The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

non-energetical ? Hartmann tries to avoid this difficulty by assuming that entelechy — or, as he calls it, the " Uncon scious " — may transport energy from one axis of space into the other. The energy it needs for the process of turning as such is taken from the one axis and placed at the other : the sum of all the energies remains unaltered, there only are energetical changes with regard to the three chief co-ordinates x, y, and z, and thus the action of the vital principle would pass the boundaries of mechanics, i.e. of inertia, but not of energetics in general. But I can hardly agree that this complication is necessary. Entelechy is a natural agent per se ; why not assume that its action in changing the direction of force and energy is an action "per se " that is implied in its intensive manifoldness ? The true laws of mechanics are broken in any case, and entelechy must by no means be imagined as a mechanical apparatus : it is just the negation of that. We must free ourselves from all the conventional images as completely as possible. You may say if you like that entelechy, when turning a mass particle, acts upon it at right angles to its path — this kind of action requiring no energy — but even thus there would only be a pseudoobedience to the laws of real mechanics, since entelechy must be regarded here as non-energetical, and as interfering with inertia at the same time.

The Suspending and the Transporting Action of Entelechy Discussed Together If now we consider the theoretical probability of the two possible ways in which entelechy or anything non-mechanical whatever may influence mechanical systems, it seems to me that our first hypothetic statement dealing with the possibility of a suspension of becoming in mechanical systems offers several advantages which are not afforded by the doctrine of a changing of the direction of forces. Accord ing to the latter theory entelechy would seem to be limited by practically nothing except the amount of existing energy, whilst, according to the former, it would be limited not only by energy as such but also by pre-existing differences with regard to velocities and potentials. And we do in fact see that entelechy is limited and restricted in its actions to a rather high degree. But I confess that the theory of " turning " and thus changing the direction of forces and energies must also be regarded as a possible solution of our problem. In any case it would assume less than any hypothesis about the real creation of energy by entelechy.

Is there any " contradiction " to mechanics in our two statements ? Certainly, as far as the exclusiveness of mechanics is concerned. Wherever there is life in the universe something happens that is not present in the given mechanical constellations as such : something is introduced, not changing the quantitative side but changing the actuality and direction of mechanical events. But I should prefer to speak of a " contrast " instead of a " contradiction."

It might seem as if there were more contrast between entelechy and mechanics than there is between entelechy and energetics, as far at least as the energetics of ordinary text books is concerned. For both of our formulations of the possible relation between entelechy and mechanics assert that a something which is non-energetical interferes, though not with the amount of mechanical energy as a whole yet with inertia, and therefore with the amounts of the two types of mechanical energy respectively. But let us not forget in this place that there also was a great contrast between vital phenomena and the complete " science of inorganic or spatial becoming " that is to be written in the future. Entelechy, as endowed with the faculty of enlarging the amount of diversity in the distribution of given elements, was in opposition to that future science.

Of course, what we have said about entelechy and mechanics would imply most clearly that entelechy can augment any " diversity of distribution." Thus this point does not need any further explanation in this chapter. The work of the " demons " of Maxwell is here regarded as actually accomplished. That life must be most intimately related to the direction of the motion of masses is no uncommon view with physicists and chemists, especially in this country. Lord Kelvin speaks of the organism as endowed with the power of " directing and moving particles," and Tait regards it as simply " unscientific " even to attempt a mechanical ex planation of life. Both these statements * are rather general.

1 Lord Kelvin, Popular Lectures, ii. p. 464 ff. ; Fortnightly Rev., 1892, vol. li. p. 313. Tait, Contemp. Rev., 1878, 31 Jan., p. 298. Lord Kelvin also refers to the impossibility of understanding the fact of inheritance on the theory of an accidental concourse of atoms. Our second proof of vitalism (see vol. i. p. 226) implies the same statement. But, as many of you will know, Professor Japp l some years ago advocated a vitalistic theory that was most markedly based upon the concept of direction. That certain lower organisms are able to consume or to produce only one of a pair of corresponding asymmetrical chemical compounds proves, according to him, that specific direction as an elementality plays a fundamental part in organic life ; besides those organisms only the conscious mind of the chemical experimenter is able to do the same. I should not like to regard the biochemical facts alluded to by Professor Japp as really proving vitalism by themselves — they only prove a certain kind of specific statical teleology, it seems to me — but certainly the role of specific direction in life is most clearly shown by them, and for that reason they are mentioned here.

