The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

We first imagine the totality of a " system," that is, a limited part of space including all the natural realities embraced in it. We study the states of the system as a whole at the different moments ^ and t2, all causal relation between it and its surroundings being excluded. Then we assure ourselves that the causality of the system with regard to its surroundings has remained unaltered in amount in spite of all internal changes. The system's state at ^ as a whole has been the " cause " of its state at U ; but as a causal system with regard to its surroundings it has remained the same.

Let us now study two systems in the sense described, and let us assume that there are causal processes going on between these two systems, but in no other way or direction. Then we call the whole of the change of the totality of the one the cause of the whole of the change of the other, and are convinced that both changes are equal in amount. It is upon these two fictions that the principle of the conservation of energy rests, and from these two fictions it derives its two fundamental modern formulations : " the energy of an isolated l system is constant," 2 and, " any loss of energy in one isolated system corresponds to an equivalent gain in another one," and vice versa. Robert Mayer was well aware that his principle was based upon an aprioristic foundation, and he did well to place in the beginning of his discussion the two phrases : " causa aequat effectum " and " nihil fit ex nihilo aut ad nihilum." In fact, it is upon a combination of the categories of causality and of quantity that the aprioristic part of the principle of the conservation of energy rests : energy is causality quantitatively determined.

1 It is meaningless to speak of the energetic constancy of the universe, as long as the problem of its material finiteness or infiniteness is unsolved. In the case of its infiniteness, of course, to speak of " constancy " would be altogether meaningless. 2 An important but secondary formulation of the principle in question is the following : the amount of energy of an isolated system is univocally determined in every movement, and the total causal effect due to such a system — the "work" done by it — if its "energy" is reduced to zero, is independent of the way of transformation.

But causality may also be conceived in a very different fashion, which enables thus the foundations of the second so-called principle of energetics to be laid. In this case we may speak of specified causality. We imagine a limited system again, but it is the singular diversity of all sorts of physical and chemical agents concerned in it that we consider. We then find that diversities in the different single parts of the system are the necessary condition that anything may happen in it at all ; that nothing can happen unless there are original diversities. For the sufficient reason of happening would be wanting in a system which was uniform throughout, wanting at least so far as the system was uniform. Only if an element or any part of a system is different from others can something happen on that particular element or part. Such, at least, is the most general ontological source of the second principle of energetics : it relates to specificities in causation, just as the first principle related to generalities.

But we shall postpone all further discussion of the second principle of energetics to its proper time, and shall first try to establish a little more about the principle of conservation and its relation to entelechy. With this discussion we enter a part of our philosophical studies which, though not final, is to rank among the most important considerations of this whole course of lectures. We have shown that there are classes of phenomena in living nature which do not allow of any resolving into elements known from the study of the inorganic world.

But we have shown nothing more. The important question now inevitably arises : What are the ultimate relations between the inorganic and our autonomous entelechy? What is the meaning of saying that inorganic factors are not sufficient for explanation ? In what way are in organic factors, so to speak, counteracted in the organic world ? That the closest relations exist between the organic and the inorganic is most clearly shown, for instance, by our studies of the " means " of morphogenesis ; moreover, it is evident from the mere fact that every organisation exhibits as many different systems of organs as it is able to perform functions, in other words, as it shows mutual relations to the inorganic. In fact, knowing what it means to be an organism, and what the different agents of the medium are, one could really deduce what systems of organs an organism must possess.

Thus our important question is inevitable. We are simply obliged to attack the problem as to what the most intimate relation between inorganic nature and entelechy implies. We shall try to get a solution by degrees, studying one by one the general scientific conceptions of the inorganic world, and always bringing entelechy into relation to it. We shall begin with so-called energetics ; pure mechanical physics is to follow. What then does it mean to assert, as we do, that the Organic crosses the border of the Inorganic ? What does it mean in terms of energetics and of mechanics ?

And what is to follow ultimately from this discussion about the problem of " entelechy and causality " ? " Energy " is a measurement and nothing else ; it measures the amount of causality given off or received by a limited system in no other sense than the kilogramme or the pound measures the amount of gravitating matter. The unit of this measurement, the " erg," is of the nature of " work/' in the terminology of mechanics. " Conservation " of energy means that there is a something in all truly causal processes, as denned above, which retains its quantity, though it may change in its character l from body to body, or rather from place to place. So far the principle of conservation is purely aprioristic ; it becomes empirical as soon as its application to the special realms of natural sciences begins. Only mechanics must be regarded as an exceptional field of knowledge in this respect, for, as ontology teaches, the principles of pure rational mechanics, and among these the general equations of motion containing the principle of the conservation of energy in its mechanical form, are aprioristic throughout. It is — almost unconsciously — for this reason

