The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

There is, indeed, one difference between visible constella tions which are the effect of entelechy and those which result from acting. The first are points of manifestation of vitalistic factors themselves — at least as long as life endures, as long as there is no corpse; the latter are inorganic constellations or machines, and in this sense correspond to a corpse only. "Die Tiitigkeit ist in ihr Produkt libergegangen," as Hegel says — activity has gone over into its product. But this difference does not come into account in our present considerations. We know from our previous discussion that it is not a fundamental difference.

After these preparations let us set to work. Let us try to find out in which departments of the whole of nature real individualising processes may occur or may have occurred — at least hypothetically ; in which fields the concept of individual unity is justifiable. We know that we should be able to find what we are searching for whenever there were such combinations or sequences of states or events as are " teleological," at least in our well-defined descriptive meaning of this word.1 In this case, and in this case only,2 there at least may be more than aggregates or sums, whilst otherwise nature, except in

1 By these words we most decidedly exclude from "teleology" everything that does not relate to combinations or sequences as such. We therefore cannot agree with those who have regarded certain forms of the most fundamental mechanical principles under a "teleological" aspect. In the " principle of least action " there is nothing teleological ; the principle is only another expression of the principle of causality with regard to Euclidean space. See my Naturl>eyri/c, pp. 47 and 97 ; also Petzoldt, Maximft, Minima uiul Oeconomie, 1891. Something similar is true with regard to the principles that bear the names of Lenz and Le Chatelier, in electricity and physical chemistry.

2 With reference to what has been called " Gestaltqualitaten " (Ehrenfels) or "fundierte Inhalte" (Meinong) by modern psychologists, we may say that all cases of individuality — organic or inorganic — would be subsumed under these concepts— which, by the way, are purely psychological — but not conversely. the individual organism, might be said to show us always the same ultimate entity — the ultimate element of matter, in purely external combinations.

But unfortunately the term " teleology " must be under stood in the following analysis much more vaguely than it was in our previous descriptive introduction (page 129). We shall not be able either to establish any near analogy with " my acting " or to discover real " purposes of nature " in the sense of Kant ; we must be satisfied, if we can dis cover anything whatever like a " whole " or a " unity," or a " purpose," and thus all that is to follow will hardly be more than the statement of subjects for future research.

In the first place we refer to the phenomena of human culture once more, as revealed in human history. We have denied on a previous occasion that there is any positive right at present to maintain that any group of cultural or historical phenomena is more than a cumulation of the actings of psychoidal and moral individuals. We quite certainly know nothing at present about such a unity. But it is important to notice that the problem is raised even by ourselves. Categorical individuality is at work ; it sets us a scientific task — an eternal task perhaps.

As in the study of the individual organism, the problematic categorical theory of culture, of course, would have to begin its analysis by showing, in the first place, that there is some kind of descriptive-teleological unity as the subject of further study. I confess we do not even know this yet. We do not see any complication or progress in human history that might not be explained as a cumulation in the easiest way. As far as we know, the State — in the widest sense of this word — is the sum of the acting of all the individuals concerned in it, and is not a real " individual " itself.

Of course, even if some kind of construction or real individual unity in culture were proved, the problem of an immanent autonomous cultural and historical factor would still be unsolved. There might perhaps some day be found such a factor — in the so-called " unconscious " or " subconscious " sphere, but teleology in history, if there were such a thing at all, might also be " machine-like " qua teleology. Of course that would not mean to say in this case that human culture is to be understood mechanically — the entelechian individuals which form part of it would contradict such an hypothesis from the very beginning — but it would express that the individual construction at a given state of culture qua construction is the effect of a construction of an earlier state, which again follows from an earlier construction, and so on ad infinitum ; the word construction relating here to the velocity and arrangement of matter in space and the arrangement of organic individual persons. In either of the two possible cases just mentioned there would be something above a mere sum of historical individuals, whether it were active at present or had been active at a certain moment of the past.

Thus the problem of historical teleology in any sense must remain an open question — a categorical task.1 1 It' history were evolution throughout, no place would be left for the concept of a "historical possibility"; if it were partly evolutionary, this concept would be applicable in but a very restricted manner. The discussion But might we not find something like a teleological unity in the dements of the historical process, in the life of the single human individual ? Is there anything like unity or purposefulness in my own life and in your life, the word life to be understood here as the sum of all, or at least part of all, that has happened to you ? I believe that all of us have a certain amount of experience inclining us to give an affirmative answer to this question — but I doubt if it is strong enough to be considered as a scientific fact as certain as Newton's law of gravitation. That degree of certainty, however, would be necessary.

