The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

primitive form was to signify a " thing." So it comes that advocates of the space-substance theory generally introduce still another kind of inorganic " substance," which they call merely distinctly marked elements of their space. But these also have the character of unchangeableness except in respect to motion, and are almost identical with the atoms of the other theory. In fact, there seems to be some force compelling the human mind to admit some substance in space and not merely space as the substance. The principle of the constancy of the sum of all inorganic or material substance would then be guaranteed for the simple reason that ita coming out of space or its coming into space is quite an unimaginable and unthinkable event. Here, indeed, are the very sources of the aprioristic principle of the conserva tion of material substance.

There exists a very close relationship between the principle of the conservation of substance and the principle of the conservation of energy : both of them in some respect resting upon the character of (formal) space as an allembracing something which neither may be left nor be entered. It is probably this relationship that has seduced some modern authors into asserting the identity of substance and energy, a doctrine which seems to us to be absolutely impossible. For this assertion forgets that what is measured by " ergs " is only the amount of causality as far as the latter has quantity and is therefore measurable, whilst substance relates to what is not touched by causality at all. The two principles of conservation relate to two absolutely different branches of ontology. Energy " is "" not, but is realised in change ; substance is.

It is true that ordinary energetics has not a very good opportunity to discover the proper equivalent of substance in nature, but the fault is its own and does not lie with the category of substance. As soon as the problems of the " being material " are not neglected, the category of substance would become applicable even in the realm of qualitative energetics ; of course it becomes much clearer in mechanical physics. In fact, might we not say that the irresistible tendency to apply the category of substance has been one of the fundamental sources of the mechanical view of inorganic nature altogether ?

But enough at this place about the meaning of " sub stance " in the inorganic world ; enough also about the difficulties remaining still unsolved here. In what follows we shall only use one fundamental result, common to all the different theories of substance relating to the Inorganic. Inorganic substance either is extensity itself, that is, space as the bearer of phenomenological reality, or it is a some thing consisting of absolutely single elements which are one beside the other in extensity. All extensities in the Inorganic are built up out of such substantial elements. That the substantial elements of inorganic nature relate to extensities and to extensities alone also holds good, if the substantial elements themselves are understood dynamically, that is, if they are regarded as certain elemental " spheres " in space which are each the seat of forces going out from a centre. Even in this case, though the centre of the force is a point and is not extensive in itself, the substantial

element in space as such is an extensity. We have no desire to advocate the dynamical atomistic theory by what we have said, at least not without restrictions. We only wish to emphasise the fact that inorganic substance in any possible form relates to extensities, and that if it relates to varieties and manifoldnesses it does so with regard to extensive ones and to nothing else. We now turn back to our proper field of researchbiological philosophy in its relations to the category of substance.

In the first place we shall have to deal with some characteristics of life which are by no means philosophical by themselves. These introductory remarks will serve at the same time to fill a certain gap in our survey of life phenomena. You probably have noticed that there was still a gap in that survey, though, I hope, our following discussion will show that this gap was only apparent and implied only a pseudo-problem. Respiration and assimilation are generally regarded as the most fundamental functions of organic life, as the very foundations indeed of all physiology.

Kespiration in its scientific meaning is the oxidation of any chemical compound of the body, that is, its combina tion with oxygen, in order, as text-books tell us, to provide a source of energy for functional performances. The com pounds to be oxidised may be split into simpler ones before oxidation or they may not. The last result of the process of oxidation is the production of carbonic acid, uric acid, urea, and some other compounds, which are poisonous to the organism if care is not taken for their removal.

As we have said already, oxidation is generally regarded as a source of energy exclusively ; or, better, as a source of so-called free energy, that is, energy that may do work on account of differences of coupled potentials. But this role of oxidation would never explain its absolute necessity. If such a doctrine were the whole truth, the stopping of oxidation would only stop the functioning of the organism ; but the organism is not only damaged, it dies if oxidation is not allowed, and death is well known here not to be due merely to a poisoning by the final products of oxidation such as carbonic acid, for the removing of which the most elaborate arrangements exist in the organism. Therefore there must be yet another part played by oxidation. We should not be wrong, I suppose, to formulate this role in the following way : — The organism by its merely synthetic or analytic metabolism seems to produce some substances which are poisonous to it, i.e. which disturb the order of its metabolism in an irreparable manner if they are not converted into an innoxious form : this conversion into an innoxious form is done by oxidation}