1 I intentionally avoid the term "quality" in this connexion. that " work," that is to say the amount of one of the two kinds of energy in mechanics, has been accepted as a standard measurement of energy in general. But that in thermo dynamics the so-called quantity of heat must be measured by " ergs " and not temperature, is a real empirical fact. In general terms we may say that the general form of the principle of conservation is aprioristic, though its special content, regarding the kind of quantity to be measured by ergs, is empirical, pure mechanics excepted.

may perform a specific amount of work pi, that is to say, may overcome the force p along the distance /, and, on the other hand, the force p affecting the body along the dis tance I will impart to it the kinetic energy — v2 again ; and one so-called calorie is always " equivalent " to 424 kilogrammetres. But things are far from being as simple as they seem at the first glance. The law of the conservation of energy is far from being empirically true if only those natural agents which are actually measurable as performing work are taken into consideration. But the truth of our principle is postulated by reason, and therefore the empirical incorrectness of the principle is corrected in a very interest ing way. Whenever the principle fails to hold, so-called " potential energies " are postulated, into which actual energy may disappear or from which it may originate. Such potential energies play their role in the theories of gravitation, of electricity, elasticity, and some other branches

of physics, and also in chemistry. There is nothing actually stated or measured in the case of all these potential energies : it is simply assumed that there must be a some thing representative of quite a definite amount of " ergs " in order that actual energy may not seem to arise out of nothing. We therefore may properly call all sorts of potential energies subsidiary : they are " real," so far as possibilities can be regarded as real in ontology, but they never are immediately real in any sense.1 In this meaning there " is " a certain amount of potential energy whenever a pendulum reaches one of its highest points. This amount is regarded as equal in quantity to the " work " performed by the pendulum whilst overcoming gravity, which " work " again is equal to the kinetic energy of the pendulum at its lowest point. Quite the same holds with regard to all the other natural agents mentioned above, the concept " work " having a more or less figurative meaning in these cases.

After these preparatory discussions we now may ask : firstly, how stands entelechy to the principle of the con servation of energy, and secondly, how stands entelechy to the concept of energy itself ? 1 Empiricists often claim that potential energies are really proved to "exist" by the fact that it always is the same amount of measurable energy which enters into the potential forms, and which is able to arise from them. But it is clear that this "fact " rests simply upon the general principle of the univocality of nature, and that, if it should not prove to be empirically true, we by no means should abandon the conservation principle, but should invent as many more supplementary energies as were necessary.

an aprioristic principle is absolutely impossible. The ques tion, therefore, is not, "is the doctrine of entelechy in harmony with the first principle of energetics ? " but, " how is harmony to be established here ? " In other words, the principle of conservation is unimpugnable as an aprioristic principle, but the type of its inorganic realisation may be changed or enlarged without hesitation. Let us remember once more that the principle of con servation is merely quantitative, that it says nothing at all about the quality or direction of events. What could this principle mean in its relation to processes of life in which entelechy is at work ? It seems to me that two different answers to this question are a priori possible. Take an organism in the midst of a given limited medium, and imagine that we know, on the one side, the energetic value of any possible event leading from the medium to the organism, and, on the other side, the energetic value of any possible event leading from the organism to the medium. Then it is possible that the sum of the energetic values of both kinds of events is the same, or that there is a differ ence, either in one sense or in the other. In the first case, we should say that in passing through processes of life energy is not changed in its quantity at all ; in the latter case energy would seem to be changed by passing through an organism ; it would either be partly stored in some un known form, or be awaked into actuality from some unknown form of storage. Whatever might happen, we should find a way to unite it with the general principle. The unknown energy spoken of in the case of a difference of the amounts of energy entering and leaving the organism, would be of the potential or subsidiary kind ; and we should know

nothing more about it, except that it must exist in some form — though not in any form known from the Inorganic ; but nothing would be established about its role in the processes of life. Before going on in our analysis, let us appeal to certain facts regarding the actual relation between the inorganic forms of energy and vitality. The latest researches, carried out most carefully, especially by Eubner and Atwater, have shown that there is no difference at all between the sums of energy leaving and entering the organism, as far as the adult organism is considered, in which metabolism is almost completely functional and not morphogenetic. Considering the heat of combustion of the food, and comparing it with the heat of combustion of all excreta, added to the thermodynamical equivalent of the actual work performed, the two values are found to be equal within the limits of error.1 Such a result greatly simplifies the problem of energy : subsidiary energies are unnecessary for understanding functioning energetically. The results would be different, probably, if in the place of the adult the developing organism were the subject of study : but it seems to me that even in this case a real equation between the energy taken in and the energy given out might be gained, if all substances which are chemically stored during ontogeny, or rather, which are stored as chemical ones, were considered

1 A good summary is given by Zwaardemaker, Ergebnisse d. Physiol. 5, as given out, and were measured according to their heat of combustion also. Thus we see that the principle of the conservation of energy is actually or probably demonstrated by the organism in the clearest form ; but, what is still more important, we also have seen that it would " hold " for the organism, even if the forms of energy known to us should not appear sufficient to form a complete equation of the organism's economy.

