The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

1 If only one phenomenon were passively presented to consciousness altogether at a certain time differential, the acts of identification and of comparison would be impossible. We cannot enter here into the important psychological and epistemological question that arises in this connexion. Compare the remarkable discussion of these problems (and of association also) by M. Palagyi in Philosophische Wochenschrift, 1907, vols. vii. and viii. 2 The word "continuous" therefore must be understood here in a rather wide sense. Space is continuous, but so may also be called the series of cardinal numbers.

reason that every single element of it must be said to influence the next, and to have been influenced by the preceding one. We now shall get a result of greater importance, if, at this point of the analysis, we take advantage of the different character of the constituents of our process with regard to spatiality. Only the first and the last phenomenon of our process were spatial ones, what there was between them was only in time but was not objectified in space. Thence it follows that spatial phenomena may be uni vocally connected by phenomena which are not spatial ; the latter forming a group by themselves.

What we have described and considered here is practically the view taken in common life, with the only exception that common life regards spatial phenomena as absolute realities, and not only as realities to the Ego. Science now will tell us that our analysis has been very incomplete, that we have regarded our body not as an organism, but as something that is extremely simple. Let us then try to complete scientifically our study of the phenomena which are immediately given to me during my acting ; let us consider my body as an organism playing its specific part in this particular series of phenomena as a consequence of its organisation ; but at the same time let us never forget that we are analysing at present a certain series of phenomena presented to my consciousness, to my Ego, and nothing else.

The organism then, my organism, may be looked upon as playing its full role. I now must beg you to allow me a certain hypothetical liberty at the very beginning. In order that a full and complete analysis of those of the phenomena concerned in our process which relate to my body may become possible, let us make a supposition, which, in fact, is not true, but which easily may be imagined to be true without exceeding the limits of our present researches. We shall assume that we are able to touch every single element of our whole body, including the brain and the nerves. It is true, we cannot in reality touch our own brain at any point, but it seems to me that there is no objection in principle to assume the possibility, as in any case brains in all their parts are what we call tangible things.

After these preparations let us begin to analyse the phenomena of the smoking lamp once more. Let us imagine that we possess a complete knowledge of all physiology, but that at the same time we do not forget for a single moment that we have to do with phenomena in respect to my Ego and with nothing else. The optical phenomenon of the smoking lamp — the " optical lamp " — is again the starting-point. Physiology tells us that this lamp first affects the retinas of our eyes ; from the retinas an influence goes out to the optic nerves, and from these to parts of the brain. But let us stop here a moment ; how could the " optical lamp " — to put it briefly

—be the antecedent of processes of which it is notoriously the effect ? In other words, how could the optical lamp influence the retinas and the nerves, since we know that our seeing the lamp as an optical image follows the irrita tion of these parts of our organisation ? It would be an absurdity. We therefore must not begin our analysis with the " optical " lamp, but must begin it with something else. Certainly a " lamp " may be assumed to exist as the first link of the phenomena in question, but, briefly speaking, it is a "tactile" lamp, tangible say by my left hand; this tactile lamp, as a constituent of immediate Givenness, influences my retina, also taken in the tactile sense, which may be admitted at least in principle. Stimulation of my " tactile "

—or at least tangible — optic nerve follows, and then follows stimulation of my tactile brain, and only at the end of all these processes is the " optical " lamp given to me.1 It is a smoking lamp ; and now this smoking calls forth the whole series of conscious phenomena mentioned before : identification with former cases of smoking, remembrance of their unpleasant effects, desire to stop smoking, remem brance of past cases of such stopping, of the means to effect

1 Our whole instance might be reversed, of course : the " optical " lamp might be the beginning of the process studied and the "tactile" lamp the end. In this case all the processes of the nerves and brain would have to be considered as " optical" also. But the whole example would become rather clumsy in this case. A good instance of this class would be a wasp that flies upon my hand and is then removed by " myself." The reader is advised to analyse this example by himself. The phases of the "continuous series" would be these : (1) " Optical," i.e. "seen " wasp ; (2) optical skin affected, i.e. changed ; (3) optical sensory nerve affected ; (4) optical part of brain affected ; (5) " tactile wasp " experienced. All the subsequent phases (identification, association, will, moving the hand) are the same as in our instance dis cussed in the text. Of course the new instance would force us to assume hypothetically that we can see our nerves and brain — at least by means of a mirror.

it, attention to the construction of the lamp, comparison with known types of construction, noticing of a certain screw as an important thing, specific will to move this screw, feeling and seeing my hand moved : the optical lamp ceases to smoke. 7. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELEMENTS IN GIVENNESS Spatial and Non-spatial Elements It now seems to me important to inquire which of all these phenomena may be regarded as spatial, that is to say, as being extensities in any sense, whether in the tactile or in the optical sphere.