For a long time the foundations of organic oxidation were an absolute enigma to biology, and all sorts of theories were invented to solve it. All these theories, as, for instance, the one which utilises the effect of oxygen in its 1 I advocated this theory as early as 1901, at a time when only Noll held a similar view with regard to organic oxidation. But at present the theory .of the anti-poisonous action of oxidation seems to be gaining ground, the new •discoveries of Winterstein being most favourable to it. Comp. vol. i. p. 199.

so-called active state (03), have become antiquated owing to the discoveries of the last few years. It was the mistake of all former theories of oxidation to look upon respiration as a process in which the organism plays an almost passive role. Either some compounds of the organism were regarded as attracting the oxygen of the medium by their own affinity, or oxygen itself was regarded as attracting parts of the organism. Modern biology has shown that oxidation is an active function on the part of the organism for the benefit of the whole. Wherever it is necessary either to destroy noxious compounds or to gain energetical potentials, the organism forms catalysers or calls into activity so-called zymogens, which set up oxidation that would otherwise not have taken place.1 The fuel consumed for the supply of energy consists generally of those constituents that are derived from the food — though hardly without some inter mediate change first taking place — but it also may be more important constituents of the tissues themselves, as we have learnt in our analysis of the metabolism of fasting. Oxidation as a mere process of anti-poisoning attacks all the so-called by-products of metabolism in general.

Thus the most general result gained by modern biological research is the knowledge that oxidation is like all the other processes of metabolism ; that it is as regulable and as limited in its regulability as they ; that it only seems to be more important on account of its universal presence in all forms of life. 1 Our description is a little schematic : former theories of respiration have made a difference between so-called "primary" or fundamental oxida tion, which is necessary for life in general, and "secondary" oxidation, subsidiary to special functions. It is highly probable that this difference will disappear in the light of modern research, but the matter has not yet been fully decided.

We therefore leave the theory of oxidation and approach the general subject of metabolism ; of this general subject oxidation has proved to be but a part. Metabolism, i.e. the change of chemical specificities during the differentiation, growth, and functioning of the organism, is generally considered under the two headings of " assimi lation " and " dissimilation." Few terms in science are more ambiguous and problematic in meaning, and few terms are used so freely and recklessly. Of course nobody would mind if they were only used to signify that some of the processes in the organism which lead to chemical results proceed from the simpler to more complicated chemical compounds, while the rest proceed in the opposite direction. In that case one could only object that the words synthetic and analytic, as commonly used by chemists, would suffice for the needs of physiology also. But, as a rule, something else and something more is meant whenever the words " assimilation " and " dissimilation " are used — and this " something more " is extremely problematic.

We here must enter the realm of so-called physiological chemistry, with which I must confess I am not at all familiar ; but in spite of that I hope that the following discussion, dealing with some very general and almost purely logical questions exclusively, may serve to elucidate a little what might be called the central point of physiology. are to signify anything specifically determined, that is something other than what chemists call " synthesis " and " analysis," and whenever at the same time they claim to be used in any strict meaning at all, they can only mean that there is a something of a specific chemical nature, yet intimately bound up with life itself, which has the power of making other less complicated chemical materials like itself or of producing from itself less complicated materials by an analytical process.

Let it be clearly understood : the word " assimilation " does not mean that there is a fundamental material A of given quantity, to which external means and forces add a further quantity, but it expresses that the material A increases by its own action at the cost of the components of the medium in the broadest sense. Taking the word assimilation in this usual sense, the question of course would arise as to the kind of forces " assimilating," that is, equalising foreign materials to the material A and seated in A at the same time. But it seems to me that another question should be settled first, which is perhaps of a still deeper importance, though it does not sound so theoretical.

I am thinking of the very simple but very fundamental question : Does assimilation in the sense we have indicated really take place ? Does the chemically distinctive substance A, the so-called " living substance," exist at all ? Are there any criteria of its existence ? There are in fact many theoretical authors who have answered these two questions affirmatively ; and they have almost always heen of the materialistic school. But is it not remarkable that the positive investigators of physiological chemistry never say one single word about the problematic material A and the problematic process of real " assimilation " ?

