The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

For, granted even that there are not more different single elements — taken as truly homogeneous constituents of the system, as so-called "phases" — at the end of the differentiation than there were before it began, there certainly is a greater amount or degree of diversity in the distribution of different single elements at the end than at the beginning, and this greater amount of diversity with regard to distribution is created by the sole agency of the system itself. What about this very striking fact ?

A mixture of oil and water, which afterwards separates into a layer of oil and a layer of water, shows also a greater degree of diversity or heterogeneity in the distribution of its elements at the end than at the beginning, and such a phenomenon becomes still clearer if three substances are mixed which are of different specific gravity, and will remain individual phases for themselves. But all such events go on under the influence of an external factor, — gravitation. Such an external factor that could be responsible for the increase of the amount of diversity in distribution is wanting in the case of the differentiation of harmonious-equipotential systems.

Now we know that an harmonious-equipotential system is endowed with entelechy, and that the function of entelechy is to suspend and to set free, in a regulatory manner, pre existing potentials, i.e. pre-existing faculties of inorganic interaction. What does that imply with regard to the origin of differentiation ? An harmonious-equipotential system is, as we know, of such a kind that out of any one of its cells any part of the organism may originate. But, as morphogenesis depends in the main on chemical and aggregative trans formations, this means that in each cell of a harmonious system the same number and kind of chemical-aggregative reactions are possible} Only part of these possible reactions become actual in each cell, and these actual reactions are different according to the relative position of the cells. This transformation from possibility into actuality is the funda mental work done by entelechy, based upon its elemental action in suspending possible becoming and relaxing the suspension when required.

It seems to me that it is a phenomenon of quite funda mental importance. If we agree to distinguish between a " diversity of elemental composition" of a system and a "diversity of distribution'' we may say — Entelechy, though not capable of enlarging the amount of the diversity of composition of a given system, is capable of augmenting its diversity of distribution in a regulatory manner, and it does so by transforming a system of equally distributed potentialities into a system of actualities which are unequally distributed.

Thus, what first appeared as a mere description of " differentiation " now appears as the immediate effect of 1 The word "possible," of course, is not to be understood here in the sense of "infinitely actual" (see page 186, note 1), as in a certain theory of catalysis. It is entelechy that suspends actuality in the present case ; with out entelechy there would at once happen all sorts of chemical reactions until "physico-chemical equilibrium" was reached.

entelechy, and as the " definitio realis " of " differentiation " at the same time. " Differentiation/' in fact, passes the limits of inorganic events. It is worth while to illustrate the differences between the diversity of elemental composition and the diversity of distribution in a still more concrete though schematic form. A harmonious-equipotential system may consist of n cells, each of them composed of m different (chemical) constituents. In each cell every constituent is able to react with every other; in other words, there exist chemical potentials or affinities between each possible pair of constituents in each cell. So far the given " diversity of elemental composition," kept in mere potentiality by the suspending action of entelechy. But now entelechy proceeds to actuality, and it does so by enlarging the amount of " diversity of distribution " in the system in question : actually, out of all the possible reactions in each cell, only one is allowed to happen, and this actual reaction which determines the " prospective value " of the cell, is different in each. The specificity in each cell is regulatorily determined by entelechy, and thus entelechy transforms a " homogeneous " distribution of given different elements and given possible reactions into a " hetero geneous " distribution of effects.