But what about the role of entelechy, and what about its relation to energy ? Ostwald, the present head of the energetical school, and many others following him, have admitted that, in cases of morphogenesis, and probably in nervous phenomena too, some unknown potential forms of energy may be at work ; and, in fact, a few such authors, as Bechterew, for instance, claim to be real " vitalists " at the same time, stating that the specificity of vital pheno mena and their autonomy is due to the peculiarities which that unknown energy possesses, just as mechanical energy has its peculiarities regarding direction in space, and radiating energy regarding periodicity.

In order not to complicate our problem we say nothing in this place about the general question whether it may seem advisable altogether to deal with the concept of energy in this manner, regarding it as elemental, and speak ing of " properties " and peculiarities of energy. Elsewhere 1 I have fully explained that I should not like to adopt such a view, which seems to me very artificial and unnatural. At this place we have only to ask, Is it possible in any, even an artificial and unnatural way, to speak of a sort of subsidiary or potential energy as being the natural agent called by ourselves entelechy ?

That the energy in question would be a subsidiary one, would not in itself be an objection to such a view. So-called chemical energy is of that kind : it is always the mere difference between two amounts of thermic energy that is called chemical potential energy — that is all. But, it is true, the " vitalistic energy " would be a rather strange sort of energy in one respect. It would be absolutely indiscoverable, since there would not even be any difference between two discoverable energies. At least in all cases where the economic equation is fulfilled there would seem to be no place for a " new " energy. Vitalistic energy, therefore, would mark nothing but a point of passage or transforma tion of known energies, and would not be storable in any way. But, it seems to me, not even this difficulty could be said to be absolute.

There exists, however, one objection to regarding entelechy as being of the type of an energy that seems to me to be absolute. All " energies," actually known to exist or invented to complete the general energetical scheme, are quantities, and relate to phenomena which have quantity among their characteristics. In asserting these phenomena to be of the energetical order, we state that there can be a more or less of them, and that this more or less possesses most distinctly

the faculty of being measurable, as being equivalent to a more or less of actual " work." But entelecliy lacks all the characteristics of qiiantity : entelechy is order of relation and absolutely nothing else ; all the quantities concerned in its manifestation in every case being due to means which are used by entelechy, or to conditions which cannot be avoided. It therefore seems to me that it is not only rather imaginative to speak of a vital kind of energy, just as it is rather imaginative to speak of all other sorts of " potential " energies, but that it is absolutely wrong and contrary to the fundamental principles of definition and terminology. It is not legitimate to subsume a something under a general concept as one of its species, if this something differs from the general term just in that property which is the most important and essential. Science does better not to classify after the principle " lucus a non lucendo."

Therefore entelechy is not a kind of energy, but in spite of that it does not disturb the validity of the first principle of energetics.1 This principle would hold in life, even if an equation of economy were impossible. New subsidiary energies would then have to be created in fact ; but these new subsidiary energies would have nothing to do with entelechy and vitalism. Whether they exist or not is a 1 Short formula of the relation between entelechy and the first principle of energetics : — In a given limited system the sum of energy remains 2 (E) = Const., whether entelechies are concerned in the system or not.— I do not lay much stress upon the often-quoted fact that so-called "mental work" done by a man has never been found to affect the general economy of the body, including the consumption of energy, though, of course, this fact might seem to be favourable to my views. On the other hand, the fact that, if a person imagines that he is performing movements, the circulation in the brain vessels is increased, allows of no univocal conclusions.

question by itself, which certainly cannot be answered with out actual empirical research. Thus I decline, even more decidedly than in my former publications,1 any kind of " energetical " vitalism whatever. What, then, " is " entelechy if it is not a special kind of energy ? More preparatory considerations are required to decide this most important question. 1 See in particular iny Naturbeyriffe und Natururteile, Leipzig, 1904. The study of the second principle of energetics is to be our next problem. It will bring us to the intimate relation between the non-energetical entelechy and the energetical factors of the Inorganic.

It has often been said that the " first " principle of energetics says nothing at all about becoming, as such, but only deals with something connected with becoming. But, as we have seen, there is another most general causal principle easily to be developed by pure reasoning : the principle that there never can be any becoming where no diversities exist. It was in the limited field of thermodynamics that a correlate of this general principle was first established. Clausius and Lord Kelvin independently found a short expression for the relations between heat and the work actually done by it ; both of them started from an old but very ingenious analysis of the motive force of the steamengine, due to the French engineer Sadi Carnot.