There certainly is a continuous series of phenomena given to consciousness, leading from the givenness of the tactile lamp through the stimulation of retina, nerves, and brain as tactile phenomena, through my seeing the " optical " lamp, and through very many other phenomena down to the moving of my hand as a phenomenon that is optical and tactile at the same time. Moreover it is very important to notice that the single constituents of this continuous series follow one another with the predication of univocal necessity. The " optical lamp " follows the tactile phenomenon in the brain, which for its part has followed the tactile phenomenon in the optic nerve, and the " optical lamp " is followed by the phenomenon of identification. But it is by no means clear from the very beginning that this continuous series must consist of phenomena of tactile and optical, that is, of spatial character exclusively. On the contrary, introspective analysis shows most distinctly that the opposite is true. The first process that relates

to the brain, following the stimulation of the optic nerve, we allow to be spatial, i.e. noticeable as being tangible in some way. This phase in consciousness is then followed by " seeing " the lamp, which was only " tangible " before, that is by a conscious act which is spatial also, but belongs to quite another class of so-called qualities. Now the first processes of remembrance and identification appear ; the smoking lamp is regarded as " similar " to smoking lamps of the past. There certainly is nothing of a " spatial " character in this process of comparison as such, even if the images of lamps formerly experienced, which are among the pre-requisites of identification, are regarded as spatial. Here follow the remembrance of how unpleasant the effects of smoking may be and the wishing to stop smoking. All these processes completely lack the characteristic of spatiality or extent. The moving of my hand is the first spatial process again, at least for the unscientific observer, though the scientific physiologist will tell us that this process follows a certain change which is spatially related to some part of the ("tactile") brain, and that between these two there occurs a spatial phenomenon relating to some motor nerves, i.e. centrifugal nervous conduction. Careful psychological introspection might still add that a certain optical imaginary idea of my moved hand is intermediary between proper willing as such and that change in the brain on which nervous conduction and actual moving finally depend.

Would it then be advisable to separate all those phenomena of our conscious series which are spatial in any sense from those which are non-spatial ? It seems to me that another kind of distinction would lead to more important results : this distinction starts from the fact that three different portions of phenomena may easily be dis tinguished in that part of our continuous series of conscious events which begins with the stimulation of my retina and ends with the moving of my hand.

The last spatial phenomenon of the first of these portions of the continuous line of conscious events is a certain phenomenon relating to the brain as a " tangible " thing following the irritation of the optic nerve. The first spatial phenomenon of the last portion of the series of conscious events is again a phenomenon relating to the brain. But the middle portion of that series had nothing to do with the brain whatever, though also this middle portion of the conscious series is composed of different links following one another uni vocally.

Thus the being or not being related to the brain, or rather to my body, gives a very clear reason for dividing the conscious series, so far as it begins with the stimulation of my retina and ends with the moving of my hand, into three different portions ; and at the same time we notice that the phenomena belonging to the first and third of them are all spatial, whilst the second portion, beginning with " seeing the lamp," consists of spatial and non-spatial elements.

Now it seems to be very important at this point of our analysis to inquire whether we could not say a little more about the last phenomenon of the first, purely spatial, portion of our conscious series and about its relation to the first phenomenon of the last, purely spatial, portion of it, both of them relating to the brain as a spatial something. Spatial and Non-spatial Elements among those which do not Relate to the Brain But first we must analyse a little further what is meant by saying that the second portion of our continuous series of conscious events consists of spatial and of non-spatial elements. Indeed, the middle portion of our conscious series, which does not relate to the brain at all, does not absolutely lack the characteristic of spatiality. Its first and its last elements certainly do not lack this characteristic, the first of them being the " optical lamp," and the last, as we have said, probably a certain optical idea of my moving the hand ; and some of the so-called associative phenomena concerned in "identification" and " finding -similar" are spatial too. But nevertheless, there remains a fundamental difference between the last phenomenon of the first portion of our series and the first phenomenon of its second portion, in spite of their both being spatial. The first phenomenon of the middle portion of the series does not relate to the brain in any way, but is the lamp as an optical phenomenon ; and a similar relation holds between the last element of the middle portion, the optical idea of moving my hand, if compared with the first phenomenon of the last portion of our series which relates to the brain again. Thus we understand that the middle portion of the conscious series, so far as it relates to spatiality, does so in quite another sense than do the first and the third portions,