As to a " phylogeny " or history of the different forms of the Living in general, we have confessed that we know absolutely nothing, except that " Darwinism " and " Lamarckism " are equally unable to solve the problem. There may be a real re'Xo? to be attained in phylogeny, but there may also be autonomy in phylogeny, and yet the pedigree of the organisms may be a mere cumulation and not a real teleological constellation.1 Of course, the re'Xo? of possibility — objective and subjective possibility— as such is, of course, beyond the scoj>e of these lectures, and so is the analysis of the relation of "possibility" to the concepts of determination in general and freedom (comp. Max Weber, Archiv f. Sozialiviss. 22, p. 143). I only say here that from the highest point of view there is not much room for objective "possi bility " at all, fitter in the face of mere causality or in the face of "individu ality," since both of these are subclasses of determination — at least in the objective sphere (comp. page 304).

1 Comp. vol. i. page 30f>. l»ergson, in bis Ltvolntion creatrice, also advocates an autonomous but endless phylogeny. as such might again be due to intrinsic or constellative and machine-like teleology. There are few domains in science where we are so ignorant as we are here. Thus the category of individuality only establishes tasks in biology, except so far as the personal individual is concerned. But is there not one class of facts which seems to show beyond any doubt a purposefulness that exceeds the range of the biological individual as such ? Yes, there is a class of organic phenomena, which have been mentioned only quite incidentally so far, since they have nothing to do with what we have studied almost exclusively, the organic personal individual. I refer to the simple phenomenon of propagation.

We have already studied inheritance, that is, the fact that the young organism resembles its parents. We have also analysed the significance of the development of the egg of an animal, or any sort of germ or bud whatever. The manifestation of entelechy, as we called it, in an egg or germ was found to be a mere subclass of universal restitution of fragments, in its ontological sense. But we have not said a single word about the significance of the individual organism's actively producing " fragments," to be developed under the control of entelechy. The problem is certainly unique.1

Have we not here the very source of all that can be teleological or " individual " in a higher than the ordinary 1 This problem, of course, has nothing to do with the problem of sexual propagation, shortly mentioned at vol. i. p. 33. I feel unable to add anything positive to the critical remarks there ; the problem is beyond us at present. sense ? Does it not seein as if propagation as such were to serve a supra-personal purpose ? In any case, in no other sense can propagation be understood at all,1 and it is therefore that we mention it in this connexion and in no other. But here also we know nothing.

Let us now proceed to the analysis of a certain type of problematic teleology which also relates to supra-personal life, but is not historical in any sense. Nobody at the present day, so far as I am aware, conceives teleologically in any way the origin of islands, mountains, clouds, rivers, or any other form of inorganic combinations on the earth. But such teleology, at least con ceived statically, played an important role in the eighteenth century. And in the same way the different types of organisms were considered as being in mutual teleological correspondence, animals indeed in their present state being certainly unable to exist without plants. This is the real concept of a harmony in nature, both organic and inorganic.

But the concept of this harmony with regard to the Inorganic goes still deeper, from geology and geography to inorganic elementalities : the properties of iron and salt are regarded as instances of " harmony," and so is the fact that water attains its greatest density at -f 4° C. and not at freezing-point. 1 The only i>os.sible objection to this view seems to be as follows : eutelechy might know that it cannot overcome inorganic j»otentials for indefinite time and might therefore secure points of future manifestation. But even this would be "supra-personal" to a certain extent.

teleology relating to the sequence of one state of politics or economy upon another, and apart from phylogeny, there seems to me to be a certain sound foundation in the concept of the general harmony between organic and inorganic nature, a something which seems to show that nature is nature for a certain purpose. But I confess at the same time that I am absolutely unable to consider this purpose in any other than a purely anthropomorphic manner. Let us now try to examine in a systematic way to what classes of inorganic or organic constellations any kind of teleological harmony possibly might relate. Of course, any such harmony would be merely statical in the first place, i.e. a given teleological arrangement and no more. But it would be much if even that could be proved.

