The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

3 Tilings would turn out differently if all morality were merely apparent, the community of men being in fact one supra-personal individual unity using the biological individuals as means. See page 121. In this case morality might possibly be regarded as the mere psychological or subjective It is a very important — and very strange — characteristic of the category of morality that it almost always appears in the form of a negation. We judge that something " ought not to happen," but it would in most cases — though not in all — be very difficult for us to say with absolute certainty what " ought to happen." l With regard to history in particular, we therefore might say that there was a real evolution in it if we were able to assert that the sum of what ought not to happen becomes less during the historical process in a not merely cumulative way. It is worth noticing that not a word has been said about " freedom," " responsi bility," and such like in this short theory of morality.

Morality relates to individuals and to individuals only." Historical cumulations of any kind therefore can be binding in a moral sense only if what they ask does not contradict the immediate relation of individual to individual. This is very important in practical life. We now come to a very important relation between morality and all vitalism. The assertion of morality implies the assertion of cntelcchy, just as entclechy implies causality and substance.

correlate of supra-personal individuality, and not as a category for itself. May we say perhaps that "morality" on its own part guarantees the suprapersonal unity in history and culture that we are in search of (see p. 344 f.) ? 1 But morality must have some sort of content. Mere "formal " morality, like that of Kant, would be as valueless as a statement of the existence of categories of " relation " which did not specify what they are. But a theory of morality is not the business of this work.

- Let me add once more : not to individuals that form part of a higher truly "individual" constellation, such as the State has been supposed to be. In this case the individuals would only be means of the supra-individuum. entelechy are connected in such a way that to assert the former is equivalent to asserting the latter, and to deny the latter is to deny the former. In this sense vitalism is the high road to morality : morality would be an absurdity without it.

How could I feel " morally " towards other individuals, if / knew that they were machines and nothing more ? — machines, which some day I myself might be able to construct like a steam engine ! To a convinced theoretical materialist, to whom his neighbour is a real mechanical system, morality is an absurdity. This is equally true, whether materialism be held as a doctrine about nature from a point of view which is idealistic and phenomenological at bottom, or professed in the crudest uncritical metaphysical manner. In either case the mechanical theory of life is incompatible with morality. It is of no avail to assume — as some have done — that there might be a something non-mechanical " appearing " under the form of a mechanical system ; wholeness can never " appear " in the form of that which is not wholeness but aggregation per definitionem.1 When an author feels morally and con siders objective human relations morally in spite of his materialistic conviction with regard to life, he unconsciously gives up his materialism. It is very strange to see what an enormous confusion of thought generally prevails in this region.

There might be vitalism without morality ; but the categorical existence of morality implies vitalism as an axiom, even if it were not yet established Inj oilier proofs. But enough about a problem that does not strictly belong to our subject. The main reason for our discussing morality has yet to be mentioned. 1 This was also our argument against psycho-physical parallelism, see p. 289. OUR whole argument has rested so far upon pure idealistic phenomenalism ; we have analysed the Given so far as it certainly is my phenomenon. In this sense, forces and entelechies were agents in nature as part of my Givenness, they were concepts auxiliary to the understanding of Givenness.

Is there really no way to escape from phenomenalism to something absolute, to " metaphysics," that is to say, to something that is not exclusively " my phenomenon " ? And what does all our argument amount to on a metaphysical basis ? It seems to me that there are three possibilities, three windows, as I might say — though dim windows only — through which at least we are able to see that there is such a thing as absoluteness. By no means do I believe that I am able to " prove " absoluteness in the proper sense of the word. We cannot " prove " the inconceivable. And absoluteness implies unintelligibility in the sense of provableness, otherwise it would not be absoluteness but phenomenality. I know very

well that the whole of Givenness is my Givenness, whether immediately perceived or conceptually transformed, that all sensations are mine, and all feelings and all concepts and categories. All of this " is " with regard to me, and I properly " know " nothing else about it. In so far critical subjective idealism is quite right. But to adhere to this idealism implies the renunciation of understanding altogether, at least in three fields of phenomenality. There are three regions of phenomenality which never will form part of any true system of Givenness, unless the bounds of idealism are broken. But they only can be broken with regard to the fact of something which " is " not exclusively with respect to the Ego,1 just as from a room with windows of groundglass we may perceive the " fact " that there is something outside without knowing in any way what it is.