What then does physiological chemistry really teach as the result of its experiments ? There are many specific chemical compounds present in the organism, belonging to different classes of the chemical system, and partly known in their constitution, partly un known. But those that are not yet known will probably be known some day in the near future, and certainly there is no theoretical impossibility about discovering the constitution of albumen and how to " make " it. All the substances present in the organism have a definite range of possibilities regarding their physiological origin and their physiological destruction. They may originate in a certain number of different ways, and may be destroyed in a certain number of ways. Organisms behave differently in this respect. Fungi, for instance, are able to build up all the chief classes of their constituents — fats, carbohydrates, and albumen, out of one organic compound of rather variable constitution, while all animals require constituents of all three classes in their food, or, at least, are not able to live without receiving albumen. The modes of construct ing and destroying the constituents of the organism almost always differ to a great extent from those used in the laboratory : to mention but one difference, what is done by heat in the laboratory is generally done by ferments in the organism. And, finally, upon this use of ferments by the organism depends the most remarkable feature of

organic metabolism. Metabolism occurs in a regulatory manner which is to the benefit of the whole : at one moment one chemical construction goes on here and at another moment another chemical destruction occurs there according as the need exists in those places ; all the regulations, of course, being confined within certain limits presented by the fact that a certain sum of specific com pounds forms the absolutely necessary food of the organism. In these chief results of metabolistic physiology not a word has been said about our special living substance A and its "assimilation." In fact, the specific constituents of the organism may be said to be " assimilated " in so far as they are liable to an increase of their amount ; but this pseudo-assimilation is always due to the action of some other constituent of the organism, never to themselves. Thus the word " assimilation " seems justifiable only so far as the organism as a whole is considered. In that sense, however, it would mean nothing of importance.

What then is gained by our discussion of the most general results of physiological chemistry for the central problem of this chapter, the problem of the relation of I entelechy to substantiality ? The facts suggest no reason for assuming that a " living substance," assimilating and dissiinilating in the strict sense, is the real base and foundation of life. On the contrary, physiological chemistry knows nothing about a living substance and nothing about " assimilation " and " dissimilation." The facts revealed by

this science, though not amounting to a real proof of the operation of an autonomic factor in life, such as our entelechy, are certainly very easily reconcilable with its existence. We shall now regard our problem from its other side. We know that the facts show no indication of a " living substance " in the chemical sense, we further knoiv that an autonomic regulatory factor is at work in organic processes. What then, let us ask, follows from the concept of this factor or agent itself with regard to the existence of a living substance of a specific chemical constitution, as the foundation of vitality ? Does an analysis of the concept of entelechy lead to the admission of a " living " chemical substance in spite of the negative facts of physiological chemistry, or do the results of such an analysis stand in harmony with our actual present knowledge of metabolism ? In the first case science would have to go and search for the " living substance " until it found it and could show it in a test-tube ; in the second case its main work might be said to be completed in this field.

I now hope to be able to show you from the meaning of the concept of entelechy — that being a well established elemental agent in nature — that entelechy can be neither the consequence of any sort of specific chemical compound —when it might be represented by such a compound as " living substance " — nor the outcome or consequence of any constellation of different specific chemical compounds of any sort, which might otherwise perhaps be regarded as the materia viva.

Entelechy, we know, is an intensive manifoldness, i.e. it is an agent acting manifoldly without being in itself manifold in space or extensity. Entelechy therefore is only an agent that arranges, but not an agent that possesses quantity. What then would be the significance of saying that a specific chemical substance is the bearer of entelechy ? To say so would be to attribute the property of extensity to a something that has nothing to do with extensity at all, to a something which in a certain respect may be said to be the negation of extensity.