As to the different types of matter and forces, physics and chemistry try to understand atoms, molecules, and crystals as mere states of equilibrium of one elemental material. The possible forms of equilibrium would be guaranteed by the nature of space from such a point of view. But what about the specific distribution and relative frequency of the different classes of inorganic materiality ? These, of course, are the consequences of a former specific distribution, which in turn is the consequence of a still earlier one. Is there anything in any of these distributions that is of the character of a teleological unity ? The only way by which this hypothetic unity might possibly be recognised as such would be the demonstration that it has some relation of purposefulness with regard to organic beings. That certainly sounds very " anthropomorphic," but we must never forget that in no other manner would it be possible here to get even the mere starting-point for a " supra-biological " or

" supra-personal " teleology, so to speak, of the future. Of an immanent or entelechian teleology we most decidedly know absolutely nothing in this domain of nature — were it other wise, our task would not be difficult. Thus the only thing we can do teleologically is to search for some point among inorganic specificities of constellation, which might possibly relate to some imaginable purpose. And the organisms alone can be such purposes. In this way the frequency and distribution of salt and of iron, and the remarkable properties of the ever-present water indeed do serve to assist important functions of all organisms and of men, and so does the separation of oceans and continents on the earth. But we shall postpone the further discussion of this central question until we have reviewed another type of possible individuality or teleology in the Inorganic.

It is not the specific distribution and frequency of the types of matter to which I refer, but the general distribution of masses in the cosmic universe. And, on the other hand, it is not with a possible mere general " harmony " that we shall deal here exclusively, but with the problem whether there may be found in the inorganic universe such types of constellation — or perhaps even dynamical events — as might allow us to speak of real inorganic individuals, or, strange to say, inorganic organisms. Of course this is quite a different logical problem from the problem of a general harmony of the universe, with man as its purpose. Our new problem, so it seems, is much less " anthropomorphic " than the problem of harmony.

Many cosmic constellations of masses, like the single planetary systems, for instance, are very typical in their specificity, as far as we know, and are not reducible to any sort of mere symmetry in space, as the chemical elements are on the theory of electrons. Now it certainly is by no means proved at present that categorical teleology is appli cable to planetary or sidereal systems, that there is anything like individuality to be found in them. But, on the other hand, it must be granted that such a view may be possible and may be proved some day, and we know that not only Fechner, in an almost poetical form, but also other philosophers, regarded planetary systems as real " organisms." This statement, of course, would not prevent a certain sort of " harmony " with regard to life from also being realised in planetary arrangements. We may raise the question in this connexion, whether a bacterium, endowed with human reason and living somewhere in the body of man, would be able to discover the wholeness and dynamico-teleological nature of its host, and would not prefer to say that, as far as it could judge, there was no reason for applying the category of teleology, even in the statical sense, to the very strange and apparently " contingent " constellation in which it was living. It may be possible that we are playing the part of this bacterium as regards planetary or sidereal arrangements.

What is actually known about the specificity of sidereal arrangements, apart from planetary systems in particular, relates in the first place to the remarkable formation of the Milky Way and the distribution of many star-systems in its plane. All this proves that there is at least a sidereal arrangement of a rather typical character. about a harmony or a truly teleological and individual constellation either in the general distribution of kinds of matter or in planetary or sidereal arrangements. But there are some approximations at least to a general statical harmonious teleology with regard to living beings and man.

To deny inorganic teleology in any form would ultimately be the same as to admit contingency as the exelusive feature of inorganic specificity of constellation. The term " contingency " has two different meanings in common use. With regard to necessity, philosophy must maintain that nothing happens in nature that is not univocally determined, and that therefore nothing is " contingent " ; but as to events at this very point in space and at this very moment of time, philosophy may speak of the contingency of their happening here and now, whenever it is not possible to discover anything like a wholeness or a plan to which their local and temporal appearance is due. Contingency in this sense is the same as nonteleology,1 whilst contingency in the other meaning is in admissible to critical philosophy altogether.2

If now we wish to express our general result with regard to the problem of any non-biological teleology or 1 It is worth noticing that the term "contingency" only acquires a clear meaning when opposed to teleology ; it is a negation. But this proves that teleology (or rather, individuality) is a category. - A fuller discussion of the problem would belong to general philosophy. Comp. also page 304 and page 345, note. individuality by using the term contingency, we may say as follows : — With reference to sidereal and planetary arrange ments as such,1 and with reference to phylogeny and history, we are unable at the present day to prove the existence of any noncontingency. But this is no final answer at all, the task founded upon the category of individuality remains. With reference to a general harmony between inorganic nature and the organisms, and among the organisms themselves, there seems to be something more than a mere task.

