The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

Entelechy cannot be regarded as arising from material conditions of any sort. What follows from this result for the facts of physiological chemistry, which formed one of the earlier parts of this chapter ? It follows, so it seems to me, that what physiological chemistry studies is only results that are chemically characterised — not results of processes that are chemical processes. It is very important to understand well what this means. Of course, chemical potentials have formed the general basis of all physiological chemical results, but these results, as we know, are not due to the mere play of these potentials as such, but to the intervention of entelechy : therefore something purely chemical is found in the results only, but not in the processes. Without entelechy there would be other chemical results.

and " dissimilation " also ; without it a chaos of chemical processes would occur, and would soon disturb organisation and functioning. Previous analytical work has taught us that entelechy acts by means of setting free pre-existing potentials the compensation of which it has suspended before ; this applies also to its work in the fundamental phenomena of all physiology. It probably is the production and actuation of ferments that is immediately controlled here, oxidation or any kind of chemical synthesis or analysis thus being purely chemical processes that follow the funda mental vital act.

In a certain respect the problem dealt with in our present considerations is identical with the famous Aristotelian question whether the concept of a house be subordinated — in more than a formal manner — to the concepts of wood or stone as its higher classes. Aristotle answers the question negatively, as we should do also. But it is exactly the same thing, only in a still more general form, to deny that entelechy itself is connected with or dependent on chemical substances.

And still another famous problem has been solved by us implicitly : the " enigma " how it might be possible for matter to " think," a question which plays a great part in one of the well-known addresses of Ernil du Bois-Keymond. The answer is simple, for the problem is a pseudo-problem : " matter " not only does not " think," but " matter " is not even the foundation of life in any sense. Entelechy is something different from matter and altogether opposed to the causality of matter.

By proving that entelechy is not identical with or a consequence of any chemical compound, or the constellation of such compounds, we by no means have solved the chief problem of our present chapter, which deals with the relation between entelechy and substance as a category. May not entelechy, though absolutely unlike everything that can be called substance in the inorganic world — whether it be conceived purely chemically or in the sense of a theory of matter — may not entelechy be called a " substance " in the most general philosophical sense of the word, that is, in the sense of a something irreducible, which remains the always unchangeable bearer of its changeable qualities ?

Then there would be two substances with regard to nature, and our theory would become very similar to some theories of the past, though with the remarkable difference that our idealistic view would not allow us to regard one of these two substances as " psychical," as all other similar theories have done — Lotze's being one of the latest. There would be one spatially extended sub stance — " matter " and one non-spatial intensive substance —"entelechy" both substances forming part of that branch of enlarged given reality called conceptual scien tific nature.

Let us first note a few very characteristic features of what may be called the behaviour of entelechies ; the analysis may perhaps afford us materials to decide our fundamental problem. At the risk of shocking you with an apparent absurdity I might say that entelechy has the power of preserving its specific intensive manifoldness in spite of being divided into two or more parts. The fact which we have called the genesis of complex-equipotential systems seems to favour this view at the first glance, and so do all the experiments relating to the development of isolated blastomeres of a germ into whole organisms of smaller proportions. More over, we directly founded our second proof of vitalism upon the evidence that, though a typical machine - like constellation of agents, different in its arrangement along the three axes of space, cannot be divided and remain whole at the same time, yet there exists in the living organism a something which does show these two incom patible characters.

The question now arises whether in a deeper sense we are entitled to speak of entelechy as remaining whole in spite of its " division " into parts. It is very difficult to free the philosophical analysis of entelechy from all that is familiar to us from our acquaint ance with extensive phenomena ; and yet we must free it from all that belongs to extensity. It was the great achievement of Kant to show that space is the inevitable form of our intuition of the Extensive. Now, as to entelechy, there is no intuition, and therefore space and all sorts of relations about space have practically nothing to do with entelechy. Entelechy itself is conceived only ; it is perceived only in its extensive results. Entelechy is not spatial, but only acts into space — I do not say " in "

space — and the word " into," of course, is itself not at all of a " spatial " character here. In this respect, as will come out fully later on, there is quite a gulf hetween entelechy and such natural agents as forces and energies, though the latter are also concepts, not percepts. Now it is clear that " dividing " is always understood as something spatial, and therefore it follows from all we have said that this word in its strict meaning is not at all applicable to entelechy. When we speak of " dividing " we always think of a something which we can cut into pieces. But entelechy cannot be cut in this manner, for the simple reason that it has no spatial dimensions at all : the " having dimensions " would contradict altogether the meaning of the term.