It gives a good idea of the strange consequences to which the doctrine of a " living substance " as the bearer of autonomic entelechy would lead, to recall the fact that, of course, a living substance in the sense of a specific chemical compound would be measurable by weight like any other chemical compound. We should have to speak of, say, six pounds of lion-substance, or a pound and a half of eaglesubstance, or three ounces of earthworm-substance ; and all these chemical compounds would some day be sold in the market perhaps. We here see most clearly that it is quite impossible to assign the characteristic of extensity ta an agent which is simply a determinant of order in extensities ; for our lion-substance, of course, would not signify so much of the actual substance of a given lion, but would mean so many

pounds of that homogeneous chemical material which is supposed to represent the " being-a-lion." Of course nothing is said by our remarks against the hypothesis that there may exist real chemical compounds, which are characteristic of organic specificity in the sense of being necessary means of morphogenesis, and which perhaps play their role in the process of inheritance as far as its material side is concerned. In fact, the new discoveries in hybridisation, as we know, seem to advocate such a view to a certain extent. These substances, however, are by no means identical with entelechy but are used by entelechy.

There is still another very grave objection against the material character of entelechy : if it were material it would be subject to energetical changes, for it would be energetical itself; but that we have seen is an impossibility. And, moreover, to assume that the disintegration of a certain amount of chemical material, homogeneous in itself, could explain real differentiation during ontogeny, would clearly contradict the principle of univocal determination.1

No Constellation of Chemical Substances Possible as the Basis of Entelechy But now you might reply to our discussion : " Good, a specific chemical compound cannot be the basis of entelechy in the sense that entelechy always appears whenever this compound is formed, by the very fact of its formation. But could not entelechy be a consequence of a specific relative constellation of different chemical compounds of specific states of aggregation ? Could there not appear a

new and elemental factor owing to the constellation of some other factors already known ? Do we not see such an event happen whenever electricity is generated by rubbing a glass rod ? " Let us try to answer this objection at first in a narrower sense. If the typical constellation of the inorganic agents A, B, C, and D is to originate a new sort of activity, which does not come to them from without, but is regarded as their true and real consequence, how would it be conceiv able at all unless you imagine that one of the four constituents, A, B, C, and D, possessed the new agent in question already in a state of potentiality, comparable to the state of a so-called zymogen in fermentation, which is waiting to be transformed into a ferment ? But, if it gives this turn to the problem, the constellation-theory represents no great advance on the purely chemical theory of entelechy already refuted. One of the four elements of the hypo thetic constellation creating entelechy would have to per form almost the same role that is performed by the specific compound of the chemical doctrine.

But to pass to more general considerations : is it at all possible that new elemental kinds of natural changes can be created by the mere constellation of agents already known ? Can such a constellation possibly be followed by more than a mere resultant action of the sum of the elemental actions of its constituents ? It has been said occasionally by modern writers that a system, by the mere increase of its amount of material, may begin to exhibit marked differences in its behaviour. Take for instance a homogeneous sphere in rotation. It will simply be flattened at its poles, if it is small, but a large

sphere of the same material and moving with the same angular velocity will throw off its equatorial substance in the form of a ring, and a satellite may be formed out of it ; for the absolute amount of peripheral velocity increases enormously with the increase of the total amount of sub stance. So there may result very different definitive forms from systems which differed only in size at the outset. But, of course, it is clear from the very beginning that the origin of new elemental factors is not touched at all in this example.

But how about the relation of rubbing a glass rod to electricity, how about the rise of the electric current from chemical potentials, as we see in the familiar galvanic cell ? It is true that at the first glance there may seem to be a real creation of something fundamentally new by a mere constellation : phenomenalism in its purest form, in fact, would advocate such a view. But the history of physics shows that it is impossible for human reason to rest content with such a conception. Science always has been in search of some pre-existence of what seemed to be new, and, in fact, science has always managed to find this pre-existence in some way. Either it has attributed the new thing that arose to what existed already, endowing the latter with it in the form of a potentiality, expressed under the name of a so-called " constant," or it has gone further and has tried to conceive the possibility under the form of a substantiality. Mathematical phenomenalism takes the first line, the modern theory of electricity follows the second ; the mere E of the first, marking the " being potentially electric " as an irreducibility, becomes the electron of the second, in the sense of the elemental quantity of the new phenomenality in

question. In some respect our mind is satisfied by both methods, though more by the second. For our present purpose it is enough to know that there exists in our mind a demand for some such satisfaction : newly arising elemental agents must be conceived as already pre-existing in some way. It will have become quite clear, I hope, from our discussion, that any theory which tries to make entelechy arise as a new elemental consequence of some constellation must result in taking one of the constituents in the real sense of a " living-substance." But the living-substance theory has been already refuted.