of their medium in its very specificity, whilst to organisms the medium is only a means of growth, their specificity resting in themselves ; but I shall not lay much stress upon this point in our present analysis.

It may be objected to the second of our definitions that researches of the last few years, especially those of Rauber and Przibram,1 have shown a very high faculty of restitution in crystals. Broken crystals, in fact, are not only capable of restoring the parts that are wanting, a process resembling regeneration, but are also able in some cases to transform themselves into a new and smaller whole, by changing all their proportions — a process which resembles the differen tiation of an harmonious-equipotential system. How could I say in the face of such facts that crystals are always themselves, and show nothing but mere growth ? I could say so, because in spite of their so-called " restitution," crystals go through their formative processes only with the aid of the forces which also determine their growth, and with no other help whatever. These forces show different intensities in the different directions of space, embracing a typical arrangement of the relative maxima of these intensities, and this character of their formative forces, taken together with some relations of tension between the solid material of the crystal and the solution surrounding it, is sufficient to

explain normal growth as well as so-called restitution : the same thing happens all the time. In this respect crystallisa tion is a mere process of addition, in spite of so-called restitution : the material of growth always comes from the solution in its specificity, and the typical form is completely determined by the directed forces of all the minute particles of the crystal. Knowing the forces of one particle and knowing the physical conditions existing, we know that this sort of growth must occur. Ultimately everything may be reduced to some sort of molecular arrangement : the specificity of the arrangement gives the specificity of the distribution of forces of different intensity. A crystal thus can be said to be " whole " in each of its parts, not only " potentia " but " actu," and all processes of restitution in it only relate to a change in the arrangement of such " wholes," the result of it being not a proper " totality " in itself.1

I have said a little more about crystallisation than might seem to be necessary, because nowadays the analogies between crystallisation and morphogenesis are being unduly pressed.2 It is my opinion that there are analogies, nay more — 1 I have shown elsewhere (Arch. f. Entw.-mech. 23, 1907, p. 174) that Przibram was wrong in saying that crystals are harmonious-equipotential systems, according to my definition, because in some cases they are capable of changing their exterior form after disturbances and producing a new smaller proportionate whole. There is nothing whatever like a "prospective potency" concerned in this process, as there is in organic harmonious restitution : there is only a change of place going on among equal parts. Even this change of place is not one single process, but the result of two independent processes : something is taken away in one locality by the forces of the medium, and something is added in another locality by the forces of the crystal. I have never said that the mere fact of regeneration proves vitalism ; but the special nature of the ' ' systems " that form the basis of organic regenera tion does prove it (see vol. i. page 241 f.).

2 Compare also the article by Hofmann in Annalen der Naturphilosophie, 7, 1908, p. 63. It seems to me that Hermann's argument cannot stand against the analysis given in the text and in the preceding note. identities ; but only in so far as crystallisation is one of the means of inorganic nature employed by entelechy for its purposes. Morphogenesis, however, only uses some features of crystallisation, which, taken by itself, has nothing to do with any organic phenomenon.

The combined essential bodies called organisms originate, like crystals, with materials delivered from without in the form of oxygen and nourishment. But the starting-point of an organism does not use these substances directly ; it first forms out of them what is to be used, and its manner of employing them is anything but a mere addition : it is a consecutive series of typical differentiations typically placed. To build up the organism as a combined body of a typical style is the task of entelechy : entelechy means the faculty | of achieving a " forma essentialis " ; being and becoming are united here in a most remarkable manner : time enters into the Timeless, i.e. into the " idea " in the sense of Plato.

Even elementary physiology teaches its student that the organic form is " forma essentialis " in yet another sense of the word. The form of the organism is not only built up typically, but is also kept in its normal state, in spite of a permanent change of material, by metabolism in the widest sense. Some authors have spoken of this feature as " dynamical equilibrium." The expression is a harmless one, if it is to denote nothing but the mere permanency of form in spite of material changes ; but nothing is " explained " at all by such terminology, and still less does it reduce anything to the inorganic sphere, as uncritical physiologists have some times asserted.

