The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

very different meanings in such a scientific view : it firstly would be used in the simple sense of a property, such as warmth or redness, but secondly, there would be qualities with regard to " bodiness," so to speak, and this second class of qualities would relate to the problems of materiality, especially to the problem of continuity or discontinuity, which is almost wholly neglected by common energetics. As a complete qualitative science of the Inorganic, as sketched here, does not exist, it is enough to have mentioned its possible existence. We pass on to a more commonly known scientific point of view.

It is very difficult to introduce in a really legitimate way the possibility of so-called mechanical physics, that is, the interpretation of nature as a pure mechanical system, and the reduction of all quality in nature to mere constella tion of elements. Mechanical physics has been called a " metaphysical hypothesis," i.e. an assumption which relates to something absolute, and might some day prove to be true ; but such a view without further explanation is not compatible with an idealistic philosophy. Others have called the theories of mechanical physics " fictions " or " pictures," adequate to describe by analogy the relations of natural phenomena with regard to their quantity only, but possessing no value beyond that of mere " economy of thinking," which might even be reached better in some other way. It was this point of view in particular that led science to

its qualitative period,1 for it was quite a natural result of regarding mechanical theories as mere fictions to reject them completely as mere ballast, superfluous for a pure description of phenomenalities. But in spite of these attacks mechanical physics still lives in our days, and, more than that, in the theory of electrons it is undergoing a remarkable renaissance. . That seems to prove that there is a great vitality in these theories, and indeed it seems to me that they are much more than mere fictions, though, on the other hand, they by no means relate to anything absolute. It is owing to innate necessities of the human mind that they arise again and again. They always arise whenever science tries to reach the final problem of " the Material " as such, and when science tries to explain the varieties of material states and of ordinary qualities on the same basis. A system of nature that is complete and at the same time free from logical and real contradictions needs mechanical physics of a certain form, and cannot be satisfied until it has succeeded in demonstrating the variety of the " Given " as being due to a mere arrangement or constellation of some elements, the law of whose behaviour is known aprioristically, at least as to its general scheme. To modern " purely " phenomenological science the combination of pro perties, of constants in particular, in one and the same " thing " is a mere given state, a something that is merely

1 It is not the place here to deal with the elimination of causality as advocated by some modern empiristic phenomenalists. As may easily be conceived, this elimination is based upon a philosophical doctrine that is altogether incomplete, and so too is the mathematical form of this " functional " phenomenalism. The philosophy of nature cannot be satisfied by the mere statement of necessary dependence ; it asks for causality in its strict ontological form.

to be acknowledged. But that is by no means satisfactory. Mechanical physics offers a real explanation of the problem of the combination of properties, and at the same time it allows us to understand another important problem, which is insoluble in any other way : the problem which may be called the systematics of natural events and properties in the Inorganic. In fact, mechanical physics in its ultimate aim tries to prove all combinations of properties in one thing on the one hand, and the totality of possible properties (and events) as such, on the other, to be the mere outcome of the possible kinds of equilibrium or causality of elemental matter. To mention only one class of phenomena that may be thus explained : mechanical physics shows us firstly why there may be so many kinds of typical atoms, it shows us secondly why there may be so many kinds of molecules, and it shows us thirdly why there may be so many kinds of crystalline systems. In order to do so it only has to solve certain problems about the possible types of equilibria in space, first of electrons, and then of atoms, and finally of molecules. Thus all its problems, to some extent, become mere problems of geometry.

All that we have said is absolutely independent of the present state of mechanical physics ; it is true whether classical mechanics holds the field, operating with one kind of material elements (" mass "-elements) and two kinds of primary forces, or whether we shall have to reduce mass to electrons, and to consider space as a sort of activity in the form of " ether." to abandon the metaphysical view of the older mechanics ; in this respect it may learn from modern energetical phenomenalism. But mechanical physics is not a system of " fictions." Mechanical physics is " phenomenalism " in the enlarged meaning of the term as we have defined it, it deals with the " mundus conceptus " as presented to the mind ; but it is a thorough -going, a truly ontological phenomenalism.1 Its general scheme is aprioristic or ontological, its specific form at a given time is truly " hypothetic," with reference to what " existence " means in enlarged phenomenalism ; in this sense molecules may be found to exist some day, just as do the nucleus and the chromosomes of a cell.