"We have discussed at full length how entelechy may possibly act with regard to an energetical or a mechanical inorganic system, or in other words, what it may change in any way in such a system. But we have not even mentioned so far the corresponding question : how may changes in any inorganic system affect entelechy ? ]>ut this problem, of course, needs at least to be mentioned as well as the other. In the theory of so-called psychophysical interaction both problems, as a rule, are treated on equal terms : the " Psychical " is regarded not only as affecting the " Physical," but also as being affected bv it.

In the first place we are, 1 think, obliged to inquire whether in the work of entelechy there may occur anything comparable with the Newtonian principle of action and reaction, this principle, of course — as in " electrodynamical mechanics " — being understood in the widest possible ontological sense. Of course, since entelechy is neither an energy nor any factor of the mechanical type, the principle of reaction cannot apply to it in any physico-chemical or

mechanical sense. But, even then, entelechy is an " agent " or a " factor " in nature, entelechy is a something acting univocally with regard to the inorganic, as we know, and therefore there must be something in this relation that is comparable with the principle of reaction in a general logical sense though beyond inorganic causality. For all becoming — not true causality alone — must always be conceived under the form of a mutual interaction. When ever a factor A affects JB, not only is B affected but so is also A. With regard to pure causality this principle holds irrespective of all our special definitions of a " cause," almost all of them being formulated with reference to practical purposes.1 I believe now that we can easily find out how to relate the concept of a " reaction " to entelechy. Entelechy when performing any act in a system becomes changed with regard to its intensive actuality by this act itself ; the " having done " changes its " doing," for doing is no longer necessary after having done. Thus entelechy is affected by the accomplishment of its own performance, in acting as well as in morphogenesis. We here meet the first case in which any kind of affection of entelechy occurs.

We now turn to a short survey of the possible ways in which entelechy may be affected by a mere change in inorganic nature as such. The organism, we know, is a system the single constituents of which are inorganic in themselves ; only the whole constituted by them in their typical order or arrange ment owes its specificity to entelechy. Therefore the single constituents of an organism also stand in energetical or mechanical possible relations to many external constituents of the inorganic universe. These possible relations may disturb the whole as governed by entelechy : by some such disturbance entelechy, in the first place, may be possibly affected, may be called into activity, so to say.

We here meet the problem of the stimuli of restitution and adaptation again. In order that adaptation may happen, the fundamental state of the organism must be disturbed in its normality : this fact affects or calls forth entelechy. In cases of restitution we were not able to state any thing in detail about the precise stimulus that sets this process going : but, since in all restitutions the morphogenetic performance, though occurring on the basis of indefinite possibilities, was always in the most typical and specific relation to what had been disturbed, we were able to say that the stimulus of restitutions is most probably something connected with the specificity of the disturbance of the normal whole. This " something " must be regarded as affecting entelechy.

In. short, morphogenetic entelechy in cases of adaptation or restitution is affected whenever the state of normality, based upon a specific suspension of possible inorganic becoming on the part of entelechy, is changed by the effect of external becoming. Entelechy then at least tries to modify its suspension in such a way as to reduce that external becoming to normality. But such a view fails in the face of normal development. Here, we know, fertilisation or some substitute for it is necessary in order that entelechy may come into action. What does that mean ? It seems to me that we shall meet the point if we assume that fertilisation or its substitute affords here some necessary means, some necessary specific potential differences, as it were, without which entelechy is condemned to inactivity, just as it is in the absence of oxygen. Artificial parthenogenesis, as analysed by Loeb, lends strong support to such an hypothesis. But this would mean that even in the case of normal development entelechy is called into activity in the proper sense ~by missing its normal result where it might exist potentially, and thus normal development would be regarded as a mere example of all restitution. Fertilisa tion or its substitute would thus play a rather secondary part. It would not call forth entelechy by itself, but would only allow entelechy to act after it had been called into activity already by the mere existence of a living fragment of an organism.

Of course, this is no answer to the problem why the organism does actively form " fragments " in the ser vice of " reproduction " ; but this problem leads beyond the theory of " personal " entelechy as the subject of embryology, and will shortly be mentioned again on a later occasion. Any restitution, like normal morphogenesis, is accomplished by a great number of consecutive single performances, or, in other words, single stages. What about the manifestation of each stage by entelechy ? We may say here briefly, I believe, that the spatial existence of, say, the stage A affects entelechy with respect to its performance of the next act leading to stage B. Thus morphogenesis — and not morphogenesis alone — becomes a series of events that occur between matter and entelechy, and vice versa.1

As to the affection of the psychoid or the entelechy of real acting by external inorganic events, we must not forget that the concept of " normality " comes in here only so far as a certain actual liking and willing takes the place of normality ; to will a certain thing at a certain time is " normal " for the psychoid at that time. If we restrict our analysis to such acting as ends in a distinctly visible result, say an object of art or of handicraft, we may say : the psychoid, its specific willing being given, is affected by the very specificity of combination of what there is, compared with what there ought to be according to its willing. In this way a printer will always take up his work at the point where he left it the day before. A similar view would hold with respect to acting in general.