Now that the study of entelechies which govern typical order in space has given us such an important result, let us glance at some features connected with action, i.e. with the work of entelechies related to typical order in time. the workman is building a small house with the bricks. It is clear, without any deeper consideration, that the system represented by the bricks is passing from a state of almost equal distribution into a state of distribution showing a very marked degree of diversity. But you answer me that each single brick is brought to its place by a single external factor, namely, by a single act of moving, on the part of the workman. That is true, certainly. But if you consider the workman plus the heap of bricks, and, of course, plus the medium, as the " system " to be studied, the whole problem acquires a very different aspect. Certainly there were many diversities in one part of the system, that is, in the man, at the beginning of the process; but at the end of it there is a very much higher degree of diversity in the whole system, as regards the distribution of elements at least : for the heap of bricks has greatly augmented its amount of diversity, and the man has lost none of his. Thus we see that the " system " has enlarged its amount of diversity of distribution by factors which lay exclusively in itself.1 It is the same result as we got from the study of the harmonious morphogenetical systems, regarding this very point of the " diversity of distribution."

There is only a difference in so far as in morphogenesis the " suspending " act of entelechy relates to the material elements of the body exclusively, while in action it relates immediately to the material elements of the brain, and 1 The energetical factors of the medium, of course, can only claim to be necessary for becoming in general, but have nothing to do with the originating of diversities in our system. By the aid of one and the same amount of oxygen, food, etc., the workman may either transform the original homogeneous heap of bricks into another homogeneous heap, or construct any kind of small house he likes.

through the brain — and the muscular system — affects a certain external material also. But this difference does not touch the chief point in question. At the first glance our analytical results seem to contradict the second — and also, of course, the empirical third — principle of energetics. For, if diversities can be created without pre-existing diversities, the absolute amount of diversity in a given system is not only not diminished, as the third principle postulates, but is most decidedly increased, and this without any external event. And yet there is no contradiction to the usual second and third energetical principle, but something quite different, for we have not admitted any augmentation of the number of elemental diversities by what we have said, nor have we allowed any increase of diversity with regard to differences of " intensity." We only have stated that an increase of diversity with regard to the distribution of elements has occurred from within, a diversity with regard to tectonics,1 so to say. But about this point nothing is affirmed "by any of the energetical principles, either

1 A very good instance of the augmenting of diversity regarding distribu tion but not elemental composition is offered by the process of printing. Take the compositor and the types as forming our "system" : by the action of printing, which is a real "action" in our analytical sense, new types, of course, are not created in any way, but the types present, which at the beginning showed a fairly simple order of distribution, say in about fifty-two boxes, will at the end show a state of distribution of the highest imaginable complexity.

positively or negatively ; the energetical principles relate to the diversity of potentials or intensities exclusively. Now it would be wrong to conclude from this fact that there is no opposition between inorganic and vital phenomena. But the opposition does not relate to the true second principle of energetics, but relates to a certain more general ontological principle that might have been established with regard to inorganic events, to a principle that in fact is realised in a certain form in the Inorganic and in a certain other form in the Organic,1 but that, so to say, has been forgotten by physics and chemistry.

This principle may most generally be expressed as follows : — " It is impossible to transform any system that possesses a certain state of diversity among its actual and potential constituents into a more heterogeneous state by the sole agency of the system." Our principle becomes limited to the Inorganic if the words "constituents" and "agency" are understood energetic ally, and in this form, of course, implies the true second energetical principle as a sub-class ; but even then it speaks of any kind of diversity, even of mere diversity of spatial arrangement, and not only of diversity with regard to intensities, as the latter does.

What is done by entelechy now contradicts or rather exceeds our principle in its general inorganic form, and here 1 It is very strange to note, that from this point of view the moat remarkable biological phenomenon of "retro-differentiation" (as it occurs in Clavellina and Tubularia, compare vol. i. page 163), in spite of its biological exceptionality, appears more similar to inorganic phenomena than ordinary differentiation does: there is a decease of "diversity of distribution" in retro-differentiation.

lies the contrast between inorganic and vital becoming : organic systems may acquire a higher degree of diversity of distribution without reference to other than their own energetical agents. But — the agents of organic systems are not energetical agents exclusively: one of their agents is entelechy. Therefore our principle, in its most general, strictly ontological form, can be shown not to be contradicted or exceeded by vital facts — otherwise it would not be a strictly ontological principle ; nay, otherwise the principle of univocal determination would be violated. The principle of univocal determination postulates that nothing happens but what is related in only one way to the rest of the Given. Formulated with special reference to the origin of diversities of any kind, the principle would demand that any increase with regard to any kind of diversity must be referable in but one way to pre-existing diversities, corresponding to the increase that is studied ; in other words, that every newly originating singularity is referable to a pre-existing singularity.