Thus we are able at least to approach the realm of that which alone deserves the name of truth with regard to being. The word " truth " in this sense, of course, signifies something very different from what is called so in logic and mathe matics, logical and mathematical truth being only the validity of relations with regard to a subject.2 1 Of course, even the words "something" and "is" are only used figura tively in this connexion. If not, the "Absolute" would not be absolute. This book is not the place for any attempt to pursue this problem further.

- Logical and mathematical truth is certainly "absolute" as to its validity .to long as there exists a subject like the human mind (comp. the very suggestive address delivered before the Third International Congress for Philosophy, Heidelberg, 1908, by ,T. Royce). But it falls to the ground with the existence of the subject, and for this reason, though "absolutely true," it is not "absolute truth" metaphysically. In modem philosophy the theory of validity has overshadowed the theory of being.

Morality is one of the windows to absoluteness we have spoken about. For morality towards phenomena or amongst phenomena which are merely " phenomena " to my Ego exclusively would be absurd. Morality therefore implies absoluteness, independence of the Ego — though this in dependence is absolutely unintelligible to me in any detail. Absoluteness in this sense is not identical with " reality " in the sense of " the Given." " Reality " in that sense remains a constituent of phenomenality and only means that a certain domain of it is objectified. Reality in this sense is nothing but the product of a certain category — the category subject-object. But morality forces us to regard Givenness, or at least part of Givenness, as a field in which something is to be accomplished — by acting — with regard to the Absolute. In conceiving morality I conceive absoluteness : I conceive the " Thou."

It is here that history acquires its importance, as the field of moral acting. It is here that its general emotional importance may become clear. History is not made of any special scientific importance by this consideration, but quite in general it proves to be the groundwork of morality ; morality in general being, of course, independent of the specificity of historical constellations. The second " window into the absolute " is constituted by the fact, already mentioned on a former occasion, that

there is such a thing as the unity of subjective experience in general and of memory in particular ; in other words, the fact that not only self-consciousness itself endures, but also something that is presented to consciousness. This tends to prove the absolute existence of an unconscious or supraconscious basis of the conscious Ego. Phenomenalism of the strictest kind would only allow us to regard as reality what is present to consciousness at one moment. But to say " I " is more than to assert the reality of one moment. It does not imply that the Ego is a " substance," for the Ego creates substances. But it implies the whole of past experience in a partly latent state and therefore implies absoluteness in general — which, of course, must remain quite unintelligible again, since the Ego could only explain its nature by means of the categories which in fact are its outcome.

The last window into the absolute is the contingency of immediate Givenness and the immanent coherence of the single phases of Givenness in spite of its contingency. Let the reason of immediate Givenness be what it may, " I," as the conscious Ego, do certainly not create it consciously out of myself ; it is very often contrary to, or at least indifferent to, my will. And yet there is immanent coherence between the single phases of immediate Givenness nevertheless, even if these phases are interrupted by sleep or by my temporary absence, or by something else. A stone happens to begin to fall from a high mountain : I see it, then turn away for a moment, and then look again : the stone in every case

has arrived just at that point in space where I expected to find it; contingent Givenness, though broken by an interval in its immediateness, is one. " I " am not responsible for it, nor are the " categories " responsible.1 Therefore, to put it briefly : the contingency of the immediately given phenomena, as far as their non-aprioristic part, that is to say, as far as " sensations " or " presentations " come into account, combined with the immanent coherence of this contingency in itself, tends to prove absolute ness with regard to the " It." " It " is now here and now there, now one thing and now another. This is all with respect to the Ego, it is true ; but not by a?- from the Ego.