Psychologically all passivity, or rather receptivity of entelechy with regard to external changes, is expressed by 1 We avoid by this formulation the difficult concept of an intra-entelechian "causality," which plays its part, for instance, in Lotze's writings — in a very different form and terminology, of course. It must be granted that introspective psychology might seem to lend support to such a concept — we shall speak ourselves of an " intra-psychical series" on a later occasion — but it is better avoided by the philosophy of nature.

the words sensation and sensibility. We can hardly avoid describing, at least analogically, what mmt happen in the affection of entelechy in general by words similar to these, just as we have spoken of a primary knowing and willing of entelechy. But, of course, our postulate that an affection of all entelechy by external changes must exist and that this affection relates to specificities of order or combination is more important than mere terminology.

As in discussing the affection of morphogenetic entelechy we came back to the stimuli of restitution, so here we could analyse again what we called " individualised stimuli " when we were discussing action. Both times the analysis of the type of affection of the vital " something" itself constitutes a proof of vitalism and forces us to call this " something " entelechy. To sum up : Entelechy is affected and thus called into activity by changes of any normality governed by it which are due to external causes, and these changes do not affect entdecliy as a mere sum of changed singularities but as changes of normality as a, whole.

This point is very important, for, on the other hand, our careful analysis of the relation of entelechy to energetics and mechanics has taught us that the activity of entelechy relates immediately to single inorganic events, though in the service of normality. The fundamental contrast between the affection of entelechy from without and any kind of affection in the Inorganic is well illustrated by the mere fact that in the case of entelechy the affecting inorganic combinations act as totalities. It was for this reason that we said that the " analysis of the type of affection " by itself forms here a proof of the " autonomy " of what happens, whilst in our discussion of the active role of entelechy, with regard to energetics and mechanics, we had to start from the autonomy of life as proved, and had to study what might follow from such autonomy with regard to single effects in inorganic nature.

All changes of normality that affect entelechy are " causes," of course, in so far as they are changes of given realities in space, though their effect is not an immediate spatial effect but one that has passed through entelechy. Qua causes, they are as specific as is their final spatial effect induced by entelechy. Thus we meet the strange fact here that, as regards biology, first cause and final effect are in the most intimate relation to one another with regard to specificity, though not in an immediate relation. This sort of relation between cause and effect occurs nowhere in the inorganic except in pure mechanics, and there in quite another form. A general ontological theory of relation — I do not say of " causality "- —might take advantage of this most important logical fact.

Entelechy related to Space and therefore belonging to Nature, but Entelechy not in Space THE contrast between the Non-living and the Living has appeared in all the discussions of this long part.1 But the contrast always was a contrast with regard to nature, or rather in nature as the " Given " in space. We have at no time lost sight of nature by what we have said. This contrast is indeed of a most fundamental character : there is quite a new type of natural becoming revealed to us, whenever entelechy is at work, actively increasing in a regulatory way the amount of diversity of distribution on account of its intensive manifoldness after it has been affected by individualised stimuli. Inorganic becoming relates to extensities and is measured by energy ; we may say that energy measures the amount of causality which is spatial in

1 The same contrast would appear if we were to relate entelechy to a certain modern type of analysing inorganic systems, i.e. the so-called "principle of phases," which also rests upon aprioristic considerations. I have discussed entelechy under this aspect in my Naturbegriffe, p. 182 ; but it seems to me that the result to be possibly obtained would not repay a long analysis in these lectures. Entelechy is a "parameter" of its own kind helping with the inorganic parameters to determine "equilibrium" and " degrees of freedom." This is the whole result to be obtained.

itself. Entelechy is a diversity or a manifoldness in itself but not in the sense of spatial extensities, therefore it has nothing to do with the amount of spatial causality as such, though it relates to events in space, and therefore it is not measured by energy. In fact, entelechy is affected by and acts upon spatial causality as if it came out of an ultraspatial dimension ; it does not act in space, it acts into space ; it is not in space, it only has points of manifestation in space. This analogy with some theoretical views that are advocated by so-called spiritualists to explain the facts which are admitted by them to exist is a very good description indeed of what happens in any natural system upon which entelechy is acting. At present it must be enough to lay stress upon the great difference * between the two great classes of becoming in nature, both of them, as we know, subject to univocality : the one spatial, extensive, quantitative ; the other non-spatial, intensive, and arranging only ; but both of them realising themselves in spatial events, i.e. in nature.