Our analysis taught us that a certain general ontological principle of becoming diverse is exceeded by vital facts if expressed in limited inorganic terms, but that entelechy plays a part in vital facts. But entelechy is an intensive manifoldness, embracing a real system of pre-existing diversities in itself: thence it follows that by our argument the principle of univocality is as well observed as ever, and that our principle of diversity in its most general form is observed as well. Also in organic systems diversities are only created on the basis of pre-existing diversities, even if external agents are excluded, for organic systems are governed by entelechy, and therefore contain all possible future perceptible diversities in an imperceptible latent form, but qua diversities ; l in short, differentiation is " evolutio " in the ontological sense of the word.

Of course the principle of univocality does not appear here in the form of real spatial causality, as will be seen later on. Physicists, particularly in this country, have very often contrasted vital with physical principles. As far as these statements relate to pure mechanics we shall have to deal with them later on. But there is one famous instance of an assertion that organic processes may contradict the true second energetical principle, at least in thermodynamics. The principle of Clausius, that heat cannot pass from the cooler to the warmer body unless an equivalent amount of work is performed, has been said to be possibly contradicted by something like an organism. The famous instance we refer to starts from so-called mechanical physics, but as it does not touch the

1 We have not said a single word in our discussion on the so-called vital "self-motion" of a particle of matter, and, in fact, should reject this "concept" most emphatically. "Self-motion" is self - contradictory, if applied to a particle of matter alone. We do not even admit the creation of motion by entelechy, but merely the regulation of existing motion, as will become still clearer in a later chapter. mechanical principles as such, it may be mentioned at this place.

Maxwell imagines two boxes of different temperature, communicating by a small hole, which may be closed and opened as you please. Now, he says, let us assume that there is a sort of " demon," who is able to move the door of the hole at his pleasure, and who only opens it when a molecule of great velocity is passing from the box A to the box B, but in no other case, the temperature of B being the higher one. The result of doing so will be, that the temperature of B, in spite of being the higher one, will be raised at the expense of the temperature of A; and this contradicts the second principle of thermo dynamics.

It seems to me that in Maxwell's fiction things stand just as they did in our instance of the workman and the bricks, where only an increase of diversity of distribution was accomplished by the vital agent. Let us not forget that " temperature " as such does not exist for Maxwell from his mechanical point of view : molecules in motion are his elements to be studied, each of them endowed with a specific velocity. His " demon " deals with these molecules as our workman with his bricks ; he does not create diversities of velocity, he only increases the amount of diversity in the distribution of differently moving molecules. In this sense there is no contradiction in Maxwell's statements to the general principle of the role of diversities in general becoming ; there only is a contradic tion to the second principle of mere thermodynamics : but " heat " and " temperature " are nothing elemental to the mechanical physicist. Of course, the empirical law

of the dissipation of energy would be contradicted by Maxwell's fiction.1 Let it be well understood : Maxwell's argument rests upon a fiction, and does not assert that life contradicts any energetical law. But it is important, since now, after our own analytical discussions, it may really be applied to life as to a natural autonomous reality. 1 It has often been said that the "second principle" of energetics does not hold for mechanics, but the "true second" and the "empirical third" principle have always been confused in such an analysis. It seems to me that the true second principle (" principle of becoming") finds its mechanical expression in the simple phrase that a system of bodies all moving in the same direction with the same velocity is unable to change its individual velocities. The law of dissipation, our "third empirical" principle, has been applied to mechanics by Boltzmann on the basis of calculations on probability. To express the chief point in our terminology : a homogeneous distribution in any system of moving bodies, endowed with different velocities, is more "probable" than a heterogeneous distribution.