The expression mentioned has assumed very different forms. Lord Kelvin speaks of the " dissipation " of heat, whilst Clausius begins his analysis with the principle that heat cannot pass by itself ("von selbst ") from a cooler to a warmer body. He ends with the phrase " the entropy of the universe tends to a maximum," the concept " entropy " signifying a special mathematical function which belongs to the specific characteristics of any thermodynamical process. There are many other formulations of the same principle.

Helm was the first to cross the boundaries of thermo dynamics with regard to the principle here in question, and Ostwald was his chief follower. Helm formulated a general " principle of becoming " (" Satz des Geschehens "), stating that differences in the factors of so-called " intensity " must be present in order that becoming may be possible, and that the raising of one intensity is only possible by the decreasing of another. It should be mentioned here that modern energetists regard every sort of energy as composed of a factor of " capacity," such as mass, specific heat, electric quantity, and of a factor of " intensity," such as velocity, temperature, electric or chemical potential, and so on.

I have tried to show on another occasion l that there are two constituents of a very different logical character in what is usually called the " second " principle of energetics. The proper principle of becoming is but a specified formulation of the aprioristic phrase, belonging to the realm of general ontology, that nothing can happen without diversities, and that the originating of diversities demands pre-existing diversities. This principle is of an equal logical value with the principle of conservation ; like the latter, it is empirical only as far as it applies to real nature. That the intensities, and these only, must be different, and that an intensity can only be raised by another intensity falling and becoming able to " do work," is the empirical part of it ; but that a " something " must be different was prior to all experience. As an illustration of this true second principle of energetics we may remark that in the very largest quantity of water, say the ocean, nothing at all would happen "by itself" if the temperature were the same throughout, or if the surface level were the same everywhere, though the absolute amount of " energy " contained in the water is enormous. There would be no differences of the intensity either of thermic or of potential mechanical energy in these cases. And on the other hand, it is on account of such differences alone that a steam-engine does mechanical work, or that a waterfall can produce electric potentials.

Let us notice, by the way, that this fact of non-becom ing in the absence of diversities in intensity might lend countenance to the proposal to call the real second principle of energetics the " first," the law of conservation the "second" principle. The in tensity -principle is "first" far more immediately. Moreover, the conservation-principle is only ideally true ; only with reference to a zero-point for all energy could all energy practically be measured ; but such a zero-point can never be attained. This shows once more that the conservation-principle rests far more on reasoning than on facts.

But let us return to the principle of Carnot in its enlarged form. Besides the aprioristic principle of becoming there is a purely empirical statement concerned in almost all of the formulations of the so-called " second " principle : " dissipa tion " or " augmentation of entropy," as it is called. This is a mere fact that is encountered in almost all fields of physics. Its importance may be realised by trying to think of a case where it is not found. In abstract mechanics a pendulum may go on possessing kinetic energy and potential energy alternately ad infinitum, it may swing for ever. But a real pendulum will soon cease to swing, on account of friction. "Dissipation," in the form of heat-conduction, here occurs by friction. We speak of the law of dissipation as the third or " empirical " principle of energetics.

It is clear from our statement that what really gives a certain sense to natural phenomena is not the true aprioristic second principle dealing with the necessity of diversities of intensity for becoming, but the empirical principle of dis sipation. Without dissipation all events in nature might behave like the ideal pendulum, there would be a permanent change of diversities, but diversities would never disappear. Experience shows that that is not the case. Of course, it is not meant by this doctrine of dissipation that all becoming which results from different intensities leads immediately to an average value of intensity, and thus to an end of becoming, as all purely thermic becoming does. In all cases where transformations of energy occur, where one kind of energy appears at the cost of another, on account of another energy " doing work," there is an increase with regard to the

energy which appears. But this increase is not only due to the decrease of the intensity of the other kind,1 but it is always of a smaller amount than the corresponding decrease had been : the difference between decrease and increase has been " dissipated," and has thus been lost for future changes in nature. By our last remarks we have been led to the important problem of the " catenation " or " chaining " of different kinds of energy, and by this we shall be led back to biology. There exists a specific equivalence between the factors of intensity of different energies, just as there was such an equivalence between the amounts of energy as such. The increasing of the intensity of any one energy stands in fixed relations to the decreasing of the intensity of the others, in such a manner that there is fixed not only what has been called the " coupling " of one energy A to the energies B, C, and so on, but also the amount of this coupling. By this fact of coupling the concept of the diversity of intensities is enlarged in a very important way : it becomes relative. There may be " equilibrium " if there is so much of the intensity of one energy and so much of the intensity of the other, and there may be a disturbance of equilibrium if the relation of the two intensities is changed.