Therefore we had better not speak of entelechy as an agent which " remains whole in spite of its division into parts," but simply say that entelechy may manifest itself wholly even after the division of a certain organic body, on which, had it remained one whole, entelechy would have manifested itself as one whole also. Entelechy always manifests itself individually : but our analysis proves that so-called individuality of the real organic body is not without further discussion to be identified with the deeper meaning of entelechian individuality.

The Concept of Localisation or Seat not Applicable to Entelechy An agent which is of a non-spatial nature cannot be said to have a definite seat or a definite localisation in space. Entelechy therefore cannot possess a "seat." It cannot at all be imagined like a point consisting of a something and moving through space, now in this and now in that direction. Descartes, as is well known, regarded the soul as having its seat in a specific organ of the brain, the so-called pineal gland. We may follow him so far as to say that there may he specific points of the organism with respect to which entelechy is active while at other points it is inactive. But these would only be points of mutual relation, not points of rest.

I fully see how difficult it is to say anything positive about entelechy without contradicting other statements regarding it. I say once more that there is nothing at all to be " imagined " in a picture-like manner about entelechy : the non-spatial can never be realised by our imagination in spatial images. It may be hard on us, but so it is. And at the same time we always must bear in mind that in dealing with entelechy we are not dealing with anything psychical, or absolute, or metaphysical : we are analysing an agent at work in nature. We know concerning this factor that it cannot be spatial in any sense, that it has no seat in space nor any dimensions, but merely acts " into " space ; in one word, that it " is " not in spatial nature but only acts with regard to spatial nature.

In fact, the characteristics of entelechy form only a complicated system of negations so far, and little more. Nor can it be otherwise unless we are prepared to change our whole view of reality, and of natural reality in particular, as in fact we very soon shall. " substance " must remain as open as the previous question about the relation of entelechy to causality. Entelechy was a kind of " quasi " causality, and now may be said to be an enduring " quasi " substance. But still we feel that our reason craves more than this.

At the end of this chapter you probably will expect the discussion of a few questions which interest you more than any others, and the answering of which perhaps you have hoped would be the final result of all our analysis. But such remarks as I am able to offer about the origin and end of individual life, and the origin of life in general, can claim merely a subjective value. Materialists profess to know a good deal about all these eternal problems, but I confess that I know nothing at all about any of them.

In the face of these fundamental questions let us remember, firstly, that our present task is neither a truly psychological nor a metaphysical one. We therefore have nothing to do with the problems of immortality as relating to the Ego ; we are only studying phenomena in respect to the Ego. In fact, even if a " principle of the conservation of entelechy " could be established, and if we were able to speak about what might be called a phenomenological metem psychosis, it would all relate to phenomena in the first place, and it is well worth noticing that without further discussion spiritualistic phenomena, if proved some day,

would also be mere phenomena to the Ego and nothing else. At the end of these lectures we shall devote some time to certain considerations that might probably lead us beyond this theoretical Egoism. With the starting of a new actual individual, entelechy begins a new manifestation, and with death it ends one ; that is all we can say. What that manifestation, qua individual, was before that beginning, and what it is after death is absolutely unknown to us. We are not even able to say whether it was and will be anything " individual " at all in these two periods or not — the words " was " and " will be " to be understood in a non-metaphysical sense, that is to say, in the sense of a "possible immediate experience. " For the ideal or Platonic existence of entelechy as an individualising agent does not, of course, guarantee any sort of permanence of the individuals which, on account of an entelechian manifestation, form part of the given universe at a given time.