Are we now at length prepared to decide what sort of a factor or agent or elemental value entelechy may be in nature regarded as a whole ? First of all it may be not quite out of place to say a few more words on so-called " phenomenalism " as the basis of natural science. So-called pure phenomenalism, so much in vogue nowadays, never is what it calls itself in the strict sense of the word, even if it rejects the concept of a priori. Even then it is not based upon " phenomena " exclusively, and ought rather to be called empirical idealism. For phenomena alone — that is, the mere sum of what is immedi ately "given" in the form of so-called sensations — would never allow science of any sort to be formed. The Ego is not only receiving but is also producing, and what is generally regarded as the "world," even by unscientific people, is for the greatest part a product of the producing Ego. Now, the " Given," as conceived in space of three dimensions, as regarded to " exist " even when it is not directly perceived, as subjected to causality in its different forms, may well be called " phenomenological," so far as it

is not regarded as something absolute, i.e. metaphysically — and science is possible without regarding the Given in this way. But the Given in this sense, though existing with respect to the Ego exclusively without further analysis, has already been made a " conceptum," and is no mere " perceptum " ; it is not immediate, but " enlarged " givenness. So much for the present on this important point, and on our manner of using the term " phenomenological." Our "phenomenalism" is identical with critical non-metaphysical idealism ; in this form it is the only basis of science that is quite free from prepossessions of any kind, and therefore all science should start from this idealism, even if meta physics is to form its end.

The question as to the logical or ontological nature of any factor or agent in the realm of the Given, in the sense explained, is simply the question with what kinds of general categories, concerned in the creation of the mundus conceptus, these factors or agents may be co-ordinated. We know already that energies and the intensities of energies are among the factors constituting the " world " in the sense of a phenomenon conceptually enlarged. Most of you, I believe, will also know that there is another class of such factors, commonly called " constants." Intensities and constants are both properties of bodies ; intensities are variable or temporary properties, constants, as their name implies, are permanent properties. These constants show very clearly the conceived character of natural factors in its contrast to mere perception. Specific heat, conductivity,

mass, etc., are instances of constants ; but so are also, in a more complicated degree, the terms expressing the transformability of one sort of energy into another, and as constants must also be regarded the relations of affinity between chemical elements and the specificity of the direc tion of the attractive forces that appear in crystallisation.1 None of these constants, in fact, gives us any information about anything that is immediately observed or perceived ; all of them deal with possibilities only, with possibilities of immediate becoming, which " exist " as realities in the most general meaning which this word can have in true idealism. Constants are expressions for possible immediate experiences of different but elemental kinds, they are concepts created in order to simplify the survey of the whole of possible experience. Their creation, however, is not only a matter of our own choice, but has to go on according to the funda mental characters of the organisation of mind.

It follows from what we have said that a sort of order of complication exists among all the different classes of constants conceived by phenomenological philosophy. The simplest class relates to simple physical properties only. Specific heat is a good instance of this class : it is an expression of the degree in which a substance is accessible to heat. The physical constants combining two fields of energy, dealing with the transformation of one into the other, form the next higher class, whilst chemical and crystallographic constants, the one dealing with the mutual relations of constants of the physical order, the other dealing with the specificity of directed forces, form the two species of the highest class.