which relate to spatiality exclusively. Spatiality comes into account here only in the sense of a relation to so-called external " things " or imaginary " ideas " of things, but not to the " brain " or any part of " my body." The last element of the first portion of our conscious series is univocally followed by the middle portion of it, and first by its first element, the " seeing the lamp " ; not, however, by this first element alone, but thereafter by all the rest of the middle portion. Here we are faced by a very important problem.

The Last Cerebral Element of the First Portion. Relations to the Scientific Analysis of Acting The principle of univocal determination * demands that the last phenomenon of the first portion of our series, relating to my brain, be such as to allow the whole of the non-cerebral phenomena of the middle portion to be such as they are. But what is the consequence of this ? We here come into close relation with some analytical results gained already in another part of our lectures, though from quite a different point of view. Whilst dealing with the analysis of action as a phenomenon in Nature, we gave the name " historical basis of reacting " to one of the chief features upon which acting rests : acting not only depends on the individuality of the stimulus which is present but also on the specificity of all former

stimuli and all effects of them. We said that in psychology the words " association," " memory," " experience," " abstrac tion " and so on are generally used to signify what can only be called "the historical basis of reacting" by the true naturalist. But at present we are dealing with " psychology " of the most exclusive nature, for all that is is regarded as psychological in our present consideration. The second portion of our conscious series now shows us fully developed what from another point of view had been included in the one phrase of the " historical basis." And so we understand that the ultimate event that relates to the brain in the first portion of our conscious series must be such as to allow the " historical basis " to come into manifestation. Now, on the other hand, this " historical basis " has been created by series of phenomena similar to the one we are studying ; that is to say, cerebral pheno mena were also included in these series : and thence it follows that the ultimate process of the first portion of the conscious series we are studying, whenever it acts at all in such a way as to awake the historical basis, must be different, say, on the fourth time of its going on from what it was the first, second, and third times. But, as all the former steps of the first portion of our conscious series are not different the fourth time from what they were the first, second, and third times,1 they cannot bear in themselves the sufficient reason for the becoming different with conse cutive repetitions of the ultimate phenomenon of that first portion. Therefore the reason of this becoming different must lie in the brain itself as a phenomenon. A certain ultimate process of the first portion of any conscious series

1 Except perhaps in as far as " functional adaptation " comes into play. of our type — a cerebral process — is thus proved to become different each different time of its happening, because the brain itself has been changed by the former happening of this process ; and the brain has changed in such a manner as to allow the second portion of the conscious series to go on as it does. Therefore — the lamp is not only " seen " but is also identified as a lamp, and reminds me of all my former experience.

In other words, as in our former chapter, we have here stated again what is to be regarded as actually cerebral in the phenomenon of the " historical basis " and what is not. The brain is certainly important ; it manifests, so to say, the elements of the historical basis ; but it does not use them. Its manifesting property may some day probably be shown to depend on so-called physico-chemical peculiarities. In this sense, but in no other, may mechanical foundations of " memory " be spoken of.

The question may arise here whether the second portion of our conscious series — beginning with " seeing the lamp " in our instance — may not be broken into parts by single elements which are " cerebral." Might not so-called associa tion, happening at different points of the second portion of our series and most decidedly at the beginning, where the " seen smoking lamp " is " identified " as being a smoking lamp, might not this association be the immediate conse quent to a cerebral antecedent, i.e. speaking idealistically, to a conscious elemental event referred to "my brain," as the last element of the first portion of the whole conscious

series was ? A detailed discussion of this problem would belong to so-called physiological psychology. I only men tion here that there are strong reasons, it seems to me, which allow us to deny a limine such a possibility. As to the " identifying the lamp," it must be kept in mind that we here have not two psychical events, firstly, the seeing, and secondly the identifying, but only one ; the lamp seen the second time is quite immediately a different thing psychically from the lamp seen the first time. There is no need there fore to refer to the brain in the midst of the second portion of our series. It was for this reason that we said the brain must have been altered by a " first " stimulus with respect to its reacting to the same stimulus the second and third time. I fully agree here with the excellent analysis of " recon naissance " given by Bergson.1

But let us return to the three portions of our conscious series. The first of them, as we now have learned, ends in such a cerebral act as will allow the second portion to go on in its specificity ; and this second portion, of course, ends by allowing the appearance of the last portion. The second portion alone is not of a cerebral character at all, but at both its ends it is connected with cerebral phenomena. There are very important consequences resulting from this funda mental relation.