Spiritualists claim to have some knowledge about our problem, saying that after death the manifestations of entelechy preserve their individuality though using a new (so-called " astral ") kind of material. But I say once more that I can form no opinion in this matter, though I should like very much to be able to do so. Science, in fact, ought to deal with these questions even at the risk of finding a mere chaos of defective criticism and actual fraud : but one single fact, positively established, would well repay the hard work of generations.

What science knows about death is simply this : a certain amount of matter that was formerly controlled by entelechy becomes freed from this control, and then obeys the laws of physico-chemical causality exclusively. Does entelechy actively withdraw from matter or not, and, if actively, then why ? Why has " regulation " become im possible ? — But it is of no use formulating any more of these unapproachable questions. The question about the so-called primary origin of life is as incapable of being discussed as is the problem of death, in spite of the great number of popular works written about it. We certainly cannot grant that life has originated by a fortuitous concourse of inorganic constituents — that is clear without any further discussion from our analysis of entelechy in its relation to matter in general.1 Con stellations do not create entelechy, but entelechy governs constellation. But nothing can be said concerning the absolutely primordial relations between entelechy and elemental materiality.

Whilst speaking about entelechy in its relation to intensities of energy, we mentioned that our theory postulates the continuity of life which is well illustrated by the fact of inheritance. From this we may conclude that there are no gaps in entelechian manifestations : there is a continuity of a constellation of specific kinds of matter always maintained by entelechy, always overcome, so to say, by its suspension of inorganic becoming. 1 It therefore is only an argument of minor, i.e. merely empirical im portance against "generatio equivoca" by contingency, that organic com pounds, even of low complexity, do not exist on earth except if produced by organisms.

the type of manifestations of entelechy has changed in the course of their continuous line. But we never come to any kind of beginning. In any case it must appear very strange that life is only known to us in immediate relation with very complex chemical compounds of a few classes. Why does not entelechy act upon the elements of matter directly ? Or is the present state of relation between entelechy and matter a consequence of the long time that life has continuously existed ? Has entelechy, so to say, altered its behaviour with regard to matter? Or are we simply in ignorance of other types of its manifestations ?

And so the series of questions and problems might be continued — but there are no answers. It seems to me that this is the right place to point out that the whole problem of the origin of life on earth is of far less theoretical importance than the problem of the laws of life, though the common opinion almost always argues otherwise. For this reason we have devoted our selves so closely to the study of the vital law and all its consequences. The solution of all problems of secondary importance will follow the knowledge of the law some day ; but without this knowledge no real solution of those problems would ever be possible.

We have reached the end of the first part of our philosophy of the organism ; let us then rest for a moment and look back upon the path we have traversed. Our scientific discussion had shown us that the phenomena of life are not explainable by the concepts and laws we know from inorganic science, but that something new and elemental must be introduced by the science of biology. The first part of our philosophy of the organism was devoted to the justification of our newly introduced factor, in a special sense of the term " justification." It has been our endeavour to show how our new elemental agent and its law may be put into relation with the general ontological and logical principles concerned in the science of inorganic nature. But we have only formulated this relation between the Organic and the Inorganic by using those ontological aprioristic principles which are empirically realised in the latter, and that has led us to mere negations with regard to entelechy.

But, of course, still another kind of justification of our entelechy is required. We not only have to show that there is no contradiction between our new conception and those elements of the system of apriorities which are concerned in inorganic sciences, but we have to demonstrate the legitimacy of our factor itself as a part of the aprioristic system of natural factors or entities. We have to show that epistemology entitles us positively to introduce into science such a something as entelechy is. In other words, we have to establish vitalism from what may be called the organisation of the Ego.

