The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

This is downright " Dualism," the old distinction between v\rj and i/ouv. But how are we to escape dualism when even the categorical system of relations is dualistic through out ? Passive Givenness also shows us causality and entelechy strictly separated, and whenever Givenness tended to absoluteness,1 absoluteness would do the same. It is true that metaphysical assumptions about the unity of the Ego might seem to guarantee us the possibility of " monism," but as soon as the Ego becomes active, it evolves its unity into manifoldness and therefore is unable to discover monism anywhere.

In the sense of a primary entelechy of order of constella tion in the world, as a 877^01^709 in opposition to mere " material," the concept of God therefore appears as an eternal task of science ; unintelligible in the last resort, as all religions maintain, and only approachable by analogies, like all absoluteness. For it only is through ground-glass windows, as it were, that we are allowed to look into absoluteness ; we only know the " fact " of the Absolute absolutely ; whilst bound to our categorical system, we only know quite vaguely the " how " of the Absolute.

Thus <( natural theology " is possible in the sense of a scientific task, but in no other. There certainly is some thing that appears to us as reason in Givenness, viz. the 1 To be quite clear : The problem of the contingency or non-contingency or limited non-contingency of the universe, and further, the problem of the primary enteiechy in the universe, relate to Givenness as a conceptual phenomenon ID. the first place. In this field — in opposition to Kant — a clear and satisfying solution of the problem is possible ; the Kantian "antinomies" are immanent, and are probably soluble in the immanent field. It, of course, is quite a different problem whether and how far the solution relates to any thing absolute. Or, to speak in jterms of theology : the physico-teleological proof of God, or anything like a God, may be decisive with regard to God as an entelechian factor in Givenness ; but it is quite another problem whether or not the decision arrived at here relates to the Absolute. This then is the most important thing : all the difficulties and obscurities with regard to the Absolute are not proper to the problem of a " primary entelechy" as such, but come upon the scene as soon as any attempt is made to refer any Characteristics of Givenuess whatever to the absolute sphere. Comp. page 321, note 1.

organisms ; and there probably is more reason than we know decidedly, viz. the harmony, or, to speak in most general terms, the distribution of primordial matter and velocity. Certainly, the " primary entelechy " that natural science allows us to assume hypothetically, and epistemology allows us to refer by analogy to absoluteness, remains far behind any conception of a perfect absolute Being that man is able to form in his mind. But it does not contradict l the con cept of God as formed by the reasoning imagination.

On a former occasion we made a short excursion into the theory of knowledge, showing how, on the basis of the categorical system, the concept of an " ideal nature " is created, and how "natural factors or agents" are established with regard to the single actual and possible events in conceived Givenness. Our former discussion related to inorganic nature as well as to the domain of life. In the face of our present metaphysical considerations, the concepts " ideal nature " and " natural factors " acquire a somewhat different aspect. The whole system of " ideal nature," including the relations of individuality and morality, would appear as a description by analogy of what is absolute : in any case the Absolute is such that it may be described by analogy in this way. But " natural agents " with regard to single events in Givenness, say the fall of a particular stone or the morphogenesis of a particular animal,

1 But science, and the doctrine of entelechy in particular, most strongly contradicts any form of so-called " Pantheism." Rntelcchy and matter are different and external to one another throughout. would now appear as what might be called a sort of emanation from the Absolute, as a something that has its source in the Absolute. With regard to causal force and biological entelechy such an emanation may actually happen before our eyes, as it does in inorganic events and in the living organisms.1 But it also may have happened, if our hypothesis of an individualised general harmony in nature is justified. In this case the Demiurgus that science allows to be established as its eternal task would be the highest t'orrn of all emanations. In all these questions, of course, the problem of time would appear once more.

But our " Science and Philosophy of the Organism " ends here. 1 On a former occasion (page 2dl) \ve have said that the ideal or Platonic existence of entelechy as a constituent of "ideal nature" does not guarantee the permanency of the individuals which are the outcome of its manifestation iu any way. It seems to me that the problem must remain open in the " absolute " sphere also. In brief: in^ivtrfwaZ immortality is not provable ; but then, of course, neither is its opposite. And a spiritual eternity that is not individual is beyond our comprehension except in a eery general and un specified fashion— though this, of course, is no argument against its existence.

" The Science and Philosophy of the Organism " — we have tried to analyse what is implied in these words, and now we have finished our task, to the best of our ability. The science and the philosophy — is this " and " really justified ? Have we really undertaken two different kinds of analytical studies ? It is true the development of the common sea-urchin seems at the first glance rather remote from the concept of categories and morality and universal teleology, and thus it might seem, as many modern philosophers maintain, as if science and philosophy were really two things, only loosely connected.

But there were philosophers in former times — and among them were Leibniz and Hegel — who did not take such a short-sighted view. And I think they are right. Givenness is One and philosophy is the endeavour to understand Givenness. Part of Givenness is sensations, part of it is categories, part of it is feeling, part of it is memory, and there are many other parts. That domain of Givenness which is formed out of sensations and categories we call Nature. It makes no logical difference, it seems to me, whether nature is studied with regard to what it actually is, that is to say, what really happens in it, or whether we try to discover which elemental parts of our mental

organisation come into play in conceiving nature and what " nature " means in the sphere of metaphysics. The first is generally called science, the latter philosophy. But in the last resort there is only one kind of human knowledge. Heterogeneous induction, 12 Historical basis of reacting, 59 ff., 78 f., Spontaneous action, 85 Starfish, righting reactions of, 31, 50, 14 A most praiseworthy and suggestive work — should certainly be studied by every serious thinker." — Morning Post.

u Mr. Hill is decidedly doctrinaire, but his book is packed with scientific and sociological facts, and it gives the reader healthy intellectual exercise." — Christian World. " Shows wide reading, is written in a forcible and clear style, and contains much that is interesting, fresh, and acute." — Aberdeen Free Press. " It is a book of e<jual calibre with Mr. Kidd's and goes even deeper than that remarkable production into the springs of life and conduct." — Methodist Recorder.

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