Our third class of facts that show us absoluteness in general now calls for a further short analysis before we resume from a new point of view our study of universal teleology. Immediate sensible Givenness is the material the categorical system has to work with ; categories establish axioms with regard to this material and thus render it a system itself. In the first place, it must now be added that the Ego is not content with axioms with regard to Givenness, but from the very beginning also forms some postulates concerning it. That is to say : the Ego forms some most general notions, which are by no means absolutely

1 A complete theory of the Absolute would have to consider in this connexion what are generally called "constants " of nature, expressed in the form of quantitative relations ; say the sixes of electrons and atoms. These constants are "contingent" with regard to the reasoning mind ; a theory of matter might reduce them to one or two constants. inevitable, as axioms are, but which are required in order that the range of our actual knowledge may be selfconsistent We have mentioned the most central one of these postulates whilst dealing with our first proof of vitalism.1 We can work experimentally only with a few eggs of the sea-urchin, but we postulate that what holds for one holds for them all. This postulate is by no means identical with the " axiom " of univocality or necessary determination, whether in relation to causality or to individuality. The axiom of univocality would remain true even if our postulate were given up. If ever two eggs of an animal behaved quite differently, we should not say that circumstances being equal different things had happened ; but we should say : the circumstances were not equal. But we postulate that nature is so uniform — I do not say " constant " — in itself that when a certain number of typical features are present there most probably will be also those, which in many cases have been found to be actually in connexion with them. It is most important that the distinction between this postulate and the aprioristic axioms should be most clearly understood. The axioms, based upon the categories as such, relate to the (liven as phenomenon in general ; they are the prerequisites of experience, of "understanding": they set up scientific tasks. The postulate relates to the Given in its specificity and apparent contingency ; it maintains that there is uniformity in the contingency ; it is a question of induction ; it is induction enlarged ideologically with regard to the possibility of science.2 As all specificity and contingency of immediate

- Modern empiricism, economism, humanism, pragmatism, or whatever it may be called, has always confused axioms with the ]x>stulate. Givenness tends to prove the Absolute, the postulate of the uniformity of nature relates to absoluteness itself. We have said before that applying the category of individuality or teleology to all Givenness forms at least an unending task, and we have raised the question whether the distribution of specific qualities of matter and of specific geographical and geological formations on earth, or the specific distribution of sidereal and planetary masses might some day be found to have some purpose, either in itself or at least for man. And we did not absolutely deny that in history also some unity might be found in the future. The problem of what we called a " limited " teleology now calls for some further elucidation in the first place.

How far into the Specific of immediate Givenness does teleology possibly go ? Granted that there is purposefulness — at least of the statical or constellative type — in the specific distribution of matter and sidereal masses with regard to the welfare of organisms : how far does this purposefulness go ? Does it possibly extend to the most minute singularities ? Then the whole universe would be one teleological unity in every detail. Nay : then only would it be " one universe " throughout. Only then would there be no " contingency " whatever.

But have we any reason to assume — even granting a good deal of supra-personal individuality — that it is purposeful in any sense of the word that a week ago it rained for five minutes, or that this morning I met three dogs of a certain colour, or that a particular stone shows certain irregularities on its surface ? I think hardly anybody, even if inclined to accept universal teleology, would care to push his teleological arguments as far as this, that is to say, right up to immediately " historical " singularities. Teleology must be at least intelligible by analogy in order that it may be admitted hypothetically ; and the reason for its being intelligible is absolutely wanting if any event whatever is regarded as an outcome of its control.

We have discussed this problem of a " limited teleology " before, though not in relation to the very immediateness of the Given. In fact, man is only able to judge about external purposefulness according to his own purposes, and the highest purpose of man is intellectuality and morality, both of which are perhaps the same in the last resort. But the universe is not perfect with regard to morality and intellectuality throughout, and therefore cannot appear to us as teleological throughout. Perhaps we may say that it is purposeful so far as it allows of the moral and intellectual perfection of the individual man, that it is a sort of moral and intellectual institution. That would agree with certain doctrines of Indian and Christian philosophy ; it would also agree with the metaphysics of the last great moral philosopher- Schopenhauer.

Thus, I believe, we may say hypothetically, summarising at the same time what we have said before : There are probably domains of — at least past — eutelechian manifesta tions in the universe, both inorganic and supra-personally organic. The harmony in nature, statical at present, is their result. But the universe is not in every historical detail a teleological system ; at least the human mind is unable to conceive it as a " universe " throughout. There is " contingency," i.e. non-teleology, in the universe, not only apparently but really.1 In other words, real teleological constellations in the Inorganic — if discoverable at all — would only relate to a mutual harmony among different classes of events with special reference to organic life in general, but would not apply to this particular event at this particular time and place. Problematic real teleological constellations in history would only relate to general types of the human mind, but not to the single personalities as such.