That will be done, and the following pages will prepare the way for it. All the proofs of vitalism given in our merely scientific section were indirect proofs, or proofs per exclusionem ; all the possibilities but one were wrong, and therefore that one possibility was true. Our next endeavour will be to prove vitalism directly. And upon this direct proof the positive epistemology of entelechy will afterwards be founded. THE way which is generally followed in biology, as in almost every branch of science and philosophy, leads from the simple to the complex, both words being taken in the sense of formal logic. But another method of analysis is possible also, and this method is now to lead us to an important result. We shall once more begin our analytical study of biological phenomena, but we shall begin it not with the most simple but with the most intimate facts, that is to say, with those facts which are related more closely than any others to the Ego.

My own body as a scientific object is to be the startingpoint of this new type of biology ; my own body in the strictest possible sense. But my own body is not to be regarded here as a constitutive part of objectified "nature," at least not for the very beginning of the analysis. The whole series of what is " given " to my consciousness whilst I am acting is to form the subject of our analysis, and only at the end of it will one part of that whole be considered as " nature." Thus our method will not be biological, nor even strictly "scientific," so to speak; it will analyse Givenness in its completeness, not only so-called " natural " Givenness. The consecutive series of the phenomena which present themselves to my consciousness whilst I am acting will be formulated. In the second place only shall we try to separate what properly may belong to " nature " and what does not belong to it. We thus shall find out, I hope, how nature and natural factors may be most elementally conceived in their relation to lifeprocesses.

I am sitting in my chair and want to write ; a lamp recently bought and not yet quite known to me in its construction stands on the table ; the lamp begins to smoke — it is here that our analysis is to begin. This analysis will not relate to " given " phenomena in their mere passivity, i.e. not to mere "sensations," but to those objects of consciousness exclusively in which some sort of activity or " apperception " on the part of the Ego is concerned. True " perceptions," of course, belong to this domain of mental activity.

My having an optical perception of the smoking lamp, in short, my optical lamp is followed by the desire to stop the smoking; in order to do that my attention is directed towards the construction of the lamp, which I compare with that of other lamps already known to me. This consideration ends in the will to move a certain screw of the lamp. I see and feel my hand touching and moving the screw ; the smoking of the optical lamp ends. These are the most general lines of the process ; it is worth while to mark them in a more detailed fashion. My seeing the smoking lamp, to be quite accurate, is first followed by the remembrance of what a lamp's smoking is ; then comes the associative remembrance that the consequences of its smoking are very unpleasant ; the will arises to stop smoking ; this recalls past cases of such a stopping, and the recollection of them recalls previous ways of doing so ; that calls my attention to the construction of the lamp ; this is found to be different from known constructions but similar to them ; a certain point of similarity relating to the means of moving the wick is noticed ; the specific will arises to perform the movement ; my hand is felt and seen moving the screw in question; the smoking lamp is seen not to smoke any more.

The whole of a special excerpt from given reality in which " I myself " am playing a part has been described here as a continuous series. All of its constituents are phenomena presented to my conscious Ego. All of them follow each other in order of time with regard to their originating, though the amount of their velocity in following each other may vary to a great extent. Only a few of the constituents are " spatial." By saying that all of the constituents follow each other in order of time it is not

stated that only one of them is presented to the Ego in each element of time ; on the contrary, my seeing the smoking lamp continues during the whole of the series, and some remembrances of past cases of smoking lamps and of lamps of different construction may also continue during the whole. But what may be called the active role l of the Ego only relates to one of the constituents of the continuous 2 series in one element of time. I only am conscious that it is " I " who experience the phenomena with regard to one, and only one, of their constituents ; the permanency of other parts of the series, though existing, is of no more consequence to me than the seeing of the room in which I am sitting during the whole of the process to be analysed.

Taken in a quite immediate and unprejudiced manner, there cannot be the smallest doubt that the Ego, as far as it is " willing," is an active factor in the whole that happens in our example. The willing Ego is influenced and is influencing. It is a real link in the whole chain of events, and this whole chain — in other terms, the whole of the consecutive series of constituents which forms the process in question — must be regarded as univocally determined so far as it is an object of reflection at all. It is for this very