The Problem of " Entelecliy and Causality " only partly solved But, after all, how does entelechy stand to causality ? Is it a special type of causality itself? I am sorry to say that the answer to this ultimate problem must once more be put off until considerations of another kind have been weighed. 1 It is upon tliis difference as formulated in the text that the very essence of vitalism, of " non-materialism " rests. It matters little how materialism is formulated in detail ; energetics is but a new form of materialism, and is far from being its tfbcrwindung, as Ostwald claims.

We have charged entelechy with the minimum amount of non-physicochemical performing that is possible in regard to its dealing passively and actively with inorganic causality. From the point of view of energy we only admit entelechy as a factor which suspends occurrences that would be possible according to the inorganic order. Perhaps we have charged entelechy with too little, though what we have done stands in harmony with our actual knowledge, which has shown us limits of regulability at many points. Let us not forget that there may exist many realities, which we do not know yet and possibly shall not know for some hundred years, on account of their minuteness perhaps— the word " realities " to be understood here in the sense of " possible objects of experience," as long as metaphysics is excluded. Let us not forget how late the phenomena of radio-activity have become known to us. In other words : there may be still more fundamental actions done by entelechy than those which we at present know of and therefore admit. May not entelechy have an individual ising action upon electrons directly ? And what about the first origin of life ? But here we are already touching some problems which belong to the next chapter.

Perhaps it will really become necessary some day to admit that entelechy not only suspends potentials, but that it creates potentials — perhaps by coupling or chaining uncoupled differences of intensity — and thereby creates * energy; something similar would be expressible in purely dynamical terms. We have no reason to deal more fully here with such an assumption, which, of course, would have to consider the problem of the finiteness or infiniteness of the universe ; for it was our endeavour in this chapter to draw only such theoretical conclusions as are nearly related to known facts.

Let us then close this chapter with a certain considera tion which most intimately relates to biological facts in In all phenomena of morphogenetic regulation and adaptation and of acting we are by no means forced to assume that entelechy by its counteracting inorganic becoming works all along the single phases of the process in question. In adaptation especially it would seem to be quite sufficient for fulfilling the needs of the organism, if entelechy were to break the inorganic chain of events at one special point, the rest being inorganic becoming again. In restitution and acting something very similar may happen. The term " moment of regulation " would be well descriptive of this one special point of happening where entelechy sets in. But we do not know anything special about this problem.1

THE late Eduard von Hartmann says somewhere in his Kategorienlehre that all philosophy has been a struggle about the concept of " substance " ; and I doubt if any one who knows the history of philosophy would say that he is Substance and inherence, in fact, are the most common of all categories ; even the child knows very much earlier how to use them than how to apply causality ; but in spite of that the problem of what is properly to be regarded as " substance " remains the unsolved problem in all the various fields of philosophical research.

The categories of substance and inherence, as all of you know, find their simplest application whenever " things " are regarded as possessing properties, as being the " bearers " of their properties. But science proceeds on its way and soon regards the " being a thing " as a property itself. What sort of a property ? What then is the criterion of not being a property ? We see here that from the very beginning a very remarkable principle of ontology is coming into action, at

first almost hidden to consciousness, but in an advanced stage of philosophy consciously applied : the principle that there must be a something in enlarged givenness which is absolutely unchangeable, and that only this unchangeable something deserves to be called a " substance " definitively. Of course, in our biological lectures we cannot pursue the subject of general ontology and epistemology : so we only mention that inorganic sciences have ended in our days by regarding as the true substance either discrete dynamical points generally called " atoms " — though not in the more restricted meaning of chemistry — or space itself. Space in this sense is not merely a " form of intuition " but is identical with what is generally called " ether " as far as the latter is taken as a continuum. In fact, if you think about all the so-called properties of the " ether " of physicists, you find that all of them are non-properties, or at least nothing but the mere expression of possibilities,1 that they are mere negations and that space alone is left as the substantial continuum, as the bearer of phenomenological reality, at the end of the discussion.

The doctrine which regards space as the inorganic substance applies more strictly than any other the principle of stability, or conservation, or imchangeableness : space cannot even change its " place," whilst all sorts of atoms are changeable according to their position in formal space. But on the other hand this identification of space and substance seems to go too far beyond the common applica tion of the category of substance, which in its most