For, as we have said, there are some inklings of a supra-personal harmony, at least from an anthropomorphic point of view, some inklings of a general sort of statical harmony in the whole of nature, as the old naturalists asserted. In fact, this word " harmony " is the only one that seems to be applicable to the few points we are able to assert positively about our subject. In any case the cosmos is such that organic life (and man's life in particular) is guaranteed in it, at least on the earth's surface.

given state of the Organic is not the result of purposefulness 1 This preliminary result is unaffected by certain analytical investigations of the last few years, especially those of V. Goldschmidt, which have dis covered something like a general law governing the type of a planetary system as a whole. If the distances of the single planetary orbits from the centre do in fact always follow a comparatively simple formula, it may be owing to the state of aggregation of their material at the moment of their formation, and may be a mere question of probability.

existence under the circumstances that prevailed. But to this objection to teleology as foreboded in mere harmony we again object on our part that this presentment of the facts is powerless to do away with the simple truth that, Givenness being what it is, one thing does occur in favour of the other. In fact, there are teleological relations between different organisms, between plants and the sun, and between water and functions of life in general. Things are so, we say, and therefore there is a certain harmony amongst the elemental constituents of nature, at least with regard to their specific distribution.

As to anything more than a mere harmony of the kind just described there are, of course, no logical reasons why the constellation of the inorganic world as such or of history as such should not be regarded as merely contingent through out and as due to an indefinite line of contingencies in the past, always determined from moment to moment by mere probability. In this case the task propounded by the category of individuality with regard to the Inorganic itself or to history as such would appear as factually insoluble. But since we actually discover some sort of harmony between the manifestations of entelechy and the distribution of inorganic realities, do not at least some features of the primordial constellation of the inorganic world seem to gain a special teleological importance, do they not seem to be harmonious for entelechy, and does not thereby the contingency of inorganic constellation cease to be " con tingency " at least in certain spheres ? Does not the nature of the probability of inorganic constellations seem to be specified in a way that at least suggests a limited purpose ?

We shall come back to this problem from another point of view, and we will only add here that to admit teleology of only a limited character implies a very important con ception of the ultimate character of the Given as such. Morality as a Standard of Measurement of Universal Teleology A rather serious objection against the purposefulness of one organism in favour of another follows from the considera tion that it does not agree with our ideas of what ought to be, that one class of organisms nourishes at the cost of pains and death to another. This objection is more important than any other, to human feeling at least, though a critical mind would hardly be inclined to call it decisive. For we do not know the means that were at the disposal of the hypothetic supra-personal entelechy that must be regarded as having made natural harmony. Nothing, of course, but the solution of the problem of the sense and meaning of the Given could furnish an answer about any type of universal teleology. We can do absolutely nothing in the face of this problem beyond simply stating that the only sphere in which we should be able to conceive such a solution at all would be that of morality and intellectuality. If there were a meaning in the universe with relation to these two purposes — which may be one purpose in the last resort — we at least should be able to conceive it.

Thus morality and intellectuality become the standard of measurement of all universal teleology in any sense, and therefore morality once more enters into our theoretical discussions. Let me now say a few additional words about the con cept of morality from a merely ontological point of view, so as to accentuate what we have said on this point on a former occasion. Morality, as a form of judging, is also a category, like causality and individuality.1 Conceiving it in this way we guarantee the unity of the Given, whereas if we regarded morality as something absolutely different from any other kind of dealing with the Given we should be dividing reality into two parts absolutely irreconcilable with one another. No matter what the special so-called content of morality may be, morality in its most general categorical sense comes into play whenever the relation of two or more active entelechian manifestations to each other is the subject of reflection. And morality as a category is as " constitu tive " as any other category, and not merely regulative, since moral acting individuals are real constituents of nature." I finally " understand " morality — just like causality and individuality — psychologically, since I myself may be one of the individuals in question.

Thus morality has its place first in the system of categories, secondly in nature, thirdly in psychology — as all categories have.3 1 There is a great difference between morality and moralising. Theoretical ethics is the description of an ideal and is intellectual in the last resort. There is no such thing as "you must," but only "so it ought to be." There fore the personal moral character of an author has nothing to do with his moral theory. 2 Comp. page 320 f.