We know already that not every event that takes place during morphogenesis and metabolism is the direct outcome of entelechian acts, and it seems worth while to say a few more words about this point. And first let us remark once more that different kinds of entelechies may be said to be at work in the organism. There is first the entelechia morphogenetica, and after that the entelechia psychoidea, and the latter may be discriminated as governing instincts and actions separately. Furthermore, the different parts of the brain, such as the hemispheres and the cerebellum in vertebrates, may be said to possess their different kinds of entelechy. In fact, we may speak of an order concerning the rank or dignity of entelechies, compar able with the order of ranks or dignities in an army or administration. But all entelechies have originated from the primordial one, and in this respect may be said to be one altogether.

Now the primordial entelechy of the egg not only creates derived entelechies but also builds up all sorts of arrange ments of a truly mechanical character : the eye, in a great part of its functioning, is nothing but a camera obscura, and the skeleton obeys the laws of inorganic statics. Every part of these organic systems has been placed by entelechy where it must be placed to act well in the service of the whole, but the part itself acts like a part of a machine.

So we see finally that the different forms of harmony in the origin and function of parts that are not immediately dependent on one another,1 are in the last resort the consequence of entelechian acts. The entelechy that created them all was harmonious in its intensive manifoldness : the extensive structures which are produced by it are therefore harmonious too. In other words, there are many processes in the organism which are of the statical-teleological type, which go on ideologically or purposefully on a fixed machinelike basis ; but entelechy has created this basis, and so statical teleology has its source in dynamical teleology.

We now see the full meaning of the statement that entelechy is an " intensive manifoldness " realising itself extensively ; in other words, we know what it means to say that a body in nature is a living organism ; we have given a full descriptive definition of this concept. But how can an " intensive manifoldness " be an elemental factor in nature ? The answer to this question will depend, of course, on what is understood by the expression " elemental factor in nature." In other words, a detailed analysis of this concept will serve to show us the circumstances under which it is legitimate or illegitimate to speak of a factor of nature as elemental.

Materialistic dogmatism would reply here that the concepts of mechanics or energetics are the only legitimate elementalities of all science — but we have nothing to do with dogmatism of any kind. The principle of so-called " economics of thinking," as prevalent nowadays, might say, on the other hand, that 1 See vol. i. p. 107. every elemental natural factor is legitimate by being necessary. Whenever analysis shows that there is something hitherto unrecognised in nature that is not to be expressed in terms of natural factors already known to science, then — and then only — "economy" would allow us to create a new elementally, and would only want to find out whether this new factor is to be regarded as a " constant," or a "force," or a sort of "energy," or what not. To the epistemological " economist," whose summum jus is to be " practical," science is mere experience, and for him there is no such thing as real philosophy — nothing higher than science. Of course, any new factors, created in this style, would by no means " explain " but merely " describe " in a shortened way : but the economists say there cannot, be any thing except description in this sense.

We are by no means partisans of modern empiristic "economism," and therefore the question as to the epistemological justification of our newly created natural factor is to us an important problem. A COMPLETE system of ontology has to develop the sum of aprioristic concepts and principles regarding nature on the principles of reasoning. It cannot be our task to do so here, and it would not even be necessary for our immediate purposes. Our endeavour is, in the first place, to show how our concept of entelechy as an elemental natural factor is related to those concepts of general ontology which play any part in the science of inorganic nature. On a later occasion a few words on the theory of categories will be added.

The concept of the univocal determination of being and be coming may be called the very starting-point of a philosophy of nature. No states and no events in nature are without a sufficient reason for their being such as they are at such a place and time, and the same thing always is or happens under the same conditions. These are the most general expressions of the principle of univocality. Of course, nothing in the doctrine of entelechy is opposed to them ; given certain circumstances, and given a certain entelechy

in a certain state of manifestation, there will always be or go on only one specifically determined event and no other. I do not give the name of " causality " to this principle of natural necessity or determination. Causality relates to a particular kind of changes exclusively, and the relation entelechy bears to it will be discussed later on. Our principle of necessity or univocal determination relates to everything that may be or happen in the universe, without any reference to the character and nature of the changes in the case of things that happen. Of course, this principle holds, whether entelechy plays its part in a series of events or not. The facts in the universe that originate in entelechy will be univocally determined as such whenever entelechy is such as it is, and entelechy is either of this or of that deter mined kind. And, moreover, any single spatial occurrence induced or modified by entelechy has its previous single cor relate in a certain single feature of entelechy, as far as it is an intensive manifoldness. It would be quite inconceivable to assume anything else, though our assumption leads to the consequence — strange as it is — that nothing really new can happen anywhere in the universe. All happening is " evolutio" in the deepest meaning of the word.