We know already that it is not energy and not intensity, since quantity is not one of its characteristics. For the same reason it cannot be a "force" in any of the very ambiguous meanings of that word. Could it be called a " constant " ? I thought so once myself ; 1 I thought it possible to speak of the entelechy of an organic system as its " constant " in the sense of its permanent property ; the word property meaning the same as it does in the Inorganic, where it is to signify nothing but the possibility of becoming that would be actual with regard to immediate perception. But it now seems to me that the word " constant " can be applied to an entelechian system only in a very metaphorical meaning, if at all : for a constant always is the property of a body, always is a something that is really possessed by the body. Only by help of the categories of substance and inherence can the real relation of a constant to its bearer be properly understood. Our next lecture will show that we are not at all able thus to regard the relation of entelechies to the material systems upon which they act. So then it must be sufficient to state it here in a more provisionary and apodictic way : entelechy is not a constant. We may only say that in this specific harmonious system or in this acting system we are studying there is something which is constant, viz., its prospective potency, which comes into all its reactions in the same manner. But this some thing which is constant is not " a constant."

Let us only say in this place that entelechies remain " elemental " also with regard to their true ontological character, just as they were elemental with regard to the law they obey. Entelechies are not energies, not forces, not intensities, and not constants, but — entelechies. Entelechy, as we know, is a factor in nature which acts teleologically. It is an intensive manifoldness, and on account of its inherent diversities it is able to augment the amount of diversity in the inorganic world as far as distribution is concerned. It acts by suspending and setting free reactions based upon potential differences regulatively. There is nothing like it in inorganic nature.

We have learnt that there is a sort of scale of constants in the Inorganic, leading from simple physical constants to the constants of chemistry and crystallography. As far as what happens is regarded exclusively in relation to univocal becoming in general, we could say that this scale is con tinued in the Organic, and that entelechy is the next degree of it. Morality, considered as a phenomenon in nature,, might perhaps be said to form the highest degree of all. But there is a gap between the constant factors of the Inorganic and the factors concerned in the phenomena of life that is not to be filled, as far as the relation of these factors to matter is taken into consideration. Owing to this gap the scale of factors of becoming, if taken as a whole, possesses only a certain descriptive value.

Once more we remark here that nothing " psychical," in the proper meaning of the word, is introduced by our entelechy : entelechy is an elemental factor of nature, con ceived to explain a certain class of natural phenomena. I well know that the word " explaining " is very ambiguous, and that in all " explanation " there is a good deal of moving in a circle. Constants are said to explain, aiid so are entelechies and specific kinds of forces and energies. What is actually done here is nothing but a kind of subsuming the single phenomena under certain classes of generalities derived from the singularities them selves, and the question must remain at this very un satisfactory point in " pure " phenomenalism or " empirical idealism," as advocated by Mach, Ostwald, Pearson, and others. On the basis of our critically idealistic philosophy, we may look a little more optimistically upon " explaining." According to this doctrine, the generalities which are con sidered to " explain " are formulated according to the immanent and categorical principles of reasoning a priori, and what empiricism adds to them only consists in the co ordination of some truly inductive general terms with the categorical generalities. In other words, the general type of all so-called natural laws is known independently of the amount of experience, and is only brought to consciousness by experience, and it is only the empirical addenda to these laws that are first " abstracted " from empirical singularities, and after that serve to " explain " these singularities. Not only constants in their different specificities but also specific

enteiechies are instances of these empirical addenda. There is no difference in this respect with regard to the sciences of the Organic and the Inorganic. Later on we shall see that with regard to apriorism also inorganic and organic natural factors are on equal terms. We now leave the realm of energetics, with all its consequences, and turn our attention to another possible interpretation of nature. Ordinary qualitative energetics is by no means a complete system, even of inorganic nature : the problem of matter, in other words, the problem of the " being material," of the " being a body," is almost forgotten. But the problem, though neglected, is still there. Now it must be granted that a science of inorganic nature seems possible which should not put aside the problem of materiality and should yet remain qualitative. Such a possible science would have to deal not only with qualitative energies and intensities, but also with the concept of qualitative forces, defined on the analogy of " force " in mechanics, and would regard ultimately the inorganic universe as a system of geometrical points, from which lines of different kinds of qualitative forces proceed — representing heat, electricity, chemical affinities, and the different characteristics of the states of aggregation. The word " quality " would have two