So much for the epistemology of mechanical physics ; its merely psychological starting-point is given by the science of acoustics : here we actually know that a body emitting sound is " the same " as is " also " a body moving in a special manner.2 We cannot discuss here the most important words 1 It was the great fault of many modern phenomenological physicists to confuse theoretical mechanics as a rational and aprioristic science with the knowledge of the actual motions of perceptual bodies. In fact, rational mechanics is above experience, and is only called into existence by it. Rational mechanics cannot be "false," it would hold, even if all actual movement in the universe did not obey the law of Galilei — as modern electrodynamics asserts, at least for very great velocities. Actual movement then would not be pure "mechanical" movement, but would be pure movement corrected by an electromagnetic field. Rational mechanics isnothing but enlarged mathematics, or rather a step beyond real mathematics in general categorical ontology.

2 The corresponding perception of two "senses" is also the chief reason for distinguishing practical "reality" from "illusion." "the same" and "also,"1 which lie at the very root of philosophy, in spite of their everyday character; it is enough for us here that acoustics forms the most simple bridge from quality to motion in constellation ; from sound to heat is but a step. We repeat that the kinds of motion " corresponding " to heat (in general words — molecules, atoms, and electrons) are in their epistemological character as " real " as are the moving particles of air corresponding to sounds. Or better : all of them are either " non-real " or " real," as you choose ; certainly they are of the same degree as to " reality," the word reality being taken in the sense of " possibility of perception." Hypotheses come in here, of course, as to the specificity of what is not yet actually perceived ; but that there must be a " something," with regard to discontinuity, which is of the degree of the molecule or the atom or the electron, is not an hypothesis but an assumption immedi ately suggested by certain facts.2

The best reason, finally, which forces us to make the subject of science proper not " sound " and " heat," but the movement of a something, as soon as there is any evidence that there is " also " movement where there is sound and heat, is epistemologically given, as we know, in the possibility 2 If molecules or atoms were ever " discovered " — perhaps by the aid of an " ultramicroscope " — what would be immediately perceived would be sensa tions, though— on account of the length of the waves of light— not sensations representing the molecules or atoms directly. But would therefore the molecules or atoms be "red" or "green," or at least "dark" or "light"? By no means, but discontinuities with regard to sensations would compel us to say that here we have a field for applying certain concepts which are waiting for application in our mind. As concepts atoms would be points from which fields of force are radiating. All this is not metaphysics, but analysis of " enlarged Givenness."

of applying nothing but geometry. Psychologically we here find ourselves face to face with the simple fact that " pushing and pulling," i.e. mechanical causality in the crudest form, is the only kind of causality we are able to perform ourselves. In this sense alone do we "understand" mechanical causality. I have said more about the philosophy of mechanics than might seem to be required in a biological discussion, because at the present time mechanical physics has been discredited in the utmost degree. It was necessary to rehabilitate it to a certain extent, in order that it might not be regarded as altogether valueless to analyse the relation in which auto nomous biology stands to the mechanical type of inorganic science.

We now return to our biological problem. What about entelechy and inorganic nature as a system of uniform elements in motion, now that we understand the relation of entelechy to the inorganic universe as a system of qualitative energies or even qualitative energetical elemental centres ? It is important to notice at the very beginning of our study of the role of entelechy in a world that is considered mechanically, that it matters little how the mechanical view of nature is conceived in detail. Whether the dualism of ether and mass, or in other terms, of primary and secondary matter, be solved or unsolved, whether the ultimate elements of mass be regarded as particles or as dynamical points, or, in the kinetic fashion, as specified permanent states in a continuum — all these questions, though of the greatest im-

portance for the ontology of the Inorganic, have no bearing at all upon the problem before us, at least in its most fundamental form. And it would not affect us if movements in nature were one day proved to be essentially electrodynamical, or if rational mechanics were shown to be actually at work in nature. In the first case, as is well understood, natural mass would not be the "mass" of analytical mechanics, whilst in the second case analytical and empirical mass would be identical.

The problem of the relation between entelechy and mechanics has to deal not with movement as such, but with a certain possible kind of causation of movement that is irreconcilable with the causations of movement occurring in the inorganic field. It will soon become apparent what that means. Hertz remarks, in his famous posthumous treatise on mechanics, that his most general principle of movement, which is a combination in some way of Galilei's principle of inertia and the Gaussian principle of the least action — that this most general principle, though only stated for inorganic systems, would also hold for systems in which life-processes are concerned, as the effect of every vital process always could be imagined as being the effect of a system of the inorganic class. From this statement and, indeed, from the whole of Hertz's analysis, it is clear without further discussion that his principle only deals with the character of motion, as far as it lias been caused in some way and is now existing, but not with the causation of motion. Be that causation

what it may, it will always result in a force of special intensity and special direction, acting upon the special element of mass, and precisely the same sort of result^ of course, might follow from the action of some inorganic combination. Under such a view there is room for all sorts of causes of motion, whether they consist in the effect of systems of " hidden masses," or in the effect of anything else : motion, and motion alone, is studied by this kind of mechanics.