1 Mature et M^noire, Paris, Alcan. Relimke, on the other hand, though a partisan of the "interaction" theory, regards what we shall call the "intrapsychical series " as permanently broken by cerebral acts ; compare his Psychologic, and his excellent little book, Die Seele des Menschen. second portion of our conscious series as contrasted with its first and third portion. It is well understood, I hope, that in the whole of the present discussion we have only been dealing with pheno mena of consciousness : we have studied how one state of my consciousness is influenced by a former one and influ ences a later state ; in this respect all of our objects have been " psychical " ones. But, in spite of that, the psychical phenomena we have studied differ from one another in so far as their first and their third portion consist in conscious phenomena which have the peculiarity of being objectified by the Ego as relating to what is called " my body " and " my brain " in particular, whilst the second portion of the series of our phenomena is not objectified in such a manner, but is either objectified to so-called " other things," the lamp for instance, or not objectified at all. Without forgetting, therefore, that the phenomena we study are without excep tion psychical, let us give the name of " intra-psychical series " to that second portion of the whole of our conscious series of subjective events which does not stand in relation to my so-called body in any respect.

And now let us abandon our strictly subjective view and let us look upon the Given as science does. We, of course, have no intention of taking a leap into realism ; the " Given " will not cease to be a phenomenon to me, but we now shall call " Nature " or " the Objective " that part of the sum of phenomena presented to me which I am forced to relate to so-called bodies in space ; and out of this " Nature " we in the first place study " my body " as the most immediate object in biology.

If we now try to relate the results of our discussion to " my body " in this sense of " my object," we find the most remarkable fact that certain processes which we are forced to regard as going on in my body may show a gap in the midst of them, so that there exists a point where their consecutive univocal line is interrupted in such a manner that it is impossible to understand its second half from its first half, as far as bodily processes — i.e. conscious phenomena objectified as relating to " my body "- —are concerned. There is " reality " between the two halves as far as states presented to conscious ness are reality, but there is no reality between them as regards " my body."

From our subjective point of view we gave the name " intra -psychical - series " to that line of conscious events which fills the gap in the whole of the phenomena ; from the point of view of natural science we are not allowed to do so, we are not allowed to mix up psychical elements with phenomena which have been objectified into so-called physical ones. But now there must be created some sort of scientifically legitimate correlate to the intra -psychical series of the subjective point of view as advocated before. Here then we meet our old friend the " psychoid" again, a sort of entelechy as a natural factor.

We thus have shown on the mere basis of subjective or introspective analysis that vitalism is not only possible but necessary as far as " my body " is regarded as an object of biology. From the point of view of strict idealistic episteinology, which studies " Givenness " without any meta physical assumptions at all, the phenomenological series of conscious states related to my body is broken by a series of states which cannot be related to that body in any sense. Psychology can fill this gap in the bodily world by the " intra-psychical series " ; science has to restrict itself to saying merely l that there is a natural factor concerned in the events going on in my body, a factor which is an " intensive manifoldness " and may be called " psychoid."

Thus phenomenological idealism leads ly itself straight on into vitalism, at least for one single object of biology — my body. It now remains for us to pass beyond the limits between " my body " as a natural object and other living realities, in order to establish our directly proved vitalism in the most general form ; and this transition is by no means difficult. The first step leads from my body as a pheno menon objectified into a constituent of Nature to the bodies in Nature which are very similar to mine : to the bodies of other men. We have actually proved that the behaviour of my body in Nature cannot be understood by a mere

1 Modern authors very often do not appreciate clearly this state of things. Everything we know about is "psychical," they say, and in this way a real " monism " or " psycho-monism " is the end. That is certainly true, but is at the same time of no use to natural science. Natural science deals with objectified spatial phenomena, and its only aim is to discover the principles and laws that are valid for these. Therefore with regard to spatial pheno mena exclusively the problem of "mechanism or vitalism" arises. That the complete series of phenomena which are immediately presented to consciousness is not a " mechanistic " series — even if the word "immediate " is understood in an enlarged meaning— is self-evident ; the terms " mechanism " and "vitalism " lose their meaning in this field.