We repeat once more that even when dealing with those entelechies which govern action, we never have to do with true psychical facts, but only with natural events. But we must now refer to a certain most remarkable relation which is generally expressed in psychological terms. In the philosophy of nature we are not allowed to speak of any " freedom " of acting, in the real and strict sense of the word, in the sense that is contrary to univocal determina tion. It is quite impossible to imagine that, with given

circumstances and a given psychoidal entelechy, there ought to be or to happen either A or B. On the contrary, what is to happen is quite fixed, and a supreme mind, conversant with all the inorganic facts of nature and knowing all the intensive manifoldness of all entelechies and psychoids, in cluding the individual history of the latter, would be able at once to predict the actions of any psychoid with absolute certainty. Such prediction is just as possible as it would be in pure mechanics, as stated in the fiction of the " Laplacian mind." It is interesting to note that almost all philosophers and theologians who go really into the depth of analysis are unanimous in rejecting indetermination in nature. In Christianity the word " grace " is a short ex pression indicating the impossibility of indetermination in nature, placing " freedom " in the metaphysical sphere : I am not even free to believe or not to believe, but to be able to believe is a gift of grace.

For the present we have to follow the course prescribed by a phenomenological philosophy of nature ; there will be another occasion to deal with the problem of " freedom " from a very different point of view. We now approach the realm of real " causality," that is, of univocality with regard to changes in space exclusively. How does entelechy stand to this concept, now that we have learnt that it does not contradict univocal determina tion in general ?

ENTELECHY may be aroused to manifestation by a change in bodily nature, such as is effected by fertilisation or by some operation, or by some motor stimulus ; and, on the other hand, entelechy may on its own part lead to changes in bodily nature. All this is very general ; it asserts that entelechy may be related to causality, i.e. to the principle of connexion of changes in spatial nature. But it does not make the smallest assertion about the most important question : " Is entelechy by itself a specific form of causal connexion, or is it not ? " This question must, however, be answered.

Now let us recollect that not every single event in space resulting from the manifestation of entelechy has its own single external cause. It was precisely on account of the impossibility of this being the case that our concept of entelechy was created. We should not need this concept if there were to be found a single external cause of every single step in the differentiation of an harmoniousequipotential system, and we should not need the psychoid were it not that action is a whole and not a sum. The single steps in the manifestation of entelechy are, as we know, uni vocally determined, but they are so by their being united in the intensive manifoldness of their realiser: thus they seem to be acausal with regard to real " causes " which are not embraced in this manifoldness, but are single changes in space. In other words, it is the essence of an entelechy to manifest itself in an extensive manifoldness : all the details of this extensive manifoldness depend upon the intensive manifoldness of the entelechy, but not upon different spatial " causes." With regard to morphogenesis we thus may speak of an immediate correlation of parts that is non-causal, as indeed K;idl has done in a somewhat different connexion. There are combinations of single diversities always interchanging with one another, but each singly independent of the other; their common ground is the specific intensive manifoldness of the entelechy that realises them. Thus the problem of the relation between causality and entelechy seems by no means simple, and therefore we shall best approach our subject by a rather lengthy series of analytical considerations.

First let us analyse a little more deeply the pure con cept of causality,1 as understood in inorganic sciences. 1 A general discussion of "energetics" will be found in my Naturbegriffc und Natururteile, 1904. I fully maintain what is said in that book about energetics itself ; but as to the relation between entelechy and energy the following discussion will be found to differ from that of 1904 not inconsider ably. I hope that this change of my opinion will be found accompanied by improvement.

A complete system of natural ontology, whilst dealing with causality, would have to develop more specified principles regarding it. Some such principles have indeed been found by naturalists, but, strange to say, they are generally regarded nowadays as being of an empirical and inductive nature, while in reality they are quite otherwise. The principle of " phases " and the principle of the " least action " are cases in point. We shall not make use of these principles in our discussion ; but we shall apply and therefore shall insist more fully upon the analysis of two specific aprioristic causal principles which have played a great role in the history of inorganic sciences : I refer to the two so-called " principles of energy."

It seems to me that these principles, generally spoken of as the "conservation of energy" and the "augmentation of entropy," have their logical sources in the different aspects which causality offers to a thorough analysis. The " cause " of an effect in spatial nature is that change in spatial nature which is invariably and " necessarily " followed by the effect. We now may consider this relation of " causality " in a more general and more specified manner.