That the special mechanical system of Hertz is kinetic at bottom, that it knows only motion as the cause of motion, and therefore knows only one kind of energy, viz., kinetic energy, does not come into account here ; his principle of movement as such would hold for any other theory of dynamics equally well. But the problem of inorganic causation of motion — almost put aside by Hertz and " solved " in a rather abrupt manner l — now demands an answer. The two chief classes of possible mechanics — kinetics and dynamics — at least require to be considered.2

1 By the assumption of stiff or rigid "connexions." This assumption fails even to fulfil the requirements of the theory of elasticity. 2 Kinetic mechanics may appear in two different forms, the one founded upon the hypothesis of the continuity of matter, the other upon discontinuity. Dynamical mechanics, of course, regards matter as discontinuous with regard to its atoms, which are "centres of force," but its "lines of force" fill space continuously — whether they be regarded as mere abstractions or as "states" of a continuous ether. Kinetic mechanics based upon continuity cannot speak of "motion" in the ordinary sense of the word. "Motion" becomes equal to " continuity and contiguity of change of elements of space."

motion ; all other forces are only apparent to it. The principle of the conservation of the " quantity of motion " (mv) of a given system is its only principle, including of course the conservation of kinetic energy, the only energy kinetic mechanics knows. But whenever nature is regarded as a mechanical system of the dynamical type, it is conceived as a typical arrangement of mass-elements possessing central forces, and in this system all becoming depends on the original state of actual motion and the amount of these forces. There

potential form — and all becoming is represented as an increase and decrease of the amount of these two forms correspondingly, their sum total remaining unaltered in each of the three dimensions of space. The potential form of energy is as subsidiary here as any subsidiary energy in the field of qualitative energetics. But, in any case, the sum total of energy existing cannot be imagined changeable ; and this principle is valid with regard to each co-ordinate separately.

The principle of the conservation of the quantity of motion (mv), of course, does not hold in a theory of mechanics that is dynamical : it is contradicted by potential energy. What role then could entelechy play in a world of either mechanical type? As far as I am aware, there is not any kinetic system of mechanics that could claim to be pure. In order to explain the totality of physical phenomena some kinds of " forces " are always being introduced, at least where it is a question of

molecular dimensions. Thus pure kinetics is in fact always given up in the long run. Therefore, I think we can allow ourselves to neglect kinetic mechanics l altogether, and may simply ask : What is the relation of entelechy to dynamical mechanics ? As entelechy is non -energetical, it certainly does not change the amount of energy of a limited system in any case whatever ; 3 but it might do everything that can be 1 If in fact only motion were the cause of motion in the Inorganic, the role cf entelechy in becoming in space — since it has been proved not to be of the inorganic type — would be confined to the real creating or annihilating of motion. But since kinetics is far from being the only legitimate form of mechanics, we are not forced to go thus far. The modern views about the electrodynamical foundation of real (not of analytical !) mechanics are intentionally neglected here.

2 In the standard work by the late L. Busse, " Geist und Korper, Seele und Lcib" (Leipzig, 1903), a very thorough critical discussion of all current theories about the relation of "mind" and mechanics will be found. We only mention here what we ourselves think to be valuable. It seems strange, considering the eternal nature of the problem, but, as far as I know, our first hypothesis, to be brought forward hereafter, seems never to have been advocated in its present form ; it will be seen to be an application of our views — which were also new — about entelechy as augmenting the amount of diversity of distribution.

3 Busse, Schwarz, and probably others have admitted an increase of the amount of mechanical energy, when discussing the relation between "mind" and matter. I should not like to go so far, unless facts really forced me to do so ; though it must be conceded, that nothing unthinkable would be postulated; for the "mind" (or the entelechy) would be a something that is external to the system in question. Compare the last note but one. The view has also been advocated occasionally that "mind" acts on "matter" by disturbing so-called labile equilibria. Such equilibria are, however, extremely improbable. Apart from this there would be no logical argument against the "lability" theory, as the amount of energy that is required in order to disturb a labile equilibrium is infinitely small (dx), and thus might be regarded as belonging to another sphere of Being. Compare the important concept of "Behaftung" in K. Geissler's valuable work, Das Unendlicke (Leipzig, 1902) ; see in particular page 406.