It is very important in this connexion to notice well that even in the only field where dynamically effective individuality is known to us — in the biological individual — this individuality seems not to be concerned in the minutest details : the single cells of a tissue are not as such a really essential constituent of organisation. And another point is very important also : wherever the category of individuality extended so far into the details as to submit everything that happens in any system to the immediate control of an entelechy or — in the statical manner — at least to some such control in the past, there would either be no room for causality at all,2 or causality, at least, would always be posterior to individuality. But it is not imaginable that individuality is actively at work — as dynamical teleology or entelechy — or has been at work, if

1 We have said before that the contingency of immediate Givenness tends to show us the "fact" of absoluteness. This concept of the contingency of immediate Giveuness, of course, must not be confused with the concept of the contingency or non-teleology of "ideal nature." 2 This would be the mistake of the materialists, only made from the other side! it finds nothing to work with. It wants " means," and matter including spatial causality is its means — in the manner we have described. Thus, in fact, as we have said, individuality by no means destroys but implies causality ; it would be an impossibility without it ; it interferes — or has interfered — with causality here and there, but not everywhere.

At this point we shall apply our results about teleology to what we have learnt about the Absolute. It was known already to Kant that our faculty of creating a real " system " of immediate plienomenological Givenness proves a certain sort of correspondence between the active and the passive part of experience, between categories or rather " ontological prototypes " and sensible Givenuess itself. For sensible Givenness might be imagined to be such as not to allow of any special order at all. In this case the mere concept of univocal determination would be awaked by experience in the mind, but there would not even be a field of substance or causality, for causality or substance as categories would not be awakened by a chaotic Givenness.

But this most general question does not affect our bio-theoretical problem as such. Let us therefore turn to a narrower field of analysis. It would not be impossible to imagine a world in which only the category of substance were applicable — change would be wanting in such a world. And it would not be impossible to imagine a world deprived of entelechy but endowed with causality — there would be no organisms in such a world ; the only realm of the category of individuality

would be my mind. But there is true causality and true individuality not only in my Ego but in the world as it is. That is to say : sensible or immediate Givenness corresponds to the categorical system most fully. This is a fact, and this fact relates to absoluteness whenever specific Givenness in its contingency and coherence tends to absoluteness. Might we say perhaps that there exists a common meta physical basis both of immediate Givenness and of our being able to " understand " it by means of the categories ?

Certainly, individuality does not govern Givenness in every detail. But the contingency of the universe in certain domains does not exclude noncontingency in certain others — in the organisms and possibly in some other constellations. What does that mean with regard to the Absolute, now that we know that objectified Givenness tends to show us something about the Absolute ? In the first place we have a factual right to say : whereever the reasoning mind finds organic living individuals, it finds objectified active reason or active reason as its object. Absoluteness in this respect therefore must be such as to be in some — unintelligible — connexion with something like reason. Or, if we prefer to say so : * absoluteness must be such as to be able to become part of our phenomenological Givenness under the form not only of causality, substance, and inheritance, but also of individuality, i.e. objectified reasoning.

1 The following formulation is probably more "Kantian" than is usually admitted. Kant was not an "idealist" to the extent that Schopenhauer supposed. Coinp. Riehl, Der philosophische Kriticismus, i., 2. Aufl., 1908. right to speak of certain constellations in givenness, other than organisms, which are teleological in the sense of a statical harmony of nature. It is true, this harmony is statical, it is a teleology of constellation, of being, not a teleology in becoming as the teleology in organisms is. One state of this statical teleology leads back to an earlier state, which again leads back, and so on, one of these states following from the other mechanically. At least we know absolutely nothing about any real entelechian non-mechanical act in the sphere of the Inorganic.

But does not this hypothetic statical harmony among certain domains of nature point back to an original primary entelechy that made it just as the artist makes an object of art ? In spite of the possibility of the indefinite regressus in time that we meet here, it seems to me that the mind is forced to assume this primary eutelechy in the universe — I do not say "of" the universe — as soon as a universal natural harmony of any kind is accepted. This primary entelcchy would not have created absolute reality, but would have ordered certain parts of it, and these parts therefore would show a sort of non-contingent constellation whilst all other constellation of the elementalities of the universe would be contingent.