imagined to be done without relation to the quantity of the energetical state of a system as such. Now it seems to me that there may be non-energetical modifications in this state of two different kinds, one of which we already know from qualitative energetics. Entelechy in its Relation to the two Forms of Mechanical Energy I am thinking in the first place of entelechy as suspend ing the becoming that otherwise would happen. The process of compensation of potentials, in the most general mean ing of the word, such as differences of coupled intensities, could as we know be suspended by entelechy. Does anything similar happen in pure mechanics with its two and only two kinds of energy ? Kinetic energy and poten tial mechanical energy, of course, would be the only fields accessible to the action of entelechy. Xow it would certainly not be a legitimate hypothesis to assume that eutelechy is able to transform any potential energy into the kinetic form by removing some kind of obstacle that has hitherto impeded this transformation, for this process of so-called " Auslosung " — to use the untranslatable German word — requires a certain finite amount of energy in any case, and entelechy is not energy. But the problem acquires a very different aspect as soon as we assume that kinetic energy, i.e. " happening," is always the given material entelechy has to work with, but that entelechy is able to transform actual happening into a state of mere potentiality by suspension, and that it can only set free such " potentials " as it has itself created by its suspension of

happening. A combination of processes of the following kind, it seems to me, is well able to explain what I suppose to be the work of entelechy. An element of mass m moves with velocity v, until it comes within range of a repulsive force ; its velocity then decreases constantly until it becomes zero. That point will be reached when the amount of its potential energy derived from the repulsive agent. Finally, the element m receives an impulse in a direction opposite to the original one, and this impulse — decreasing from moment to moment, as velocity increases — will last until the element has reached its original velocity, and also its

m original kinetic energy — ^2, taken in the opposite sense. Now imagine that the process of constantly decreasing motion just described, is suspended by entelechy at some stage or other — say at the moment in which the velocity is m vl — in such a form that the amount of — v* is transformed into an equivalent amount of " potential " energy, localised at the place of m and kept there until it is set free, that Could not such a thing happen without any relation to questions of energetics ? Certainly it could, for the process of suspending would not touch the amount of energy in any way, though it would interfere with inertia, and the process of relaxing suspension would be in no sense equivalent to an " Auslosung " or removing of obstacles. The mechanical process we have imagined is represented very

clearly by an inelastic body moving with the velocity v and entering during its motion into an elastic ball. It will move into this ball for a certain time with decreasing velocity, come to rest for a moment, and then move in the opposite direction with increasing velocity again : let this process be stopped at the moment when the inelastic body has traversed say one-third of the path into the elastic mass. There is no contradiction to energetics in such an event, provided, of course, that after the suspension has ceased the mechanical and energetic events contimie their course from the point whence, it was broken.1

So I think that even in mechanics proper we have the possibility of formulating in a strict logical sense what is done by entelechy.2 Entelechy, ~by its very nature, may suspend move ment, transforming kinetic energy into potential energy, and it may set free suspended movement as circumstances require. Of course, as we saw with regard to general energetics, entelechy can only be regarded as able to set free those potentials which it has made " potentials " by its own suspending action, but not potentials that owe their existence to any inorganic cause. This important feature would lead us to a discussion of the continuity of suspension

1 Our hypothesis, of course, implies that a movement like that of a pendulum, which changes its direction periodically, passing through states of mere potential energy at the point of change, may be suspended in this point of change, in which there is no movement. This case, of course, is more simple than ours, and would not charge entelechy with an actual stopping of kinetic energy. But our more general hypothesis seems to me to be legitimate as well.

2 A similar view, with regard to ' ' psycho-physical " interaction, has been urged by Wentscher and others; but as a rule "suspending" and " Auslosung" have not been distinguished clearly enough. by entelechy, as seen in inheritance, but we regard our previous remarks on this point of the theory as sufficient (see page 181). Before discussing our result any further let us turn to the second possible way in which entelechy may influence mechanical systems. The discovery of this possible role of the Non-mechanical in mechanics goes back to Descartes. In our own days Eduard von Hartmann in particular has investigated more carefully what is supposed to happen here. Descartes, strictly speaking, was not trying to study the influence of entelechy as a natural factor on mechanical mass and motion, but to fix the interaction of " mind " and body. You are aware that we ourselves regard such a problem as not legitimately formulated. But Descartes' analysis holds well on a different epistemological basis in the form that any non-mechanical agent, though not able to change in any way the amount of energy in any dynamical system,1 has the faculty of reversing any mass-element it likes, and of thereby changing the direction of forces and motions. It might be objected that a certain amount of energy would be necessary for any "turning" of a mass-element, there being required a certain force, or rather pair of forces, from the side on account of inertia. Where is the necessary energy to come from, since entelechy itself is regarded as

1 Descartes, strictly speaking, according to his theory of the continuity of matter, knew only kinetic energy ; the so-called "quantity of motion" (mv), therefore, was the mechanical quantity he would not allow to be altered by mind. For this reason our first hypothesis about the relation between en telechy and mechanics would have been impossible for him. Even his own statement about this relation — or rather about the relation between "mind" and matter — does not acquire any very clear meaning on the kinetic theory.